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Chapter I: Introduction and Purpose of this Study 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
Article 21(3) 1 
 
Elections are a key element of the recognition of human rights (i.e. freedom of 
expression, of assembly and association, etc.) and are a vital and important step in the 
democratization process by giving the opportunity for political participation and 
representation.  
 
Only after the end of the Cold War has the ideal of democratic governance spread 
across the globe, and the importance of transparent and functioning governance 
institutions become widely recognized. Promoting democratic development and 
giving support to the institutions and processes related to elections has become an 
important element of international support programs, as elections can act as a catalyst 
for a new political order in a post-conflict environment. This can be witnessed 
through Electoral Assistance programs being part of major UN led peace-building 
missions around the world in countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, South Africa, 
El Salvador, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and many more. 
 
It was with my deep involvement in Kosovo’s electoral process since 2002, as well as 
my personal belief in an individual’s right to participate in free and fair elections, that 
I decided to write about the role of International Electoral Assistance in Kosovo as 
my thesis topic. During this period, I have participated in numerous national elections, 
and was involved in the transformation of processes within the Count and Result 
Center. 
 
Following the disputed military intervention by NATO in 1999 and the withdrawal of 
Serbian security forces, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the UN 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UN Electoral Assistance Division. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/index.shtml, [access: 
01/05/2010] 
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Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The resolution defined the 
borders of Kosovo as remaining within the former Yugoslavia, but was to be led 
toward “substantial autonomy and self-governance”2. In 2000, after the establishment 
of the Joint Interim Administration Structure, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) 
initiated the election operation as an important tool for the democratization of 
Kosovo. In years to follow, different areas of responsibility were handed over from 
the electoral assistance providers to Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) within the 
country. 
 
In the case of Kosovo (as well as Bosnia), international organizations were mandated 
to directly shape the institutional, constitutional and legal set up, whilst in other cases 
electoral assistance and general legal reform programs have provided less visible but 
significant assistance contributing to the change and modification of the electoral 
framework and its processes. There were two main international players involved in 
Kosovo’s electoral process: OSCE, as mentioned above, and the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a non-governmental organization focusing 
on electoral assistance and democracy promotion. Both organizations were involved 
in assisting the central Count and Result Center (CRC), where the results of all 
polling stations are audited and tabulated. Throughout the ten years since the first 
post-war elections in Kosovo, the international community has played a continuous 
role within the CRC – either by entirely supervising and managing the operation, or 
by acting in an advisory function. This continued role in the CRC by the international 
community poses interesting questions: Why does the local EMB seem unwilling or 
unable to own this absolutely vital electoral process that effectively audits criteria 
which deems their elections to be free and fair. Why does the international 
community still oversee the overall results processing? Consolidating thoughts around 
this issue by using Tom Stoppard’s quote “Its Not the Voting that’s Democracy, Its 
the Counting.”3, the work in the CRC plays an important role in Kosovo’s electoral 
cycle and therefore in its democratization efforts. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Paragraph 11 a “...main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: (a) Promoting 
the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in 
Kosovo....“ Full text available at http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf, [access: 
03/04/2011] 
3 Tom Stoppard, Jumpers, Act I, Grove Press, 1971 
	   9	  
Despite ten years of large-scale and continuous international electoral assistance in 
Kosovo, the fraud observed during the 2010 Parliamentary Elections proved the 
difficulty in achieving a sustainable and credible electoral process, and specifically 
“free and fair” elections without the commitment of all actors involved.  
 
It is within this setting that this thesis sets out to explain the status quo of international 
electoral assistance in Kosovo and to interlink an operational reality into a theoretical 
context, explaining why the elections 2010 might or might not have failed in being 
free and fair due to massive fraud in the polling stations.  
 
There could be certain antagonism in political science towards this rather technical 
case study, but as pointed out by Andrew Ellis at a conference on Effective Electoral 
Assistance: “It [Electoral Assistance] is a political process. It may be called technical 
assistance but it is not a technical process where you design solutions and parachute 
them in. It is a political process with political actors and therefore needs to be handled 
in a political manner.” With these words in mind, this study will try to look into the 
broad spectrum of democratization from a different angle. 
 
1.1. Field of Inquiry 
 
Through my election work in Kosovo, first with the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and later with the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES), I was able to not only gain an inside view of “how things 
work” in a conflict-prone society, but also a different perspective on democratization, 
transitional elections and international assistance. 
 
Working on this thesis has raised a number of questions in my mind as to the parallels 
that exist between the theory described in democracy literature and that what is 
actually taking place on the ground in Kosovo. Scanning through the wave of 
publications of the late 1980s and early 1990s on the topic, I found myself wandering 
about the relation between theory and reality in political science, the missing link 
between democracy assistance programs and academic democratization theories, and 
the difficulty of implementing these theories into reality. There is little scholarly work 
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on distortions in election results due to fraud, although elections are fault-prone 
ventures where electoral manipulation may have serious implications on the 
legitimacy of the elected and the regime. The challenge therefore is trying to include 
my practical experience into academic, political science research and putting the 
different objectives into perspective by methodizing all research questions to be able 
to plan the direction of this study. 
 
The objective of the present thesis is to analyze the role of electoral assistance in 
democracy and democracy promotion. In particular, examine the role of electoral 
assistance in the democratization process of post-war Kosovo, with the attention of 
past year’s Parliamentary Elections. 
 
First and foremost, it is vital to clarify the terms democracy and democratization and 
to point out the role of election in democracy and democracy promotion. Discussing 
democracy assistance demanded an understanding of how the international 
community tries to make processes sustainable and effective, and how electoral 
assistance programs are designed to support free and fair elections. 
In the case of Kosovo, the obvious question to ask is “what did electoral assistance 
providers do to ensure the integrity of the vote and transparent elections in the past”. 
More specifically what was their specific role in the 2010 election? 
 
Therefore three main research questions will be analyzed in this study: 
Ø What is the role of elections in democracy and the democratization process? 
Ø What is the role of elections in post-conflict environments? 
Ø How can electoral assistance help to assist and ensure free and fair elections in 
Kosovo? 
 
Further questions can be raised regarding the different motivations and interests of the 
IC behind aid programs, the questions how to measure the effectiveness of external 
aid programs in general and how to improve them, however these topics are not 
within the scope of this paper. 
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1.2. Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses 1: 
Although elections are a core element in democracy promotion and institution 
building efforts of external aid programs in Kosovo, its long-term outcome is very 
much dependent on local actors and conditions.  
 
Hypotheses 2: 
Despite the fraud identified by Kosovo’s Count and Result Center and the partial 
election boycott by the Serbian minority, the Kosovo Parliamentary Elections of 2010 
can be deemed free and fair as the integrity of the vote remained intact through the 
recount of ballots and re-election in certain municipalities. 
 
Hypotheses 3: 
Without substantial change to Kosovo’s political culture, the development towards 
democracy will not be possible. 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
In methodological regard, the present study will rely upon a combination of methods: 
Ø Analysis of primary and secondary sources 
Ø Participant observation (informal interviews and field notes) 
 
To begin with, a consideration of democracy and democratization theorist literature is 
useful in examining the relationship of elections, democracy and democratization with 
regard to the link between international election assistance and democracy promotion. 
Furthermore, a study of election assistance literature, analysis by NGOs and electoral 
networks is needed when attempting to define the exact nature of election assistance. 
As there is a large volume of literature available, I will use the qualitative content 
analysis by Mayring to collect relevant data and information for further analysis. 
“Qualitative content analysis defines itself [...] as an approach of empirical, 
methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, 
following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash 
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quantification.”4 This methodological approach is helpful in identifying key data from 
documents in order to systematically collect, evaluate and analyze it. This helps 
finding correlations between literature and the research questions.  
 
The following international and Kosovar NGOs and electoral think tank analyses and 
reports, mostly available through the internet, are analyzed: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), European Network of Election 
Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and 
Development (KIPRED), Freedom House. 
Further documents and reports from organizations like the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), US 
State Department, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the UN 
Security Council are used and available in the world wide web as well. 
The Kosovo Constitution, Laws on Kosovo Elections, UN Resolutions and other 
relevant official documents are included in this thesis. 
 
Based on the character of this thesis and its focus on the Parliamentary Elections 2010 
(specifically the work in the Count and Result Centre), the participant observation 
method is an appropriate approach as it allows emphasizing a detailed contextual 
analysis and focusing on the process and different aspects of it. Participant 
observation enables the researcher to observe and understand the interactions of 
people from the position of an insider.	   5 Participant observation is a methodology to 
become directly involved into every day’s life of the people and maintain the 
relationships established. 
The participant observation is a method of data collection. Danny Jorgensen point out 
conditions when participant observation is appropriate:	  6 
• the research problem is concerned with human meanings and interactions 
viewed from the insiders’ perspective; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mayring, Philip, Forum Qualitative Research, Qualitative Content Analysis, Vol.1, No.2 (2000), 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1089, 13/01/2011 
5 Jorgensen, Danny, A Methodology for Human Studies, Applied Social Research Methods Series, Vol. 
15, SAGE Publications Inc., California, 1989, p.21 
6 ibid. 
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• the phenomenon of investigation is observable within an everyday life 
situation or setting; 
• the researcher is able to gain access to an appropriate setting, 
• the phenomenon is sufficiently limited in size and location to be studied as a 
case; 
• study questions are appropriate for case study, and 
• the research problem can be addressed by qualitative data gathered by direct 
observation and other means pertinent to the field setting. 
 
My personal experience working for elections in Kosovo in 2002, 2004 and 
2009/2010 contributes to this subject area and is essential in gathering necessary 
information through work and personal relations with local and international election 
personnel, members of international organizations and Kosovar citizens. 
The empirical source to the following thesis is casual conversations, as well as 
informal interviews, official and unofficial documents, report and field notes in 
combination with primary and secondary sources. 
 
For reasons of clarity, the international prevalent form ‘Kosovo’, which is common in 
most English-language publications, is used as opposed to the Albanian form 
‘Kosova’ or ‘Kosovë’. For Kosovo’s municiapalities, the author follows UN pratice: 
both, the Albanian and Serbian names, divided by a slash were used.7 
 
1.4. Content 
 
This thesis is composed of five chapters.  
 
Following the introduction, the second Chapter discusses concepts of democracy and 
democratization, the role of elections in democracy and the linkage with democracy 
assistance.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 UNMIK/REG/2000/43. 27 July 2000. On the number, names and boundaries of municipalities, 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re2000_43.htm, [access: 12/19/2011] 
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Chapter Three gives an overview of the role of electoral assistance in post-conflict 
societies and talks about its role as a tool for democracy promotion. The most 
important organizations involved in electoral assistance programs are presented and 
electoral administration and the electoral cycle approach explained, in order to make 
the complex structure of electoral processes and the implications of sustainability 
more understandable. Furthermore, the establishment of international standards for 
free and fair elections and their applicability are discussed in this section.   
 
Chapter Four sets up the context in which the case will be presented. It gives an 
overview about the political structure in Kosovo after 1999. It describes the 
establishment of UNMIK and delineates the current situation with EULEX and the 
EU. Attention is paid to Kosovo’s Electoral Management Body, the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) who is responsible for the organization and implementation of 
elections in Kosovo, and the Electoral Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP), the 
authority for adjudicating complaints and appeals concerning the electoral process. 
The case of Electoral Assistance in the Count and Result Center for the Parliamentary 
Elections in Kosovo 2010 considers the contextual importance of electoral assistance 
in light of the standards for free and fair elections and the integrity of the vote. It 
demonstrates the significant role electoral assistance took in this specific situation 
under pressing circumstances and elucidated the implementation of processes for 
getting more accurate results to account for each and every voter who casted a ballot 
on election day. A discussion on how “free and fair” can be measured in this context 
and/or if it can be reduced to various checks in the CRC, is essential in evaluating the 
implications of the findings of the CRC. Furthermore it discusses the prospects for 
further developments in Kosovo and why or why not the 2010 elections can be 
considered “free and fair”. 
 
The final chapter concludes the thesis and closes the loop by describing up to which 
point Electoral Assistance is mandated to assist, and where national Electoral 
Management Bodies act themselves, based on their own decision and own political 
interests. 	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Chapter II: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.1. Democracy and Democratization 
 
Democracy and democratization are of central concern for this work on 
‘Democratization, Post-conflict Elections and Electoral Assistance’. However, 
democracy itself is a widely contested term, and trying to define its meaning is a 
challenging task, as no single valid concept or definition for it exists. 
 
There are uncountable contributions to this topic – many of them contradictory in 
their approaches and unsatisfying in the answers they attempt to form. This thesis 
cannot attempt to pursue the full spectrum of democracy concepts, but rather it shows 
exemplarily the ones with contemporary relevance to demonstrate the broad range of 
the democracy debate and its dynamics. In carrying out such an exemplarily 
overview, it must be acknowledged that conceptualizing democracy is an ongoing 
process and the societal contexts and dimensions are still changing.  
 
Historically, early contributions to the topic of democracy dates back to ancient 
Greece where citizens8 participated directly in legislative and judicial functions. 
“Athenian democracy required a general commitment to the principle of civic virtue: 
dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private live to public 
affairs and the common good.”9 Aristotle used the term in order to designate one of 
the deviations from his ideal of a well-ordered commonwealth.10 Later in the feudal 
system of the Middle Ages, power was not vested in elected bodies but was based on 
rank that could be only attained through inheritance or by force. A new aspiration 
began in the Renaissance, and finally the nineteenth century was the start of liberal 
democracy and new debates about the true content of liberty and liberal values 
emerged. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Females and slaves were excluded to count as Athenian citizen. 
9 Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, 
Polity Press, UK, 1995, p.6 
10 Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1942, 
p.218 
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According to the “liberal” or Lockean view, the democratic process accomplishes the 
task of “programming the government in the interest of society, where the 
government is represented as an apparatus of public administration, and society as a 
market-structured network of interactions among private persons”. Here politics (in 
the sense of the citizens’ political will-formation) has the function of bundling 
together and pushing private interests against a government apparatus specializing in 
the administrative employment of political power for collective goals. 11  
The dilemma of balancing between “the sovereign power” and the “limits on that 
power”, quasi liberty versus authority was the difficulty of the liberal democracy 
discourse.12 
 
Etymologically the term “democracy” originates from the two Greek words: demos 
(people) and kratos (rule), hence the “rule by the people”, which immediately raises 
some complex issues. Held depicts these by setting out the various problems and 
questions this phrase entails:13 
• Who is to be considered “the people”? 
• What kind of participation is envisaged for the people? 
• What conditions are assumed to be conducive to participation? 
Can the disincentives and incentives, or costs and benefits, of participation be 
equal? 
• How broadly or narrowly is the scope of rule to be construed? 
Or what is the appropriate field of democratic activity? 
• If “rule” is to cover “the political”, what is meant by this? Does it cover (1) 
law and order? (2) relations between states? (3) the economy? (4) the domestic 
or private sphere? 
• Must the rules of “the people” be obeyed? What is the place of obligation and 
dissent? 
• What roles are permitted for those who are avowedly and actively 
“nonparticipants”? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Habermas, Jürgen, Constellations Volume I , No I , 1994. @ 1994. Published by Blackwell 
Publishers, I&9 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, 
USA, p.1, www.euro.ubbcluj.ro/.../habermas_3_normative_models_of_democracy.pdf,  
12 Held (1995), p.9 
13 Held, David, Models of Democracy, 1st ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996 (2nd ed., 2002), p.2 
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• Under what circumstances, if any, are democracies entitled to resort to 
coercion against their own people or against those outside the sphere of 
legitimate rule? 
 
Bearing this excerpt of questions in mind, it can help to imagine the broad range of 
notions within the discussion of democracy, not only in political science theory but 
also in philosophy and economics.  
 
David Held’s definition “democracy means a form of government in which, in 
contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule”14 seems in many 
ways to be the best suited and least disputed one. Linz goes one step further and 
defines democracy as “the free competition for power, [that] implies a whole list of 
freedoms and rights that citizens do not enjoy in other political systems and that are in 
themselves valuable.15  
 
Attila Agh uses four ‘definitions’ of democracy that can also be seen as stages of the 
democratization process:16 
1.) Procedural democracy: Free and fair elections, constitutionalism, rule of law 
including minority right (a very sensitive issue for the ‘nationalizing’ states) 
2.) Liberal democracy: free enterprise economy, clear separation of public and 
private, and the political representation of economic interests through 
intermediaries. 
3.) National democracy: a communitarian period in which the political 
community is organized in a nation-building process with citizenship 
participatory rights. 
4.) Egalitarian democracy: distinction between formal and substantial equality by 
acting as a welfare state (supporting some social strata through a ‘social’ 
market economy). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Held (1996), p. 1 
15 Linz, Juan J., Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy, in: Berg-Schlosser (Ed.), 
Democratization: The State of the Art, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (2004), p.128 
16 Agh’s definition is based on Ellen Comisso’s studies in Central European and Balkan regions: Agh, 
Attila, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 1998, p.10 
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For Agh, democratization is not just a political process, “since democratic transition 
proceeds as a ‘triple transition’ in politics, economy and society and their intricate 
relationships; they are closely connected to a nation-building process, and these 
feedbacks decide the progress of democratization as a whole”.17 When there is 
‘disharmony’ within the ‘triple transition’, it can cause a ‘vicious circle’ with negative 
impact, which can undermine the democratization process. In contrast a ‘virtuous 
circle’, that is “politics creates all preconditions for a prosperous market economy, 
and economic growth accelerates social transformations, [..] the result is ‘harmony’ 
between democratic politics, a stable market economy and post-industrial society.”18 
According to Sorensen, the processes of democratization and globalization 
additionally “sparked new debates about the economic, cultural and social conditions 
under which democracy can develop, and about the consequences of globalization for 
democracy.”19 
 
Held outlines the ingrained conflict in democracy theory as, “whether democracy 
should mean some kind of popular power (a form of politics in which citizens are 
engaged in self-government and self-regulation) or an aid to decision-making (a 
means of conferring authority on those periodically voted into office)”.20 
Based on this conflict, Held offers a definition of the two broad types dividing the 
different models of democracy21: 
• Direct or participatory democracy: a system of decision making about public 
affairs in which citizens are directly involved, and  
• Liberal or representative democracy: a system of rule embracing elected 
“officers” who undertake to “represent” the interests and/or views of citizens 
within the framework of “the rule of law”. 
Held also points out that “the consolidation of representative democracy has been a 
(late) twentieth-century phenomenon” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Agh (1998), p.9 
18 ibid, p.11 
19 Sorensen, Georg, Handbook on Democracy and Democratization, 2010, 
www.dpsa.dk/2010%20filer/Democracy%20and%20Democratization.doc [accessed: June 27, 2011], 
p.5 
20 Held (1995), p.5 
21 Held (1995,1996), p.6 
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In consideration of this study, and its focus on the role of elections as a tool for 
choosing representatives in liberal and representative democracies, my focus lies on 
the political process, leaving the economical and societal factors aside but not 
forgotten. 
 
2.2. Democratic Agendas 
 
Gerardo Munck illustrates in his study Democracy Studies: Agendas, Findings, 
Challenges an evaluation of the great body of literature on democracy studies, and 
identifies three primary agendas of democracy theory: democratic transition, 
democratic stability, and democratic quality.22 
 
The distinction between these agendas is not only useful for organizing scholarly 
research and literature, but it also gives a good overview of the discussions on 
democracy and democratization focused predominantly over the past 30 years. 
Furthermore it is beneficial to be able to link it with Kosovo’s status quo as a 
democracy in transition and the role elections played in this process. 
 
2.2.1. Democracy Transition 
 
Democratic transition literature focuses strongly on election, “or more specifically, on 
the critical step in history of democracy when a country passes a threshold marked by 
the introduction of competitive elections with mass suffrage for the main political 
offices in the land”23. The conceptual design with its emphasis on elections as a 
threshold for democratic transition excludes various issues concerning the formulation 
and implementation of public policy and respect for the rule of law.24 
 
Attila Agh goes beyond the summarizing concept of democracy transition and 
distinguishes between “transitions from authoritarian rule and transitions to 
democracy”.25 He states, the pre-transition crisis is “the climax of the crisis in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Munck, Gerardo L., Democracy Studies: Agendas, Findings, Challenges, in: Berg-Schlosser (Ed.), 
Democratization: The State of the Art, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (2004), p.65 
23 ibid, p.66 
24 Munck (2004), p.68 
25 Agh, (1998), p.7 
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authoritarian system” that reaches a critical point and has a negative impact in form of 
destruction and disintegration. The next period is the creation of “a new system 
through transitory measures and institutions”.26 
 
The decision to focus on democratic transitions is driven by two insights:27  
1.) Elections are a significant event and can alter a country’s political dynamics; 
2.) Transition to democracy is a distinct process and is theorized in its own terms. 
 
The domain of democratic transition research was dominated by a Schumpeterian 
approach to democracy in its earlier stage.28 Joseph Schumpeter offered in his work 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy a redefinition of democracy, which in his view 
was simply a mechanism for choosing political leadership. His ‘democratic elitism’ 
marks a rather pessimistic perspective, as he believes that the electorate is neither 
motivated enough nor interested in political issues to make appropriate political 
decisions. Therefore political parties and their competing elites dominate the political 
process. 
As Schumpeter argues,  “[t]he democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”29 
 
As he conceives it, the electorate can choose political leadership during elections, 
who are then making political decisions between elections. At the next election, the 
electorate can substitute their elected leadership and vote for another political party or 
individual. This ability to choose between leaders at election time is democracy – an 
approach of democracy that dismantles democracy of ethical or economic content and 
gives elections the utmost importance. 
In comparison to the classical doctrine, Schumpeter saw certain advantages such as  
“a proper recognition of the vital fact of leadership”, that “the will and the good of the 
people” was not an ideal criterion to distinguish democratic governments from others, 
non-neglect of group-wise volitions, restricted “the kind of competition for leadership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 ibid, p.7 
27 Munck (2004), p.68 
28 ibid, p.66 
29 Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, Harper and Row, New York, 1942, 
p.241 
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which is to define democracy, to free competition for a free vote”, clarification of the 
relationship “between democracy and individual freedom”, function of evicting a 
government by electorate.30 
 
“Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political – legislative and administrative – decisions and 
hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will 
produce under given historical conditions. And this must be the starting point of any 
attempt at defining it.”31 
 
With the shift in world politics during the 1960s and 1970s the Schumpeterian notion 
of democracy and democratic transitions became less relevant.32 Later, with the third 
wave of democratization in 197433 and the influential writings of Robert Dahl, 
democratic transition regained its popularity and Schumpeter’s conception about 
democracy resumed acceptance within the academic world.34 
 
Robert Dahl’s notion of polyarchy is for many scholars a root concept, especially for 
empirically oriented democratization studies and attempts to conceptualize 
democracy. In his work Polyarchy he attests that “no large system in the real world is 
fully democratized” and uses the term ‘polyarchy’ for “relatively democratized 
regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized”.35 His concept of 
democratization offers two dimensions: Public Contestation (Liberalization) and 
Right to participate (Inclusiveness)36. For the transition from a closed hegemonic 
regime to polyarchy he characterizes at least seven conditions:37 
1.) Historical sequences 
2.) The socioeconomic order 
3.) The level of socioeconomic development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Schumpeter (1942), pp.242-244 
31 ibid, p.217 
32 Munck (2004), p.67 
33 The year 1974 is marked as the beginning of the third wave  (worldwide movement to democracy) 
by Samuel Huntington with a coup d’etat in Portugal, Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.3 
34 Munck (2004), p.67, Huntington (1991), p.6 
35 Dahl, Robert A., Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, Yale Univeristy Press, London, 1971, p.8 
36 ibid, p. 6 
37 ibid, see summary p.203 
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4.) Equalities and inequalities 
5.) Subcultural pluralism 
6.) Domination by a foreign power 
7.) Belief of political activists 
 
Elections with universal suffrage are of central importance in Dahl’s theory, in 
contrast to Schumpeter who neglected this criterion. Dahl’s explicit two dimensions, 
the amount of regular and open competition in a political system, and the extent of 
different forms of participation in the process of political decision-making by the 
population of a given society, show a limited but useful characterization of 
contemporary democracies. Implicit in his notion is a third (normative) dimension 
that concerns basic civil liberties, such as freedom of information and organization, 
and a political order that guarantees and maintains the rule of law to make regular 
political contestation and participation possible and meaningful.38 
Berg-Schlosser summarizes these factors as the “input” side of political systems, 
whereas historical, economic and cultural bases and conditions of democracy and the 
actual performance and effectiveness of democratic systems imply the “output” side.39 
Dahl’s polyarchy is often criticized as having a minimalist approach like 
Schumpeter’s elite theory of democracy, but its conditions seem tangible and 
applicable towards a practical understanding.  
 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s work Transitions from authoritarian 
rule was another important step to establish the grounds for a normative and analytic 
research.40 They define ‘transition’ as “the interval between one political regime and 
another [..] Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process 
of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some 
form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of 
a revolutionary alternative”41. They mark the beginning of a transition with the 
modification and change of rules by the authoritarian regime.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (Ed.): Democratization, The State of the Art, VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften_GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden, 2004, p.52 
39 ibid, p.53 
40 Munck (2004), p.67 
41 O’Donnell, Guillermo/Schmitter, Philippe C., Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 2.print, 1989, p.6 In O’Donnell et al., eds., 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Part 4, pp. 1- 78. 
	   23	  
The process “of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and 
social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties” 
O’Donnell and Schmitter characterize as ‘liberalization’, an early stage in the 
transition.42 They further differentiate between liberalization and democratization, 
their analysis’ central concern. The distinction between these two terms is a useful 
starting point: political liberalization implies a lifting of oppressive rules and 
regulations and extension of civil and political liberties within an authoritarian 
regime, whereas political democratization “entails an expansion of political 
participation in such a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful 
collective control over public policy.”43 The distinction between these concepts is 
important as it calls for the key differences between the two. “Political repression can 
be relaxed without expanding political participation”44, vice versa can political 
participation be granted with political liberties still remaining limited. Furthermore 
O’Donnell and Schmitter emphasized, the “key role of elite interaction and strategic 
choice during the transition and in most cases ascribed limited importance to mass 
mobilization from below”45.  
In their seminal work, giving particular attention to founding elections, “elections 
must be freely conducted, honestly tabulated, and openly contested”.46 The role of 
elections for a transition to political democracy is of significant value, whereas 
political parties hold a minor role. Twenty-five years later Schmitter reviews their 
conclusions and states, “no democratization process can afford to do without parties, 
especially once elections are convoked. For better or worse, parties seem to be 
indispensable in structuring competition for representation within territorially defined 
constituencies.”47 They also point out the relevant but sensitive technical issues for 
elections in transitional periods. For one the need of establishing thresholds for 
representing minor parties and social groups (ethnic or religious minorities), the 
formula for the seat distribution within constituencies, and the choice of political 
systems.48 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ibid., p.7 
43 Brynen, Rex/Korany, Bahgat/Noble, Paul (eds.), Political Liberalization & Democratization in the 
Arab World. Theoretical Perspectives, Vol.1, Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc., Boulder, Colo., 1995, p. 3 
44 ibid., p.4 
45 Schmitter, Philippe C., Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings, Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, 
Number 1, January 2010, pp. 17-28 (Article), The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 18 
46 O’Donnell, Schmitter (1989), p. 62 
47 Schmitter (2010), p. 23 
48 O’Donnell, Schmitter (1989), p. 60 
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The famous work of Samuel Huntington The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Century (1991) coined the term “Third Wave” and describes the 
emergence of democracies in waves.49 Huntington’s explanatory factors contributing 
to the third wave of democratization are legitimacy crises in authoritarian regimes, 
economic growth with the new educated middle-class demanding greater rights and 
freedoms, and an increasing urbanization. Furthermore he sees a new political role of 
the Catholic Church, supporting more progressive politics. The changes in the US-
Soviet politics and the expansion of the EU were additional multipliers advancing 
pro-democracy movements, with a snowballing effect.50 Huntington also follows the 
Schumpeterian tradition in terms of the significance choosing political leadership 
trough free, fair and regular elections in a democracy. He adds Dahl’s two dimensions 
– contestation and participation – and its implying civil and political freedoms in his 
analysis framework on democracy.51 The replacement of a government in free, open 
and fair elections is the “critical point in the process of democratization” and the 
processes surrounding Election Day vast and extensive.52 
Agh also points out the importance and dominance of politics in the period of 
democratic transition and argues the importance of parliaments as a central site and 
political parties as the major actors in the process of transition, thus focusing as well 
on an elite approach.  
In this regard there is again an emphasis on elections as party politics’ main focus is 
to remain in power and therefore be re-elected. The possibility of government change 
through elections is considered as a positive sign in the transition process and the 
democratic spirit. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Berg-Schlosser summarizes the emergence in waves: “Democracies have emerged in increasing 
numbers since the beginning of the 19th century, mostly in Anglo-Saxon and Western European 
countries. This culminated in a more rapid expansion shortly after World War I, still mostly in Europe 
but now including some parts of the former Tsarist, Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. This trend was 
the considerably reversed, leading to fascist or other types of authoritarian regimes, through until the 
end of World War II. The breakdown of the colonial empires after World War II then led to the 
emergence of many more independent states, first in Asia and then in the Middle East and Africa. 
These included a number of new democracies. In addition to the latter, some civil-authoritarian or 
military regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America have also democratized or redemocratized 
since the middle of the 1970s. The most recent upsurge occurred after the democratic changes in 
Eastern Europe in 1989-90, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its worldwide repercussions.” See 
Berg-Schlosser (2004), p.16 
50 Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991 
51 Huntington (1991), p.7 
52 ibid, p.9 
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The connection between political elites and the institutions of governance is another 
parameter examined in democracy theory literature. For instance, Linz & Stepan 
claim: 
“A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached 
about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government 
comes to power as a direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de 
facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative 
and judicial powers generated by the new democracy do not have to share power with 
other bodies de jure.”53 
 
As Munck formulates, “Democratic transitions do not occur through a single process 
but rather through multiple paths defined by factors such as the power and strategies 
of elites and masses and the top-down or bottom-up impetus for political reform.”54 
 
“A focus on democratic transitions, thus, does not deny that countries vary along 
other dimensions or that other dimensions may be as important as those highlighted 
by a Schumpeterian approach. […] [it] is not based on a judgment about the 
importance of a Schumpeterian approach compared with any other approach but it is a 
rather conceptual decision, which helps to distinguish dimensions of concern within 
democratic theory that most likely vary independently from each other.”55 
 
Democratic transition remains an important challenge to a large number of countries. 
Many countries in the Middle East, Asia or China have not yet reached a democratic 
status, whereas “on the other hand, countries that have passed the democratic 
threshold always face the possibility of a democratic breakdown.”56 
 
2.2.2. Democratic Stability 
 
Munck offers with the term ‘Democratic Stability’ a clarifying approach to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Linz, Juan J., Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1996 p. 4 
54 Munck (2004), p.70 
55 ibid, p.69 
56 Munck (2004), p.68 
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concept of ‘democratic consolidation’57, which created confusion among scholars 
themselves regarding to the meaning of  “consolidated democracy”. 
Originally, the term’s purpose was to “describe the challenge of making new 
democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of 
making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams 
against eventual ‘reverse waves’.”58 Agh epitomizes it by two simple terms: 
“Democratic transition can be characterized by ‘chaos’ as a mixture of two social 
systems, and democratic consolidation by ‘routine’ as a full accommodation to the 
new homogenized system.”59  
 
Munck sees the research on democratic stability as the most direct continuation of 
research of democratic transitions. “It is concerned, quite simply, with the 
sustainability and durability of the democracies, defined in Schumpeterian terms, that 
result from successful democratic transitions.”60  
Linz and Stepan allegorize a democracy as consolidated – or in Munck’s sense 
stabilized – as the „only game in town“61. In their study Problems of democratic 
transition and consolidation they define a consolidated democracy by three factors:62 
1.) Behaviorally: no relevant stakeholders are seriously engaged in secession or 
regime change.  
2.) Attitudinally: most people belief in democracy as the best form of government 
and contra-democratic attitudes in a society or public opinion are marginal. 
3.) Constitutionally: democracy is consolidated when all major actors of the state 
operate according to the democratic process including specific laws, 
procedures and institutions.  
 
Linz and Stepan continue by criticizing the dominance of electoralism and market 
mechanisms in the democratization debate and argue for five interacting arenas 
necessary for a consolidated democracy. As first arena they define the need for an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 First Munck suggested using the label “thin” and “thick” concepts of democratic consolidation. Later 
he moved his focus on the notion of democratic stability and democratic quality, to precise the 
discussion about consolidated democracy and to introduce a conceptual order. 
58 Schedler, Andreas, What is Democratic Consolidation?, Journal of Democracy - Volume 9, Number 
2, April 1998, pp. 91-107, p.91 
59 Agh (1998), p.8 
60 Munck (2004), p.82 
61 Linz, Stepan, (1996), p.5 
62 ibid, p.6 
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environment, which allows for the development of a civil society, second arena a 
“relatively autonomous and valued political society”, the third is characterized as rule 
of law, the fourth arena spans “useable state bureaucracy” and the fifth an 
“institutionalized economic society” as essential conditions.63 
In summary all of these arenas are inter-related and supportive of each other. A failure 
of one arena can have an adverse effect on another arena and compromise the 
consolidation. 
Linz and Stepan’s pre-requisite for a consolidated democracy is a state: “Democracy 
requires statehood. Without a sovereign state, there can be no democracy.”64 But they 
do offer a solution for ‘multinational’ states in a political “roof” that protects the 
rights of individuals and focuses on consensual policies in the five arenas.65 
 
David Held’s model of ‘democratic autonomy’ also requires both, an accountable 
state and a democratic reordering of civil society.66 But he spans an even wider bow 
of preconditions for a consolidated, stable democracy. 
“Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the 
specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities 
available to them; that is, they should be free and equal in the process of deliberation 
about the conditions of their own lives and in the determination of these conditions, so 
long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others.”67 
His concept does not merely comprise of casting a vote on Election Day but calls for 
a “bill of rights including equal opportunity for participation, individual preferences 
and citizens’ final control of the political agenda”68 as Sorensen summarizes in his 
handbook on Democracy and Democratization. It also includes social and economic 
rights. Held’s model of “democratic autonomy” can be seen as a wide and 
comprehensive notion of democracy in contrast to Schumpeter’s very narrow 
definition. 
 
It needs to be said that more and more countries that had democratized after 1974 
remained democratic and scholarly attention shifted to “theories of convergence and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Linz, Stepan (1996), p.7ff 
64 ibid, p.19 
65 ibid, p.35ff 
66 Held (2002), p.316 
67 Held (1995), p.147 
68 Sorensen (2010), p.4 
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the end of history that suggested that major political differences were bound to 
diminish”69 as world politics have changed with the end of the Cold War. The 
relevance of research on democratic stability is an interesting factor in regard to 
potential and actual breakdowns of democracies as witnessed in Latin America, 
Africa or Asia.70  
 
The notion within academia was not to diminish the relevance of elections in the new 
democracies as “the free and fair nature of elections evident in many countries serve 
as a reminder of basic differences in the democratic-ness of countries” and “there is 
little doubt that competitive and fair elections leading to alternation in power have 
become fairly common events.”71 
The point made is that elections might not be enough to explain the discrepancies 
between different countries in their democratic behavior but other issues that are 
linked with democracy such as the rule of law, corruption, nepotism, freedom of 
media, etc. need to be further explored. A multitude of variables72 were included to 
explore the reasons why some new democracies were more stable then others but had 
not much explanatory power. 
As per Munck this could mostly be explained by the narrow indicator “durability”, 
therefore further research needs to be done before rejecting any explanatory variable. 
Another suggestion was to use explanatory variables in reference to democratic 
quality. One positive finding was that level of economic development, which does not 
explain democratic transitions, is nonetheless an important determinant of the stability 
of democracy based on the work by Lipset, Przeworski et al.73 Furthermore argue 
Linz and Stepan that elite consensus on the distribution of power among political 
institutions is a critical factor for democratic stability.74 
 
 
According to Linz and Stepan,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Munck (2004), p.83 
70 ibid, p.83 
71 ibid, p.83 
72 Variables like the modality of transition to democracy, economic and political reforms, economic 
performances, the strength of civil society and political parties, the presidential or parliamentary form 
of government, etc. See Munck, p.85 
73 Munck (2004), p.86 
74 Linz, Stepan (1996) 
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“Disagreements among the core actors of transition over the type of government and 
electoral system may create questions about the legitimacy of the emerging 
democratic government, the decision-making process, and the future of the political 
system. Such institutional indeterminacy about core procedures necessary for 
producing democracy may not only leave the transition incomplete, but also postpone 
any consolidation of democracy.”75 
 
2.2.3. Democratic Quality 
 
A new research agenda “democratic quality” is in its early stages and in the process of 
defining and delimiting the subject. Linz, in his paper Some Thoughts on the Victory 
and Future of Democracy also identifies the complex problem of the quality of 
democracy and points out the need to find a “more positive justification” in favor of 
democracy as “democracy by comparison ha[s] lost strength”.76 
 
Munck points to Guillermo O’Donnell who has done much work on democratic 
quality and stresses the fact that more and more countries are democratic, but many 
differ from the classic democracies “failing to enshrine the rule of law, eradicate 
clientelistic and other particularistic practices”.77  
Democratic consolidation in the Balkans and other countries face some serious issues 
but nonetheless argues Linz rightly that even if some of the problems or crises result 
in a questionable democratic quality, the chance of a backslide to authoritarian rule 
low.78 He points out that the quality of democracy is furthermore affected by the 
quality of the political class. Referring to Schumpeter’s view that political individuals 
need to be of “high quality” in order for a successful democratic method. 
Indicators of the quality of the “political class” would be:79 
1. The proportion for whom politics is “a vocation” rather that just a way of 
making living. 
2. The commitment to some values or goals relevant for the collectivity, without, 
however, pursuing them irrespective of consequences. This means some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 ibid, p. 4 
76 Linz, Juan J., Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy, in: Berg-Schlosser (Ed.), 
Democratization: The State of the Art, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften (2004), p.127 
77 Munck (2004), p.91 
78 Linz (2004), p.116 
79 ibid, p.130f 
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mixture between being guided by a Gesinnungsethik and a 
Verantwortungsethik in Max Weber’s sense. 
3. The amount of political corruption, relatively narrowly defined, as use of power 
for private and personal ends, specifically enrichment, or to illegally favor 
particular organizations or groups. 
4. The use or tolerance of illegal violence, even against enemies of the state and 
democracy, and even when a majority of citizens are ready to condone it. 
5. Willingness to play with or use the disloyal opposition, revolutionary 
extremists or putschists, against other democratic forces or the institutions, to 
blackmail them or gain power. 
 
Linz also indicates a very high or very low rate of voter participation as a sign of a 
crisis of democracy. “Extremely high rates of participation and extraordinary 
majorities for one party or candidate (in presidential systems) are suspect.”80 
 
In Assessing the Quality of Democracy, Diamond and Morlino suggest “democratic 
quality can be thought of as a system in which improvement in one dimension can 
have diffuse benefits for others (and vice versa).”81 They lean on Dahl’s polyarchy in 
defining their framework of democracy for their analysis and exclude hybrid or 
“electoral authoritarian” regimes, who fail in holding free and fair elections, a 
fundamental prerequisite of democracy. Their definition of a quality democracy 
includes a “high degree of freedom for its citizens, political equality, and popular 
control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful 
functioning of stable institutions” based on three meanings of quality: procedure, 
content and result.82   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 ibid, p.132 
80 Munck (2004), p.91 
81 Diamond, Larry/Morlino, Leonardo (Ed.), Assessing the Quality of Democracy, John Hopkins 
University Press, Maryland, 2005, p.x 
82 ibid, p.xii 
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This resulted further in eight dimensions of varying quality of democracies:83 
Procedural Dimensions: 
1.) Rule of law84: base upon other dimensions rest 
2.) Participation: participation in a broader sense; not only in voting but also 
in the political process 
3.) Competition: electoral competitiveness between different political parties 
and fair access to mass media 
4.) Vertical Accountability: obligation of elected political leaders to account 
for political decisions 
5.) Horizontal Accountability: office-holders are answerable to other 
institutional actors; checks and balances by pubic entities 
Substantive Dimensions: 
6.) Respect for civil, political and social Freedoms 
7.) Progressive implementation of greater political Equality 
Results Dimension: 
8.) Responsiveness: to the expectations, interests, needs and demands of 
citizens 
 
Interestingly they conclude from findings resulting from their case studies that 
“competition and participation are engines of democratic quality”, and underline the 
benefit for stronger, resourceful and influential social groups in comparison to small, 
powerless and marginalized ones for these qualities.85 “Leveling such inequalities, 
giving voice to the voiceless, and bringing all citizens more fully into the arenas of 
civic participation remain the most enduring and difficult challenges for the 
deepening of democracy.”86 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 ibid, p.xii ff 
84 “Democratic rule of law ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability 
which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power.” 
See: O’Donnell, Guillermo, Why the Rule of Law Matters, in Diamond, Larry/Morlino, Leonardo 
(Ed.), Assessing the Quality of Democracy, John Hopkins University Press, Maryland, 2005, p.3 
85 Diamond/Morlino (2005), p.xl 
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2.2.3.1. Democratic Sub-types 
 
Georg Sorensen argues successfully in his book Democracy and Democratization that 
there has been a “shift from “transition” to “standstill” in the sense that many regimes 
remain in the gray area of semi-democracy or semi-authoritarianism.”87 Also Berg-
Schlosser find “at a closer look, however, these new democracies show a bewildering 
variety of specific sub-types and concrete defects when compared to their more 
established counterparts, especially those in Western countries.”88 
 
This paragraph exemplarily chooses three examples of democracy sub-types: 
 
Defective Democracy 
Wolfgang Merkel approaches democracy in his reference work Embedded and 
Defective Democracies with the root concept of embedded democracy89, which 
consists of five interdependent partial regimes (electoral regime, political rights, civil 
rights, horizontal accountability, effective power to govern). He criticizes the 
perception of ‘electoral democracy’ and its dichotomy, arguing that it is ignoring the 
“distinction between consolidated liberal democracies and their diminished sub-
types”90, which he calls defective democracies. “Defective democracies are 
democracies in which the partial regimes are no longer mutually embedded, the logic 
of a constitutional democracy becoming disrupted” meaning when one of the partial 
regimes is defective, it ceases being an embedded democracy. Merkel identifies four 
sub-types of defective democracy: exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, 
delegative democracy and tutelary democracy. 
He sees democratic elections as an inadequate indicator to explain democracy. Rather, 
he concludes that “Democracy seems to be periodical phenomena, occurring when 
elections are held, rather than a continual and omnipresent process of social order. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Sorensen, Georg. Democracy and Democratization. Processes and Prospecs in a Changing World, 
3rd Edition, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 2008, p.2 
88 Berg-Schlosser (2004), p.13 89 “The concept of embedded democracy follows the idea that stable constitutional democracies are 
embedded in two ways. Internally, the specific interdependence/independence of the different partial 
regimes of a democracy secures its normative and functional existence. Externally, these partial 
regimes are embedded in spheres of enabling conditions for democracy that protect it from outer as 
well as inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies.” In Wolgang Merkel. Embedded and Defective 
Democracies, p.34; In: Democratization, Vol.11, No.5, December 2004, pp.33–58, p.33 
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Therefore, competitive and free elections appear insufficient for guaranteeing other 
relevant aspects of democracy, such as the rule of law, civil rights, and the 
accountability of its representatives for example.”91 In his view, only the other four 
partial regimes assure the constitutional principles of democracy and the purpose of 
democratic elections fulfilled.92 
 
Delegative Democracy 
Guillermo O’Donnell published his article Delegative Democracy in 199493 
conceptualizing the term ‘delegative democracies’. In this form it characterizes the 
politics of new democracies and relates to the “exercise of power” and not the “access 
to power” that were of relevance for democratic transition and democratic stability.94  
In delegative democracies “electoral competitiveness and relative civil and political 
freedom” prevail but executive office-holders, once elected, “are minimal responsive 
to citizens preferences, constrained by other agencies of government, and respectful 
of the rule of law.”95 
Mechanisms of horizontal accountability – the checks and balances by other 
institutions – are circumvented or forfeit by the political leadership, albeit opposition 
parties and assemblies may vocalize criticisms.96 Elections are essentially the only 
mechanism of accountability. Thus, a defining feature of delegative democracies is 
the dominance of the executive leader and the absence of a “network of relatively 
autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that have the capacity of calling into 
question and eventually punishing “improper” ways of discharging the responsibilities 
of the given officer”.97 
 
Illiberal Democracies 
Another democracy sub-type is called illiberal democracies. In this case 
“democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed 
through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and 
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92 ibid., p.37 
93 O’Donnell, Guillermo, Delegative democracy, Journal of Democracy, 5:1,2004, pp. 55-70 
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depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms”.98 Zakaria argues that the reason 
for the late recognition of this dilemma arises from the western perspective of 
democracy as free and fair elections in combination with the rule of law and basic 
human rights, the so-called constitutional liberalism. He elaborates his argument 
further by stating that the concepts of democracy and constitutional liberalism diverge 
in some countries with a negative effect: centralized regimes, erosion of liberty, 
ethnic conflict and war. His conclusion, in regards to the international community is 
to minimize the high priority of voting and advance the gradual liberalization of 
societies. 
 
2.2.3.2. Attempts to measure Democracy 
 
With the rise of democracies around the world and the varying concepts of 
understanding the democratization processes, the need for “measuring” those 
democracies became an increasing relevant and preferred objective.  
Berg-Schlosser summarizes: “The current indices of democratization provide 
information only about the state of affairs in a country at a given point in time; they 
do not assess the stability and durability of democratic systems as such.”99 He 
describes the varying purposes and problems accompanying the “measurement” of 
democracy (type of method and research instrument used; developing and measuring 
concrete sub-types of democratic political systems, etc.).100 
 
Freedom House 
One of the best-known and most popular indexes to date is Freedom House101, which 
ascertains long-term development trends of democracies. Freedom House is a non-
profit and self-professed watchdog organization established in 1941. Over the past 40 
years Freedom House has become a preferred source by attempting to compare 
country data based on specific criteria; with free and fair elections as a minimum 
requirement. This rather paltry qualification indicates a state as electoral democracy 
in the Freedom House index. In 1989, for example, 69 countries were labeled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Zakaria, Fareed, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs, Volume 76- Number 6, 
November/December 1997, p.2-23, p.2 
99 Berg-Schlosser (2004), p.57 
100 ibid, p.53 
101 see Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ [access: 07/05/2011] 
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“Electoral Democracies”, while in 2011 115 countries can be found. Based on 
available literature and known dimensions of democracy, the demarcation of holding 
free and fair elections as minimum requirement of democracy seems too narrow and 
problematic.102 
 Freedom of the World 103 the organization’s annual survey designates one of three 
categories ‘free’, ‘partly free’104, and ‘not free’ to each country in the index. This is 
not an index of democracy per se but “both the ‘political rights’ and the ‘civil 
liberties’ indicators which cover important dimensions of democratic systems.”105  
Despite its weaknesses, Freedom House serves to identify trends and developments, 
though the data needs to be applied with care, as their coding system is based to a 
certain degree on subjectivity, a political checklist methodology which itself is 
problematic, and intuitive observations. 
 
Democratic Audit 
“Democratic Audit” by David Beetham and Stuart Weir is a normatively more 
demanding perspective.106 “They originally examined four major aspects of 
democratic quality and performance: free and fair elections; open, accountable and 
responsive government; civil and political rights; and democratic society.” 
The original four expanded to 14 areas:107 
1. Nationhood and citizenship 
2. The rule of law 
3. Civil and political rights 
4. Economic and social rights 
5. Free and fair elections 
6. The democratic role of political parties 
7. Government effectiveness and accountability 
8. Civilian control over the military and police 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Merkel (2004), pp.34-35, Merkel also states that “in general, fair and correct execution of elections 
is difficult to determine empirically”. 103 According to the survey’s findings is Kosovo rated as partly free and not an electoral democracy. 104 A Partly Free country is one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. 
Partly Free states frequently suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and 
religious strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain 
degree of pluralism. (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=594), (05/27/2011) 
105 Berg-Schlosser (2004), p.56 
106 ibid, p.59 
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9. Minimization of corruption 
10. The media and open government 
11. Political participation 
12. Government responsiveness 
13. Decentralization 
14. International dimensions of democracy 
 
The goal now is to generate a comparative model with the support of the Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in order to contribute to the idea of a 
critical qualitative assessment.108  
 
With the discussed concepts of democracy it might be easier to categorize different 
countries, putting them into a specific schema but nonetheless it is not explanatory in 
all the aspects. 
 
 
2.3. Democracy Assistance 
 
The underlying notion of why democracy is a value that needs to be transported 
around the world is embedded in the idea of democratic peace – democracies are less 
likely to begin a war with each other. Promotion of democracy from the outside is a 
very delicate balancing act between influencing the process of democratization while 
“leaving ultimate control to insiders”109 
 
Democracy assistance has vastly increased in the 1980s with the democratic transition 
in Latin America and parts of Asia, and expanded further in early 1990 with the 
democratization wave in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa. 
Democracy-related assistance programs were developed and donor governments 
engaged in the notion of a democratic world order. 
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Thomas Carothers identifies a duality of purpose that characterizes western aid efforts 
aimed at democracy promotion:110 
1) Idea of promoting democracy as a political good that will improve the lives of 
citizens by bringing more freedom, political representation, and governmental 
accountability (esp. Latina America, Eastern Europe). 
2) Democracy as a valuable goal to advance social and economic development  - 
democracy as one component of an overall approach to attaining sustainable 
development (esp. Africa, Asia). 
 
In his paper Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy, Carothers offers an 
explanation of the strategies used by donors of democracy assistance programs. He 
points out the fact that the strategy used is based on a western model of liberal 
democracy, more specifically a “US-specific blueprint”.111  But in comparison to the 
standard US political science definition of democracy, which centers on elections and 
respect for basic political and civil right, the model for democracy assistance is more 
institutionally oriented.112 Democracy aid programs therefore are aimed at shaping a 
particular institution along the lines of a western counterpart institution. 
 
The quintessential elements of democracy aid programs are designed around this well 
summarized definition: “Democracy is equated with regular elections, a constitution 
guaranteeing basic political and civil rights, a three-part governing structure, viable 
local government structures, national political parties, independent trade unions, 
independent media, and at least some advocacy NGOs capable of channeling citizens’ 
demands to the government.”113  
Assistance programs are therefore based on three main categories114: 
1.) Electoral arena 
2.) Governmental institutions 	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111 Carothers (1997), p.115 
112 Carothers acknowledges in his concluding remarks the existence of differences between non-US 
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3.) Civil society 
 
Ad 1.)115  
Goal: Holding of free and fair elections – presidential, parliamentary, and local 
Aid can consist of: 
• Technical assistance to electoral commissions to improve election 
administration; 
• Support for voter education campaigns implemented by local civic groups or 
EMBs 
• Election monitoring by international delegations or domestic organizations; 
• Political party development: Strengthen the main political parties through 
technical assistance and training on campaign methods and institutional 
development. 
Goal: party system marked by a limited number of national political parties 
differentiated by mild ideological shadings, with genuine national institutional 
reach, and strong campaign capacities. 
Ad 2.) 
Goal: Build democracy from top down 
Aid can consist of: 
• Constitutional assistance (Expert advice, conferences, exchange visits and 
seminars on constitutionalism and constitutional analyses) 
Goal: Adopting a constitution that guarantees democratic government and a 
full range of political and civil rights. 
• Parliamentary assistance (training for staff and members of the parliament, 
technical assistance for parliamentary libraries, research units and public 
affairs offices) 
Goal: Strengthen the overall institutional capacities of parliaments and help 
operate in a more effective, representative manner. 
• Judicial reform (training of judges, prosecutors and other legal personnel, 
technical assistance relating to court administration, underwriting the 
publication of court decisions, providing law books and legal materials, and 
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supporting the establishment of arbitration mechanisms and other forms of 
dispute resolution) 
Goal: Increase the efficiency and independence of judicial systems. 
• Local government strengthening (training and technical assistance) 
Goal: Increase the capacity of local government officials to perform 
administrative, fiscal, and developmental functions, and policy dialogue with 
the central government. 
 
Ad 3.) 
Goal: Strengthening civil society 
Focus on:  
• Advocacy-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – Human right 
groups, election monitoring organizations, and environmental organizations 
Goal: policy-oriented advocacy as crux of the pro-democratic function of civil 
society 
• Media (training programs for journalists, sometimes equipment donations to 
newspapers, radio or television stations) 
Goal: Fostering the growth of independent, professionalized media 
• Unions 
Goal: Strong, independent unions are a crucial component of democracy. 
 
The status quo of an institution in the recipient country is being compared to the 
idealized endpoint of a western counterpart institution. The identified gaps should be 
closed with the help of an assistance program, in most cases by a sea of trainings. Aid 
providers are seeing the process of knowledge transfer and behavioral training as 
essential for democracy and view democracy assistance in the role of a facilitator of 
it.116 
 
The institution-modeling approach, which is neither based on US domestic political 
experience nor on academic theory, is rooted in “the actual experience of the 
democratic transition that the assistance is attempting to support”.117  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Carothers (1997), p.116 
117 ibid, p.119 
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“According to this model, the transformation process begins with a political opening 
in which a non-democratic regime opens up the political system. The political 
opening gains momentum and leads to national elections, and in some cases, to the 
drafting and adoption of a new constitution. Once an elected government is in place, 
the transition proceeds with the rationalization and democratization of government 
institutions and the simultaneous strengthening and diversification of civil society.”118 
 
Carothers highlights the existing discrepancy between academic democratization 
theory and actual democracy assistance in the field and finds rather pragmatic 
explanations for it. On the one hand he states academic research is backward oriented 
whereas democratic assistance is and must be forward oriented, based on the actual 
work experience in the field. Competing theoretical approaches of democratization do 
not help matters, as seemingly everything in a society seems vital for the transition 
process, in so far has democracy theory little output relevance for assistance 
providers. 
Furthermore there is a “low tolerance for the political science jargon”119 and the 
limited time for academic research in regard to program design and implementation 
for a recipient country. 
 
Although Carothers identifies the strategy of institutional modeling as a logical 
explanation of rapid democratic transitions and western actors involved in giving 
assistance, he criticizes that it is “superficial and too generic”.120 
 
Twelve years later Carothers detects in his work Democracy assistance: political vs. 
developmental? not only a maturing field of democratic assistance, but also an 
emergence of two distinct approaches: the political approach and the developmental 
approach of democratic assistance.121 
Whereas the political approach is the continuation of the institution-modeling 
approach with a narrow conception of democracy and a focus on elections and 
political liberties, the developmental approach is based on a broader democracy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 ibid, p.116 
119 ibid, p.118 
120 ibid, p.130 
121 Carothers, Thomas, Democracy assistance: political vs. developmental?, Journal of Democracy 
Volume 20, Number 1 January 2009, 5-19, p.5 
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definition. “One that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept 
of democratization as a slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set 
of political and socioeconomic developments. It favors democracy aid that pursues 
incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, 
frequently emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state.”122 
In this sense the developmental approach is part of the larger national development 
process and proponents deem social and economic rights equally important as 
political and civil rights.123 
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2.4. Elections and Democracy 
 
Elections and the right to vote have undergone tremendous change over the past 
hundred years. As an example, manhood suffrage was introduced in many countries 
only in the early 19th century with an expanding on universal suffrage, meaning the 
right to vote for women as well, only in the later 19th and early 20th century.124  
The People Act in the United Kingdom granted only in 1918 “most men over twenty- 
one obtain the vote, together then with women over thirty, who were not treated 
equally with male electors in regard to age until 1928”.125 In Austria’s neighboring 
country Switzerland, women were only granted the right to cast a vote in 1971, and 
some even waited twenty more years to vote at local level. During the apartheid era in 
South Africa voting was practically limited to a white electorate. Even to this day, 
women have limited rights of suffrage in some Arab countries. 
 
As previously argued, elections have a distinctive role for a democracy and are an 
important impetus for the democratization process. They are “the defining institutions 
of modern democracy”.126 Scholarly research on the importance of elections offers 
controversial interpretation, with some scholars dismissing ‘electoralism’ as an ethno-
centric diversion from genuine democracy, while others emphasizing its centrality.127 
 
Katz analyzed the role elections play in democracy in his homonymic book 
Democracy and Elections. He tried to identify and connect the two fields of inquiry 
by exploring the relationship between them. 
In his words, “elections are to prevent tyranny, confirm authority, articulate externally 
determined truth, select and empower representatives, allow the will of the people to 
be articulated and carried into effect, prevent selfish interests from using control of 
the government to exploit others, promote the flowering of human potential, and 
foster the development and maintenance of viable communities.”128  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage, 04/06/2011 
125 Goodwill- Gill, Guy, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice, Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, Geneva, 2006, p.94 
126 Katz, Richard S., Democracy and Elections, Oxford University Press, Oxford, NY, 1997, p.3 
127 Pastor, Robert A., The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for 
Policy and Research, Democratization, Vol.6, No.4, Winter 1999, pp.1-27, Frank Cass, London, 1999, 
p.5 
128 Katz (1997), p.100 
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He points out five functions of elections:129 
1.) Legitimation: Democracy is to take virtually universally to be the only 
acceptable form of government, this becomes a general argument about the 
legitimacy of a political system, which is legitimate because it is democratic, 
and democratic because it holds elections. 
2.) Installation of Officials: Most elementary function; an electoral system that 
left unfilled vacancies would be a failure. 
3.) Selection and Choice: Democratic theory must allow some element of choice 
by the citizens (elections as choices among persons and elections as choices 
among policies). 
4.) Representation: Create or foster representation in the twin senses of 
establishing a normative expectation and facilitating a recruitment or reward 
structure for the elected to represent the electors. 
5.) Popular Involvement: Elections are expected to provide an occasion for 
popular involvement in politics and for popular education about politics. 
Election campaigns provide a setting for candidates and other involved 
citizens to present alternative views to the wider electorate, and an occasion 
when ordinary citizens are expected, and expect. To devote more attention 
than usual to listening to that debate. 
 
Katz further analyzed various models of democracy with greatly diverging 
institutional frameworks (see fig. below) based on four fundamental values of 
democracy, popular sovereignty, liberalism, participation, community, adding 
‘equality’ as fifth value.130 The concept of ‘equality’ he views as essential as “no 
theory can be said to be democratic without a significant element of equality” and 
pinpoints the lowest common denominator as “equality at the ballot box”131. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Katz (1997), pp.101-105 
130 Four values: Popular sovereignty (‘will of the people’ should determine government personnel and 
policy), Liberalism (groups need not just formal rights but practical power to protect themselves from 
abuse by their governors), Participation (participation in self-government is an essential prerequisite for 
full human development), Community (democracy both reflects and fosters a single demos that both 
has, and perceives itself to have, a commonality of interest). See: Katz, Richard S., Democratic 
Principles and Judging “Free and Fair”. In: Revisiting Free and Fair Elections, An International Round 
Table on Election Standards, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, 2004, p.21 
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The four values of democratic theory are largely incompatible and different 
choices concerning electoral institutions must be made between them. In Katz’s 
global empirical study on electoral systems, his objective was finding the institutions 
most applicable to each model of democracy. 
Fig.1: Models of democracy132 
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Manin, Przeworski and Stokes also highlight the double role of elections and reason 
that for one elections enable the electorate to select the rulers, and on the other hand 
elections act as an ‘accountability mechanism’. “Elections are a “contingent renewal” 
accountability mechanism, where the sanctions are to extend or not to extend the 
government’s tenure.133 
Agh points out the fact that general and local elections play an important role “in the 
political learning of both the masses – the party constituencies – and the elites – the 
party leaders – from election to election.”134 
 
A focus report on ACE (The Electoral Knowledge Network), Electoral Laws: A 
Macroscopic Perspective, with the goal of examining the laws that govern the 
conduct of elections around the world, came to some interesting conclusions. Firstly, 
the data suggested that electoral rules are rarely correlated with economic 
development, an expected finding assuming that “economy may be a strong 
prerequisite in the democratization process but it may have little to do in the precise 
forms of democracy that a country chooses”. In addition, the second surprising 
discovery was the general absence of a relationship between the degree of democracy 
and the nature of electoral rules. This suggested to the authors “the lack of consensus 
on even the minimal conditions under which elections should be contested in a 
democracy.”135 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Przeworski, Adam, Stokes, Susan C., Manin, Bernard (Ed.), Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1999, p. 10 
134 Agh (1998), p.19 
135 Blais, André, Dobrzynska, Agnieszka, Electoral Laws: A Macroscopic Perspective, on ACE (The 
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2.5. Conclusion  
 
The swift progress of democracy in many countries raised hopes for a better world; the expectations 
were that democracy would not only promote political liberties and other human rights but would also 
lead to rapid economic development and increased welfare as well as to international relations 
characterized by peaceful cooperation and mutual understanding. 
Georg Sorensen136 
 
The previous paragraphs clearly demonstrate the pivotal role of elections in a 
democracy. Electoral processes relating to voting, as well as its underlying notions 
and values play a critical role in safeguarding the quality of elections in a democracy. 
Democratic elections mirror many aspects of democracy including the rule of law, 
participation, legitimacy of a political system, civil and social freedoms, and thereby 
provide a mechanism to give citizens a voice. Pastor sees a consensus that defines 
democracy as a system of government by which the people choose their leaders in a 
free election, and those leaders have effective power under the rule of law.137  
 
In order to conduct a study of democratization and electoral assistance it is crucial to 
have a concise and practical definition of democracy. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, several different concepts of democracy exist. David Held’s definition 
“democracy means a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies 
and aristocracies, the people rule”138 is little disputed but leaves a lot of questions 
unanswered. It serves as a wider and comprehensive notion of democracy in contrast 
to Schumpeter’s very narrow definition. Schumpeter’s approach to democracy as a 
mechanism for choosing political leadership is elitist and simplifies the overall 
mechanisms of democracy. Robert Dahl’s polyarchy as a tool for conceptualizing 
democracy is valuable for democracy theory as he places emphasis on universal 
suffrage within elections, in contrast to Schumpeter who neglected this criterion. 
Dahl’s two dimensions, contestation and participation imply a third dimension 
concerning basic civil liberties. With the addition of civil rights, an important aspect 
is given to the notion of democracy. Huntington follows the Schumpeterian tradition 
in terms of the significance in choosing political leadership. He adds Dahl’s two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Sorensen, Georg (2008), p.1 
137 Pastor (1999), p.5 
138 Held (1996), p. 1 
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dimensions – contestation and participation – and its implying civil and political 
freedoms in his analysis framework on democracy and considers the importance of 
free, fair and regular elections. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter give 
particular attention to the significant value accrued through the role elections play in 
the transition to political democracy. Linz and Stepan also claim, “A democratic 
transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political 
procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power as 
a direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the 
authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial 
powers generated by the new democracy do not have to share power with other bodies 
de jure.”139 Wolfgang Merkel sees democratic elections as an inadequate indicator to 
explain democracy for his model of embedded and defective democracies, whereas 
O’Donnell concludes in his theory of delegative democracies, that elections are an 
essential mechanism of accountability.  
 
Although democracy cannot be reduced to the holding of regular elections, many 
academic analyses employ a minimalist definition of democracy, namely free and fair 
elections for an adult electorate. While this makes data more comparable and safer to 
apply, this should only be viewed as the start of the democratization process with its 
manifold implications. Elections present a crucial opportunity to instill and 
consolidate practices that enable meaningful social and economic development.140 
But not only can citizens choose their representatives and participate directly in a 
political process, “conversely, elections are crucial to the political legitimacy of 
governments and represent a foundation for states to serve every citizen and take on 
the challenges of poverty focused development”.141 Assessing the future outlook as to 
whether democratic advancement will continue or there will be a more peaceful world 
as a result of democratization efforts cannot be answered by this study.  
 
The author chooses the definition set forward by Dahl in his classical work of 
Polyarchy in which he views democracy as an ideal that does not exist in the real 
world, but as a model which allows citizens to formulate their preferences freely, 	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signify these preferences to other citizens and the government by individual or 
collective actions and finally to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct 
of government.142 His two dimensions contestation and participation constitute a 
framework for defining regimes. Within this framework democracies are regimes, 
which endorse contestation and participation for its citizens to the highest degree. 
Dahl’s polyarchy is structured procedurally and institutionally, and is therefore a 
useful tool not only for this work but also for democracy practitioners and donor 
countries in terms of democracy promotion. 
 
One additional topic, the question of a prerequisite of democratization, namely 
territorial boundaries and a nation-state, needs to be re-addressed at this juncture.143 
Scholars argue that the state formation and nation building are “prerequisites of any 
meaningful democratization” 144 The conditions for developing a liberal democracy 
with an “unsolved identity or stateness crisis” are also noted by Merkel who sees civil 
and political rights endangered in such cases.145 
With regard to Kosovo’s status and questions of its territorial sovereignty, the 
question of its democracy stability and quality is an extremely complex issue. Despite 
the acceptance of Kosovo as an independent state by eighty-seven states146, many 
countries have not yet recognized its independence. Serbia, as the major opponent, 
sees Kosovo’s declaration of independence as a violation of international laws and 
has continued influence over the mostly Serbian populated north. For the purpose of 
this paper the author does not address these issues directly as the mostly consolidated 
Albanian population structure has the same political goals. The boycott of most 
elections after the Kosovo conflict by the Serbian population will be addressed at a 
latter stage.  
 
With regards to the questionable scenario of whether to consider Kosovo as a 
“democracy” without a resolved status, the author has decided to take a pragmatic 
approach for this study by assuming Kosovo’s independent status within its 
boundaries as given. 	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Chapter III: Electoral Assistance 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Over the past thirty years, elections have played a pivotal role in democratic 
transitions around the world, in addition to acting as a central pillar towards conflict 
resolution. This theme continues to play a more important role with the current shift 
towards globalized world politics meaning that interests move beyond local borders. 
However, in order for elections to succeed in gaining international legitimacy, free 
and fair elections have become vital for the transitional country and its leadership.  
 
The international community147 has established elections as a major impetus for 
promoting democracy around the world, and over the last two decades, the elections 
have become a vital factor for international assistance programs that have shifted 
from pure peace building to a wider state-building approach.  
Following from this, electoral assistance has developed into “something of a growth 
industry”148, where different organizations with different backgrounds are 
(sometimes) competing for assisting programs and the various funds available. Many 
post-conflict elections would not have materialized without international assistance 
and/or funding, or would have lacked credibility. The success of elections in regards 
to a democratization effect differs considerably from country to country. Where in 
some cases successful elections were vital in mobilizing further democratic steps, in 
other cases flawed elections led to additional problems. The primary goal of electoral 
assistance is first and foremost to ensure that countries have the ability to organize 
future elections with little or no external help.149 
 
Studying the relationship between elections, democracy and their interdependencies is 
instructive, but not at all self-explanatory. 	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Democracy cannot be reduced to the holding of periodic and genuine elections, 
however free and fair criteria imply important aspects of democracy such as the rule 
of law, the political system, exercise choice, the involvement of political parties 
within the population, freedom of media and speech, participation of minorities and 
campaigning, acting quasi as a safeguard to human rights. 
According to Benjamin Reilly, “[can] the holding of elections have a decisive 
influence on how the rhythm of peaceful democratic politics can evolve and become 
sustainable, to what extent the internal politics of fragile new states become 
stabilized, and whether a peace settlement and new post-conflict regime comes to be 
viewed as legitimate.”150 
The democratic norm of free and fair elections and its implications for the 
electoral process itself are important factors for electoral assistance programs and 
democratization processes. Electoral assistance, which enables countries to hold free 
and fair elections, is a valuable source of promoting democracy in a broader sense.  
 
The level of importance which elections are given by political actors and donor 
countries is correlated to the importance of elections in democracy theory. Elections 
are fundamentally important for a democratic transition but do not equate to 
democracy. Nevertheless, elections in a post-conflict scenario have a different point 
of departure and need to be set up in challenging circumstances. 
 
In this chapter, the author of this study will discuss electoral assistance, the particular 
characteristics and objectives of elections in a post-conflict scenario, emphasize the 
role of election administration, introduce the most important players in the field of 
electoral assistance and outline international standards for free and fair elections. 
 
3.2. Electoral Assistance as a Tool for Democracy Promotion 
 
The notion of international electoral assistance has transformed over the years and has 
roots in the broad area of democracy assistance and part of democracy development 
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of countries in transition.151 The proclamation of the UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948 provides in Article 21152 the legal and moral justification for 
democracy assistance. International organizations that were foremost used for 
arbitration and peacekeeping functions are more and more involved in state building, 
especially in electoral programs. As there is a strong emphasis on election as a key 
component of the democratization process, it is in the international community’s 
utmost interest to help ensure the organization of a credible voting.  
 
Election assistance may be defined as the technical or material support given to the 
electoral process. It may imply professional help to establish a legal framework for 
the elections. It may also take the form of a general input to the national electoral 
body, such as providing voting materials and equipment, or helping in the registration 
of political parties and/or of voters. It may also imply support to NGOs and civil 
society in areas such as voter and civic education or training of local observers, as 
well as support in media monitoring and training of journalists.153 
According to Reilly…“electoral assistance forces critical choices to be made and 
elections represent a key step in a broader process of political maturation and 
legitimation. The holding of elections can have a decisive influence on how the 
rhythm of peaceful democratic politics can evolve and become sustainable, to what 
extent the internal politics of fragile new states become stabilized, and whether a 
peace settlement and new post-conflict regime comes to be viewed as legitimate.”154 
 
As previously described at great length, elections are an important tool in soliciting 
citizen participation and a vital forum to exercise political voice.155 The electorate 
gets the opportunity to choose their representatives and hold governments accountable 	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for their actions. It is a highly visible process with high-stakes not only for the 
concerned citizenry but also for the IC. Once the balloting is organized in a free and 
fair manner, it brings credit and reputation not only for the government in question 
but also for the organizations involved. The process depends therefore much on the 
quality of the elections and of the representative institutions. “Many countries have 
started to reform their electoral practices to more closely meet the interconnected 
goals of accountability, legitimacy, representativeness and sustainability.”156  
 
The widespread and strong emphasis on elections by the international community is 
comprehensible, viewing them as a tool for settling the question of ‘who’ will govern 
after a conflict to lead a country towards democracy. “Not holding elections or 
refusing to provide a timetable for elections may raise serious questions about the 
commitment of negotiating parties to a democratic future.”157 This helps to explain 
why elections often form the nucleus of peace accords. Clearly, the situation of fragile 
states in a post-conflict setting is different due to its unstable security situation with 
the possibility of a relapse of violence and conflict. In this frequently politically 
complex and volatile environment players in electoral assistance must often respond 
quickly to delayed requests from a host country. With these scenarios in mind, any 
approach of electoral assistance will depend on the type of election: post-conflict, 
breakthrough, consolidating or procedural”:158 
 
Post-conflict elections take place in the aftermath of war or civil conflict, and are often part of 
a peace agreement. They are fragile operations and can be jeopardized by outbreaks of 
violence in violation of a ceasefire. Problems concerning this type of election can include 
demobilization and disarming of combatants, and the establishment of new public security 
forces. 
 
Breakthrough elections are the first or second round of elections after a period of 
authoritarian or military rule. This type is characterized by a “shift to a constitutional 
government based on civilian rule and competitive elections”. This period is prone to a 	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reversion into authoritarian rule due to uncertainty and antagonism due to the electoral rules 
and procedures. 
 
Consolidating elections are the third or fourth round of elections, which serve to advance the 
process of democratization, and have in some measure become routine. A limited degree of 
uncertainty still exists, however assistance centers around maximizing performance and 
building institutional capacity. On an operational level, countries may benefit from assistance 
in refining election legislation, introducing technological or procedural innovations, and in 
improving strategic planning and organizational management. 
 
Procedural elections are routine elections held in accordance with times and procedures set 
out in the constitution. Processes have been set up and adopted by institutions, which are 
capable of executing them. There may be little reason to provide assistance to procedural 
elections. 
 
Efficient assistance programs need to target weaknesses within the system and its 
institutions, assessing how problems and deficits can be supported – financially 
and/or technically – and build electoral capacity to close the gaps. The context of 
elections is a key factor in deciding what type of strategy and assistance is suitable. 
Assessing the context means considering the “type of election, the configuration of 
the political environment, social-cultural factors, the economic situation, institutional 
issues, and security concerns”.159 Building electoral capacity is not limited to the 
establishment of electoral institutions and legal prerequisites. Safeguarding the 
effective knowledge transfer, the build up of manpower and competence development 
of local staff is a special challenge for assistance programs, as the ability to remain in 
the assigned position for local personnel is often impractical. 
 
Kumar and Ottaway conclude rightly that “without international assistance, elections 
would not have materialized [in many countries] […] and would have been less 
credible”.160  
Financial and technical assistance enables the holding of elections in precarious 
circumstances and might help in preventing fraud, however it does not resolve the 	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question of its impact, the efficiency of electoral assistance programs and high costs 
related to it. A further analysis is needed to understand the positive and negative 
effects of assistance in post-conflict scenarios. 
 
With regards to Kosovo, the first municipal elections in 2001 as well as the first 
Kosovo-wide elections in 2002 can both be considered post-conflict elections, 
whereas those held in later years as consolidating or better ‘transitional’ elections. 
The author prefers the term transitional due to Kosovo’s contested status as a 
democracy. The term ‘consolidated’ might imply a certain degree of democracy 
stability and routine electoral processes, which needs further discussion. 
 
3.2.1. The Role of International Electoral Assistance 
 
Post-conflict and transitional elections can require various forms of external support 
of which electoral assistance is one. Its relevance is extremely significant, due to the 
importance in conducting free and fair elections, often a vital component of peace 
accords and mark simultaneously an important step towards democracy and 
international reputation. Elections serve so to speak as peaceful alternative to war for 
contesting political power. 
 
The degree of engagement by the IC in post-conflict and transitional elections varies 
enormously. In some cases, international intervention is limited to financial help, 
technical assistance programs or/and election monitoring. In other cases, the role of a 
local government and EMB to design and implement post-conflict elections is 
assumed by international organizations themselves. 
 
Krishna Kumar classifies international support for post-conflict elections into four 
categories: 
1) Peacekeeping Operations 
2) Creating Political Prerequisites 
3) Developing Electoral Infrastructure 
4) Monitoring Elections 
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Establishing a peacekeeping force to oversee cease-fires and prevent a new outbreak 
of violence is vital to the holding of elections. International peacekeeping forces 
provide a sense of security to people and can have a mediating effect on conflicted 
parties. In addition to security aspects, logistical capabilities such as transport and 
communication are of high value for elections.161 
 
The categories ‘Creating Political Prerequisites’ and ‘Developing Electoral 
Infrastructure’ can be subsumed under the term ‘(Technical) Electoral Assistance’. 
The ample scope of electoral assistance activities ranges from ‘institutional 
strengthening’ programs with a focus on building capacity within existing EMBs, 
assisting them with general issues such as budgeting, management, planning, 
logistical strategies, staff recruitment, training, etc. to a more sophisticated approach, 
helping designing electoral systems, creating codes of conduct, drafting constitutional 
changes, reform of legal codes and so on. Between these two approaches lies the 
gross of electoral assistance programs.162 
According to Reilly, international EA consists of the following major sub-areas (see 
in detail Annex, table 1, p.152): 
Support for first-time elections, assistance for constitutional and legal reforms, 
assistance for EMBs, voter registration, civic and voter education programs, 
international monitoring and observation, and strengthening of political parties. 
 
Besides the problems addressed earlier in connection to post-conflict elections, there 
are further concerns regarding efficiency and costs of external support programs and 
the subsequent question, how can international electoral assistance ensure free and 
fair elections? 
With the number of electoral assistance programs around the world growing, concern 
about its effectiveness in designing and implementing such programs and its 
outcomes have emerged. Events have shown that elections can bring two parties back 
together to the table and end hostilities, or they can lead to new violent outbreaks. 
One key issue for consideration of electoral support is the sustainability of its 
processes and technologies for a recipient country. Electoral technologies must be 
chosen in accordance to the capacity of the host country to handle it respectively as 	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well as processes, which might need great logistical, financial or (trained) human 
resources. “The real challenge facing the international community is to help build 
sustainable procedures that function effectively without external assistance” 
concludes Reilly and raises the fact of the international’s tendency to focus on a 
country’s first election. This kind of support is very shortsighted and ignores the 
cyclical nature of elections and its learning curve. The progress in this area is slow 
(mostly due to financing) but the trend towards long-time programs is continually 
increasing and the Electoral Cycle approach designed to encourage improvements in 
this direction. 
 
3.3. Elections in Post-conflict Situations 
 
Post-conflict elections differ significantly from elections organized under normal 
circumstances. First and foremost, the political landscape in a post-conflict country is 
ill-suited for political reconstruction, development and reform. Signing of peace 
treaties and setting dates for the first post-conflict election are taken as a positive 
signal by all stakeholders, but offers limited guarantees for solving deep political 
cleavages and political reconciliation.163 They symbolize an end to intra-state 
conflicts and carry prospect and hope in a conflict-ridden society for genuine 
elections. The resulting pressure on its outcome is enormous as it can act as tightrope 
walk between war and peace. Benjamin Reilly summarizes the positive role of 
elections in post-conflict scenarios as: “Elections provide an inescapable means for 
jump-starting a new, post-conflict political order; for stimulating the development of 
democratic politics; for choosing representatives; for forming governments; and for 
conferring legitimacy upon the new political order.“164  
 
Given the difficulties and risks of elections in a post-conflict context, electoral 
assistance faces numerous challenges – from the creation of a voter list, the security 
situation around Election Day, to the counting of the votes, which the case study of 
this paper will demonstrate. There are numerous factors, which can lead to the success 	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or failure of an election and consequently the beginning or full stop of a 
democratization process. Considering the two goals of post-conflict elections, namely 
war termination and democratization, competitive elections act as “instruments used 
not only to promote democracy but also to attempt to consolidate a fragile peace”.165 
Negotiating peace agreements often translate into a claim for free and fair elections to 
establish a new legitimate government for a renewed post-conflict order.  
Two additional factors influencing post-conflict elections that are relevant for this 
study point directly to electoral assistance programs: 166 
 
• Existence of effective political institutions and  
• Capacity of those institutions to undertake elections 
 
Such political institutions are interim governments, electoral management bodies like 
election commissions and political parties. They play a pivotal role in establishing a 
working electoral framework and conducting credible post-conflict elections, thus 
making important steps towards democratization. Constituting a forum for active 
participation of former opponents and an opportunity for establishing democratic 
norms and create a democratic framework, political institutions are an important area 
of international assistance. Characteristic for post-conflict societies is the lack or the 
extreme fragility of these fundamentally important institutions.167 “Many such 
countries do not have the legal framework for free and fair elections. They lack an 
election commission, personnel with the technical training to organize elections, and 
voter lists. [They] lack the economic and human resources to launch competitive 
elections.”168 Only with substantial international assistance can such obstacles be 
overcome. Albeit the good intentions of all actors involved, Reilly identified three 
areas with a dire influence on post-conflict elections: Timing, Electoral Mechanics, 
and Political Parties and Power-sharing.  
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Timing 
“Issues of timing also directly affect administrative choices, electoral system designs 
and the way political parties form”169. When post-conflict elections are organized too 
soon, national political issues are not brought to resolution – instead focus remains on 
the current conflict. In their quantitative analysis Brancati and Snyder determine that 
“in post-conflict settings, holding elections too soon after a civil war ends generally 
increases the likelihood of a return to war.”170 According to their study, early 
elections can be successful when “the opposing sides are not well armed and have 
institutional guarantees of their security, as in the case of decisive victories, 
demobilization, peacekeeping, and power sharing.”171 All too often the IC has pushed 
for early elections with the anticipation of a quick moving democratization process, 
the belief of political stability and the hope of fast withdrawal of international troops. 
The possibility of ill-timed elections leading to renewed conflict is high without the 
necessary preconditions and right context. The demobilization of former combatants 
as well as assisting post-conflict regimes to strengthen their impartial administration 
capacity and justice are crucial criteria to build the right environment for post-conflict 
elections and a less likelihood for a return to war. 
 
Electoral Mechanics 
Reilly divides electoral mechanics into two areas:172 
1.) Electoral system (the formula by which votes are converted into seats, ballot 
papers, structure of electoral districts) 
2.) Electoral administration (electoral management body, provisions for voter 
registration, boundary delimitation, etc.) 
1.) Electoral system 
The design of electoral systems is one of the most important institutional choices for 
any political system. Electoral systems have a rewarding or restricting influence on 
political behavior. They are “a key mechanism in shaping wider political practices, 
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and can have an effect far beyond the elections themselves.”173 While most scholars 
subscribe to this belief, strong controversy exists when trying to specify which 
electoral system is best suited for divided societies emerging from conflict. 
Two main schools of thought predominate: the consociational and the centripetal 
approach. Whereas the consociational argue “that some form of proportional 
representation is all but essential for divided societies, as this enables all politically-
significant ethnic groups, including minorities, to form ethnically-based parties”, 
proponents of the centripetal approach advocate electoral systems “that encourage 
cooperation and accommodation between rival groups, and therefore work to break 
down the salience of ethnicity rather than foster its representation in parliament.”174 
Despite the difference of these approaches, there is basic agreement on some sort of 
power-sharing government. Proportional representation  (PR) systems are designed to 
include the proportions of the constituents in the government and are therefore for all 
intents and purposes an important step of democracy building. PR systems can resolve 
inequalities of party representation, guarantee minority representation and achieve a 
higher female quota in the assembly. In the last years, most major transitional 
elections used PR systems using open or closed lists (allowing voters or parties 
themselves choosing candidates). According to Reilly, “party-list PR has become the 
de facto norm of UN parliamentary elections. […] PR systems have many advantages, 
for transitional elections in new democracies: they are fair, transparent and provide a 
clear correlation between votes cast in the election and seats won in parliament.”175 
More generally electoral systems are defined in terms of the ‘4-Ps’: politics, parties, 
polling and proportionality.176 The proportionality factor is the most contested one, as 
it concerns the plurality-majority, the semi-proportional and the proportional systems. 
 
2.) Electoral administration 
Electoral administration is, in contrast to electoral systems, an uncharted territory that 
has until recently received scant attention from comparative political scientists. Its 
value for post-conflict elections is high and rather underestimated by scholars. The 
implications for democratic transitions are explained in greater detail below, as there 
are some valuable insights to be gained for the case study of Kosovo’s count center. 	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The role of EMBs is to organize and manage post-conflict elections and 
combine functions relating to both conflict resolution and democratization. The 
primary purpose of any electoral commission is to deliver credible (“free and fair”) 
election services to the constituency and all political parties. Impartiality and 
independence, efficiency, professionalism, and transparency are important attributes 
for an election administration in the context of a hostile post-conflict environment.177 
The composition of an EMB – whether in some form of Independent Electoral 
Commission or based around party representatives and political appointees, has a 
great influence on elections and decisions to be made. “The world-wide trend is 
definitely towards independent electoral commissions staffed by non-partisan civil 
servants.”178 The election commission in Kosovo as an example is based on the less-
favorable US form of electoral administration with party representatives which, as 
Reilly argues rightly, has “an almost inevitable tendency to split along party lines”179, 
therefore becoming inefficient when it comes to cases in favor of one party or 
another. Impartiality, independence and efficiency are integral parts of the overall 
credibility of the electoral process.180 Partisan commissions can severely damage the 
credibility and jeopardize the democratization process.  
 
The registration of voters is another force to be reckoned with as in most post-conflict 
scenarios records of civilians are lost or have been destroyed. Often a basic census of 
the population is missing altogether. Creating a voter register is a great logistical and 
time-consuming challenge but necessary to ensure someone’s right to vote, the 
assignment to a polling location and electoral districts. 
 
Political Parties and Power-sharing 
As mentioned earlier, political parties play a pivotal role in engineering post-conflict 
environments. Scholars identified the need to build “broad-based, cross-regional and 
multi-ethnic political parties in fragile multi-ethnic states, particularly those 
susceptible to separatist appeals, [...] and to avoid the narrow, personalized and 
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sectarian parties and party systems that have undermined so many new 
democracies.”181 
In order to achieve such broad based political parties and party systems, there have 
been various institutional approaches in transitional democracies:182 
1.) Party rules governing formation, registration and campaigning encouraging parties 
to constitute along cross regional and cross-ethnic lines 
2.) Electoral systems with preferential voting (enables voters to rank candidates of 
preferences for candidates on the ballot paper) 
3.) Distribution requirements (voter support must be collected from across different 
regions) 
4.) ‘Rules of the game’ encourage/require parties to submit multi-ethnic lists of 
candidates, advocating multi-ethnicity within parties 
5.) External intervention: as ‘top-down’ impetus to organizing and building 
sustainable political parties. As an example, a network of ‘political party service 
centers’ was established in Kosovo to support political parties with “logistical and 
material assistance and, by implication, helping them move towards becoming 
functioning, policy-oriented political parties”. 
 
Besides these issues, Reilly points to the ‘generals-to-politicians transformation’183, a 
problem occurring especially in the Balkans, where leaders who fought the conflict 
become the party elites. This is problematic in terms of their political programs and 
goals. 
 
Post-conflict elections are entrenched in the process of war termination and 
democratization. They are “marred by political instability, violence and social 
intimidation. Where they exist, these conditions can threaten the integrity of any 
elections process and call for sensitized and cautious external support”184 Overcoming 
those challenges, building sustainable and feasible electoral institutions and processes 
are important measures towards long-term democratization for a post-conflict 
country. Post-conflict elections are a ‘form of conflict resolution’ but are not a ‘quick-
fix’ solution for war torn societies, which need to socially and politically stabilize and 	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recover. Demilitarizing politics is a pre-condition for elections to promote peace and 
democracy as is creating reliable and effective electoral institutions. 
Garber offers a comprehensible summary of the characteristics of post-conflict 
elections:185 
1.) Occur after the negotiation of peace accords that involve most, if not all, the 
parties in the conflict. 
2.) Peace accords afford a major role to external actors (either an international 
organization or a group of nations), often involving the deployment of military 
or police forces to the country emerging from conflict. 
3.) External actors generally commit to assuming a major role in administering, 
supervising, observing, funding, and otherwise supporting the elections. 
4.) Elections often take place while reconstruction efforts are still in their infancy, 
refugees and displaced persons have not returned to their original places of 
residence, and land mines make travel difficult in certain regions of the 
country. 
 
3.4. An Underestimated Function: Electoral Administration in 
Democratic Transitions 
 
The fair and effective administration of the rules is often as important as the rules themselves. 
Robert A. Pastor186 
 
This study has elaborated on the conditions and consequences of democracy and 
democratization, following the theoretical scholarly tradition. As will be analyzed 
later in detail in the case study, the administration of elections is an often-disregarded 
link between democracy and elections, as well as theorists and practitioners. 
Practitioners identified the relevance of electoral administration as a result of their 
experience in the field but its particular impact still needs further analysis.  
 
The conduct of elections consists of many tasks once the constitution approves the 
government framework, establishes an Election Commission and sets a date for 
elections to be held. The tasks at issue in the individual areas of administration are 	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included in the three different elections stages: Pre-Election Stage, Election Day, 
Post-Election Verification and Dispute Settlement (see Annex, p.153). 
Electoral administration can lead to the success or failure of an election, hence a 
failure of a democracy transition and a relapse to conflict and war. “Elections are both 
the supreme political act and a routine administrative exercise. […] In a poor, 
relatively uneducated, developing country, the administration of an election is no 
simple matter. In such countries, the boundary line separating political manipulation 
and technical incapacity is rarely surveyed, and elections can fail for one or both 
reasons.”187 
Political suspicion is strong in an environment emerging from conflict, and technical 
incapacity can be seen as a politically motivated manipulation therefore being highly 
explosive. Certain administrative tasks can result in technical problems and lead to 
intensified political polarization. As Pastor argues rightly, “The failure to conduct an 
election that is judged fair by all sides can preempt a democratic transition. Repeated 
failures can lead to violence and chronic instability.”188 
In advanced democracies electoral administration is taken for granted – a routine 
exercise for all participants.  In transitional democracies however, the situation is 
extremely different, as political leaders have limited experience in the political arena 
or with the procedural rules governing an election. In addition, these leaders are not 
used to subtle tactics needed for political compromise, or from a practical perspective 
the “technical elements of conducting an election also of a magnitude of difficulty as 
to overwhelm most poor countries.”189 
 
Reilly has pointed out the influential forces of the composition of EMBs and their 
potential danger in a post-conflict society. Also Pastor stresses the importance of the 
structure and character of this function as it can determine “whether an election is a 
source of peaceful change or a cause for serious instability.”190 The stakes of post-
conflict elections are high and therefore the manner in which they are administered 
plays a key factor in their outcome, legitimacy and further democracy transition and 
stability. Election administration has a direct impact on how elections are perceived 
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by voters, political parties, candidates and civil society.191 Electoral assistance 
programs are often engaged in advising or mediating roles to Election Commissions, 
trying to improve and strengthen their institutional capacities.  
 
Election administration is a critical variable in a democracy transition as “technical 
problems converge into the political ones, threatening the entire process”192. It is not a 
variable explaining democracy itself, as Pastor suggests, but an important variable 
explaining successful or flawed elections. “A ‘flawed’ election is one in which some 
or all of the major political parties refuse to participate in the election or reject the 
results. This definition contrasts with a more traditional one that relies on ‘checklists’ 
to determine whether an election is free, fair and meaningful. [One of the main] 
problems with this ideal definition is that it fails to confront the pattern of 
manipulation and boycott, which is what stymies most transitional elections.”193 This 
definition does not imply that all developing countries have a patent for fraud, 
corruption and manipulation or that it cannot be corrected. According to Pastor, most 
elections have some sort of irregularities but much depends on credible institutions to 
monitor and if necessary prosecute such felonies, which is the case in established 
democracies.194 This is an important example why monitoring elections is crucial, but 
not only by the IC much more so by political parties, domestic NGOs and citizens. 
 
Pastor identifies the most persistent problems in transitional election as, registration, 
multiple voting, and the count.195 The registration of voters is extremely challenging 
due to missing or incomplete civil registries or a census. Voter registration is “ one of 
the most complex, time consuming and expensive operations of the electoral 
administration. At the basic level, it consists of collecting and storing data to create 
lists of those who are eligible to vote in an election.”196 Multiple voting can result 
because of flawed voter lists or deliberate fraud. Providing indelible ink is one of the 
means trying to prevent multiple voting but variations in quality or available solvents 
can circumvent this measure of precaution. The counting of ballots, which this case 	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study will examine in greater detail, is sensitive as increasing the number of votes of a 
favored candidate/political party, and/or reducing the number of votes of a rival 
candidate/party can alter results. The aggregation of results at the regional and 
national level falls into this category as well.197 
 
Goodwill-Gil recommends implementing measures for states to “ensure the 
achievement of democratic goals and the progressive strengthening of democratic 
traditions”. He points out the importance of a neutral and impartial EMB which needs 
to ensure following:198 
a) Those responsible for the administration of the election are trained and act 
impartially 
b) Coherent voting procedures are established and made known to the voting 
public 
c) The registration of voters, updating of electoral rolls and balloting procedures, 
with the assistance of national and international observers, as appropriate 
d) Encourage parties, candidates and the media to accept and adopt a Code of 
Conduct to govern the election campaign and the polling period 
e) The integrity of the ballot through appropriate measures to prevent double and 
multiple voting and fraud 
f) The integrity of the process for counting votes 
g) Announce the election results and facilitate any transfer of authority 
 
Building up of institutional capacities to allow for the identification of material gaps 
in electoral processes, addressing them and trying to resolve them, is an important 
step in gaining the confidence of the people for elections and a further democratic 
transition. 
 
3.4.1. Sustainability through Process-based Electoral Cycle Approach 
 
The reasons for including the Electoral Cycle into this study are many. Firstly, it 
illustrates the electoral process including technical aspects in a comprehensible way, 
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and secondly it helps further on connecting free and fair criteria to actual tasks and 
analyzing the efficacy of electoral assistance programs.  
The Electoral Cycle was developed by the EC, IDEA and UNDP by recognizing the 
principles of the Paris Declaration in Aid Effectiveness199 and serves as a “visual 
planning and training tool designed to assist development agencies, electoral 
assistance providers and electoral officials in partner countries”.200 
 
Electoral assistance focused for a long time on the running of a specific election in a 
specific country rather than taking a more long-term approach. For many years, 
assistance programs were designed to help with the particular electoral event, 
disregarding the very cyclical nature of elections and its surrounding processes. One 
of the key errors of judgment lay in the “belief that such support alone would suffice 
to ensure the sustainability of the following electoral processes, ensuring results in the 
independence and transparency of the electoral management bodies concerned and the 
consequent democratic development of the partner country.”201  
Whereas short-term (event-driven) assistance supported a particular election and 
sought to assure that the outcome was free and fair by domestic and international 
stakeholders, long-term (institutionalizing) assistance is developmentally oriented. 
The goal is to build or strengthen institutional and human capacities involved in the 
electoral process, “either as managers and implementers (election commissions, 
monitoring groups, the judiciary) or as participants (political parties, candidates, civil 
society). The primary concern is with strengthening the electoral process per se in 
order to make it a sustainable endeavor in the long term.“202 
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The Electoral Cycle203 
 
 
The Electoral Cycle is mainly divided into three periods: pre-voting period, voting 
period and post-voting period. There are no fixed starting or ending points for the 
three periods or for the segments inside the cycle. 
Elections are composed of a number of interacting and influencing modules with 
different stakeholders. They are not mutually exclusive, but complementary, and 
therefore the failure of one aspect can have a negative impact on any other – in the 
worst case “on the credibility of the elections itself, and thus on the legitimacy of the 
elected government and the democratization process of a partner country and its 
overall development objectives.”204 
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Some examples of inter-dependencies within the electoral cycle are the following: the 
printing of ballots are delayed, causing polling stations to be inadequately prepared 
for their assigned voters; security of the transport is insufficient, hence manipulation 
by a political party is possible; malfunction of a voter registration system leads to an 
eligible voter being denied their right to cast a ballot, etc. The counting and the 
tabulation of results are additional sensitive areas where possible violations or 
manipulations of the process can put free and fair elections at risk, and will be 
analyzed in a later chapter. 
The goal of the Electoral cycle is to plan and implement electoral assistance within 
the democratic governance framework by forecasting five to ten years out. The 
decision must be made politically and operationally, as “such a decision entails an 
overarching involvement and commitment to the democratic evolution of the 
concerned country”.205 
 
3.4.1.1. Election Observation 
 
Election Observation is another important component of electoral support by the IC. It 
is more visible than technical electoral assistance as it communicates with the global 
media and is therefore a useful communication tool on one hand and a form of 
“measuring instrument” on the other.  
To some regard election observation is the political complement to election 
assistance. Its main objectives are “the legitimization of an electoral process, where 
appropriate, and the enhancement of public confidence in the electoral process, to 
deter fraud, to strengthen respect for human rights, and to contribute to the resolution 
of conflict.”206 
The precondition of an Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) is the invitation of a 
host government and reflects in a sense the will of a country to engage in a 
democratic political dialogue with the international community. A Needs Assessment 
Mission assesses the host country and makes recommendation about the size of a 
potential EOM. Once an EOM is deployed, the strengths and weaknesses of an 
electoral process are evaluated and reported. Recommendations based on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Electoral Cycle, ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 
206 EC Supporting Elections, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/election_observation_missions/about-electoral-support_en.htm [access: 07/12/2011] 
	   69	  
observations conducted during the election period are important factors in 
determining further assistance programs for the concerned country.207 
 
Election observation is a useful tool, not only in the above-mentioned context, but 
also for an election’s credibility. In this sense it is not vital who the observers are – 
international or local organizations – but more the fact that the process is observed 
and occurrences (good or bad) reported. 
 
As a critical side remark, Wolfgang Merkel argues the difficulty to empirically prove 
free and fair elections based on election observation, and whether elected leaders rule 
so-called electoral democracies by democratic and constitutional principles between 
elections.208 Reilly also points out the huge resources that were spent on international 
election observation in the 1990s. A shift to a more efficient process of elections 
observation, and a focus on building domestic observation capacity more recently 
have streamlined this kind of ‘election tourism’. 
 
3.5. Organizations involved in electoral assistance 
 
There are three main actors that shaped electoral assistance since the 1960s: the 
United Nations, the United States and from the mid-90s, the European Commission. 
For the Balkans (which represent very unique circumstances under the Dayton Peace 
Agreement for Bosnia and the Rambouillet Accords for Kosovo) the OSCE was 
mandated with the organization of elections and establishment of electoral 
institutions.209 Other electoral assistance providers offer additional services to 
elections and democracy strengthening. 
 
3.5.1. United Nations – UN 
The UN focuses on providing electoral assistance as a “strategic entry point for 
broader democratic governance programs” and has two primary goals:210 
• To assist Member States in their efforts to hold credible and legitimate elections 	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in accordance with internationally recognized standards; and 
• To contribute to building, in the recipient country, a sustainable institutional 
capacity to organize democratic elections that are genuine and periodic and 
have the full confidence of the contending parties and the electorate. 
The assistance programs aim to transfer skills and operational knowledge and 
strengthen capacity and institutions of various actors involved into an electoral 
process. The leitmotif of UN’s electoral assistance is to “ensure that elections are 
fully owned nationally”211, meaning it is a national operation with international help. 
The United Nations’ involvement in electoral assistance began in the 1960s with the 
Trusteeship Council with the observation and/or supervision of elections. The end of 
the 1980s saw major UN assistance of three kinds – organization and conduct of 
elections; supervision and control of elections; and verification of electoral 
processes.212  
The electoral assistance under the UN umbrella is organized through UNDP. The 
Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA/EAD) 
supports the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs in his capacity as the UN’s 
focal point by responding to country requests and determining the political feasibility 
of assistance.213 Their role is mainly to provide technical assistance to an electoral 
event and to longer-term electoral systems and processes.214 There are a number of 
other UN actors directly or otherwise involved in electoral assistance activities like 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Volunteers (UNV), 
the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN Population Fund 
(UNFPA), the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and the UN Department for 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA).215 
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3.5.2. European Commission – EC 
The EC started its electoral assistance activities in the 1990s, within the larger domain 
of democracy promotion, as set forth in Article 6 of the European Union Treaty.216 
The support it was providing shifted from solely financial contributions to a more 
substantial and visible approach, in the process becoming one of the key international 
donors and a leading global actor for electoral assistance programs and election 
observation. “The creation of a quality support unit within the main implementation 
arm of the EC, Europe Aid, steered the steep increase of funding designated to 
electoral assistance operations (from 2004 to 2006, about 320m EUROs), with senior 
level attention increasingly focused on the specific challenges of supporting elections 
in post-conflict scenarios.“217 
 
The EC’s primary role is to support institutions and agencies that implement electoral 
assistance activities. EC Delegations worldwide operating under the ‘de-
concentration’ principle, thus having the leading role, together with the relevant 
national authorities, over the identification, formulation, implementation and 
evaluation phases.218 
EC electoral assistance projects and EU election observation missions are funded 
through different financial instruments (geographic funds for the electoral assistance 
and centrally managed EIDHR funds for the observation missions).219 EC views 
electoral observation as the political complement to election assistance. Its main goals 
are “the legitimization of an electoral process, where appropriate, and the 
enhancement of public confidence in the electoral process, to deter fraud, to 	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strengthen respect for human rights, and to contribute to the resolution of conflict.”220 
EU election observation involves the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
an electoral process and recommendations acting as a crucial basis for deciding on 
further assistance after the elections. It further strengthens other key EU foreign 
policy objectives, in particular peace-building.  
 
3.5.3. United States – US 
 
At the end of the 1980s the United States initiated their electoral assistance programs 
through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Department of State and the National Endowment for Democracy.221 Their focus 
was centered on election observation and political party support. IFES (the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems) devoted exclusively to technical 
aspects of electoral processes, was established in 1987 (see more details about IFES 
below). 
 
3.5.3.1. United States Agency for International Development – USAID 
USAID is an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign 
policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It supports long-term and equitable 
economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting:222 
• Economic growth, agriculture and trade; 
• Global health; and, 
• Democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. 
3.5.3.2. International Foundation for Electoral Systems – IFES 
IFES is a non-governmental organization and was founded in 1987 specializing in 
election assistance and democracy promotion. The organization “promotes democratic 
stability by providing technical assistance and applying field-based research to the 
electoral cycle in countries around the world to enhance citizen participation and 
strengthen civil societies, governance and transparency.“223 
  
Through fieldwork, applied research and advocacy, IFES strives to promote citizen 	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participation, transparency and accountability in political life and civil society. IFES 
helps improve transparency and efficiency in government institutions through 
capacity building initiatives, and independence and professionalism of public officials 
so they can better serve their constituents. IFES’ F. Clifton White Applied Research 
Center for Democracy and Elections (ARC) generates innovative applied research to 
enhance the practice of democracy building and to bolster the development of 
democratic and participatory institutions, processes and cultures. Through its research 
and outreach activities, ARC seeks to bridge the gap between theories of democratic 
development and the practical realities of democracy building in order to enrich 
democracy programming. 
IFES has been involved in Kosovo since 1998 “when an agreement between Slobodan 
Milosevic and the international community was reached that allowed for diplomatic 
verification and humanitarian assistance as well as some sort of self-rule for Kosovo 
and elections within nine month's time.“224 The organization conducted certain 
electoral assessments concerning the quality of population registries for the province 
and the extent of the Kosovar Albanian population's participation in public 
administration and electoral processes.225 Further projects in the areas of election 
processes, capacity building and promoting the rule of law were developed and 
implemented. 
The cooperation with the Central Election Commission in regards to reforming the 
electoral framework and certain processes continues. 
  
3.5.4. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE 
The OSCE is a leading organization in the field of election observation. It conducts 
election-related activities across the 56 participating states, including technical 
assistance and election observation missions. ODIHR, the Office of Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights is OSCE’s specialist institution primarily concerned 
with elections, human rights, and democratization. ODIHR is based in Warsaw, 
Poland. The organization “promotes democratic election processes through the in-
depth observation of elections and conducts election assistance projects that enhance 
meaningful participatory democracy.“226 	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One of OSCE’s standard setting instruments, the 1990 Copenhagen Document, had an 
important role in the elaboration of the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair 
Elections.227 
 
OSCE has been involved in Kosovo’s elections since 2000 and continues their 
engagement until now. The OSCE Mission assisted with organizing and supervising 
elections (four on local, three on central level) from 2000 to 2008 and still holds a 
non-executive advisory role to the Central Election Commission CEC and the 
Election complaints and Appeals Panel, providing considerable assistance to these 
institutions.228 OSCE is part of a working group on electoral reform to improve the 
legislative and administrative frameworks for Kosovo’s elections. 
 
3.5.5. Additional Assistance Providers 
3.5.5.1. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance – IDEA 
IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy 
worldwide. International IDEA’s mission is to support sustainable democratic change 
by providing comparative knowledge, and assisting in democratic reform, and 
influencing policies and politics.229 It was established in 1995 and operates at 
regional, national and international levels. 
 
Their activities include: 
• Providing comparative knowledge derived from practical experience on 
democracy building processes from diverse contexts around the world; 
• Assisting political actors in reforming democratic institutions and processes, 
and engaging in political processes when invited to do so; and 
• Influencing democracy-building policies through the provision of our 
comparative knowledge resources and assistance to political actors. 
3.5.5.2. European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations – ENEMO 
ENEMO (European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations) is a group of 21 
civic organizations from seventeen countries of the former Soviet Union and Central 
and Eastern Europe. These nonpartisan organizations are the leading domestic 	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election monitoring groups in their countries. In total, ENEMO member organizations 
have observed more than 110 national elections and trained more than one hundred 
thousand election monitors. ENEMO seeks to support the international community's 
interest in and support for democracy in the post-communist countries of the OSCE 
region, to assess electoral conditions and the political environment, and to offer 
accurate and impartial observation reports. ENEMO international observation 
missions evaluate the electoral process using international standards for democratic 
and fair elections and benchmarks in the assessed country's legislation and 
constitution.230 
3.5.5.3. The International Organization for Migration – IOM 
IOM supports the inclusion of migrant communities (refugees and displaced persons) 
into democratic electoral processes in their countries of origin. In cases where “certain 
concentrations of a population are residing beyond the territorial confines of the area 
embarking in electoral exercises, the establishment of structures for external voting is 
essential to ensure their participation in the democratic process taking place in their 
countries of origin.”231 
Under the auspices of UNMIK and OSCE, IOM-OKV (Out of Kosovo Voting 
Program) created the structures to involve 300.000 eligible Kosovars temporarily 
residing outside of Kosovo to register and vote in the Municipal Elections in 2000.  
The program involved in-person voting in Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia and 
voting by-mail in other countries with Kosovo refugees and displaced persons. The 
Kosovo Assembly elections in 2001 were organized for in-person voting in Serbia 
proper and in Montenegro, and all other countries were included in the by-mail 
operation. 
3.5.5.4. National Democratic Institute – NDI 
NDI is a nongovernmental organization, which was founded 1983. NDI and its local 
partners have worked to establish and strengthen political and civic organizations, 
safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in 
government.232 
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NDI’s election-related programs have the goal to advance democratic progress and 
promote the integrity of electoral and political processes. Their activities are „tailored 
to the broader political process in each country to promote citizen participation as 
electors, and electoral candidates as a means of achieving democratic governance, 
mitigating potentials for violent conflict, and improving the lives of people.“233  
 
3.6. International Standards for Free and Fair Elections 
 
 
I do think that fair elections are extremely important.  
This is not because such elections will necessarily lead to wonderful outcomes. It is because these 
elections, per se and due to the political freedoms that must surround them if they are to be considered 
fair (and, consequently, if the resulting regime is to be democratic), mark a crucial departure from the 
arbitrariness of authoritarian rule. When some fundamental political freedoms are respected, this means 
great progress in relation to authoritarian rules and gives us  
ample reason to defend and promote fair elections.  
Guillermo O’Donnell234 
 
One of the main features of democracy is the holding of free and fair elections, 
including the accurate depiction of the voters will as represented in the institutions 
elected to govern them. This principle is rarely challenged, however, when it comes to 
clarify the term free and fair and its underlying rules and their adoption, there is much 
less consensus. Katz explains it with the many conceptions of democracy “each of 
which having distinct implications about what kind of legislation should be 
adopted“.235  
 
With Guy Goodwill-Gill’s seminal work Free and Fair Elections: International Law 
and Practice, a constructive approach developing a definition for ‘free and fair’ was 
offered.236 Nonetheless, scholars and practitioners have yet to come to an agreement 
on the evaluation of freeness and fairness of an electoral process. Interestingly, the 	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work of institutions involved in election observation provides helpful insights and 
gives valuable input into this debate.237 Reilly, acknowledging the great variation in 
the meaning of free and fair elections, classifies it in general terms: “A ‘free’ election 
typically is in which contestation for office is open and competitive, and free from 
significant electoral violence; while ‘fair’ usually refers to features such as a level 
playing field, equal rights to participation, and acceptance of outcomes by all 
parties.”238 But he also points out that the overuse of the term ‘free and fair’ bears the 
danger of becoming meaningless and is inadequate “for capturing the complexity of 
democratization in a post-conflict society”.239 
 
Goodwill-Gill suggests, “the dynamic and programmatic dimension to free and fair 
elections as institutional means to representative democracy can best be understood 
by returning once again to the underlying premises. Amongst others, ‘free’ is about 
participation and choice; ‘fair’ is about equality of participation and of the vote, and 
about impartiality and non-discrimination; together, they imply respect for human 
rights at large and the absence of coercion.”240 
 
When ‘free’ is about “participation and choice” and ‘fair’ about “equality of 
participation and the vote, and about impartiality and non-discrimination” when does 
‘not free’ and ‘not fair’ begin? How can it be judged and which criteria included?  
  
As was implied earlier, a successful election is more than a voting exercise on E-Day; 
it is a totality of processes that include the nature of the electoral system, voter 
entitlement and registration, political parties, civic education, campaigning and 
processes after a ballot was cast. 
Goodwill divided the requisite activities and criteria into ten broad categories:241  
1.) Electoral law and system; 
2.) Constituency delimitation; 
3.) Election management; 
4.) The right to vote; 	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5.) Voter registration;  
6.) Civic education and voter information; 
7.) Candidates, political parties and political organization, including funding; 
8.) Electoral campaigns, including protection and respect for fundamental 
human rights, political meetings, media access and coverage; 
9.) Balloting, monitoring and results; 
10.) Complaints and dispute resolution. 
Ad 1.) Electoral law and system 
The choice of the electoral system is a State’s domain of domestic jurisdiction, and  
“there is not a single political system or electoral method that is equally suited to all 
nations and their people...”242 The accepted desideratum agreed upon by international 
law “genuine periodic elections guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors, which shall be the basis of the authority of the government”, allows 
considerable room for variation. But choosing between a proportional or majoritarian 
system of representation has considerable consequences to further electoral processes 
like political campaigning, the political culture and has an effect on related political 
rights. The underlying notions are that “a chosen system must facilitate the expression 
of the will of the people”243 and that “no vote should carry disproportionately more 
weight than any other”.244 
  
Ad 2.) Constituency delimitation 
The general objective is to translate the will of the electorate into representative 
government. How the State delimits its electoral boundaries or districts lies in the 
State’s practice and choice of electoral system but considerable differences in the 
population proportion between electoral districts would raise a number of questions.   
 
Ad 3.) Election management 
As was earlier mentioned, an independent and fairly administered electoral process is 
essential. At a practical administrative and oversight level, the institution of an 
independent Electoral Commission is now widely adopted as an important step in 
building traditions of independence and impartiality, and the confidence of the 	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electorate and parties alike. In practice, the election machinery can either be impartial, 
or in balance. The ideal or most effective model will depend on the relative maturity 
of the national system.245 
 
Ad 4.) The right to vote 
Formal constitutional recognition of the citizen’s right to vote is common to most 
States and plays both a substantive and a confidence-building role. This right may be 
subject to reasonable restrictions which are not arbitrary and do not interfere with the 
free expression of the people’s opinion. However, it is important that the State 
respects the principle of non-discrimination including race, religion, sex, social group, 
political opinion or other irrelevant consideration. It is also critical to note that an 
electoral system which denied the vote to minority populations, or which 
disenfranchised half the citizenry, for example, by excluding women, would be 
incompatible with international standards, and incapable of reflecting the ‘will of the 
people’. 
 
Ad 5.) Voter registration 
The right to vote is normative, however in practical terms it is only given once the 
voter is enrolled on an electoral list. An efficient voter registration process is crucial 
to a successful election, and can vary from country to country due to its own political 
and societal contexts and available resources. 
The electoral list must enable all eligible citizens to be included and prevent electoral 
misuse and fraud. Accuracy is important for a system in place, which ensures a 
regular updating of the voting registers. “Electoral lists should be published promptly, 
and clear effective means should be available for correcting errors, including 
omissions and cancellation of those deceased or who have moved.”246 
Not only is the integrity and transparency of the voter registration system important, 
but also its security. Publishing electoral lists enhance a degree of confidence to the 
electorate and contribute therefore to ensure free and fair elections. “Only if the 
population at large is aware of the procedures and effectively able to access them, will 
a resulting election likely be fair.”247 	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Ad 6.) Civic education and voter information 
Civic education and voter information are central in achieving the objective of free 
and fair elections, as an environment understanding the values of democracy must 
exist and acted upon. 
 
Ad 7.) Candidates, political parties and political organization 
Another substantial index of free and fair elections is that of candidates, political 
parties and political organization. It falls within the concept of human rights. “Article 
25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides that every 
citizen has the right, without discrimination, to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, to be elected, and to have equal access to public service in his or her country. 
Those rights are not absolute, however, and may be subject to a variety of reasonable 
limitations.”248 
The choice of electoral system can influence the right of individuals to present 
themselves as candidates for election. This also applies to threshold requirements, 
which can limit representation possibilities for parties that fail to obtain a certain 
percentage of the vote and thus fail to have access to the Parliament Chamber. 
Registration criteria, funding, public space, media etc. have all a critical effect in 
enabling or hinder in establishing and forming political organizations and parties. 
 
Ad 8.) Electoral campaigns 
Electoral campaigns, another index of free and fair elections, are important with 
respect to certain fundamental human rights, together with the responsibility of the 
State, as described in article 2 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”249  
In an assessment, national and international observers will evaluate if “freedom of 
movement, assembly, association and expression have been respected throughout the 
election period; whether all parties have conducted their political activities within the 	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law; whether any political party or special interest group has been subjected to 
arbitrary and unnecessary restrictions in regard to access to the media or generally in 
regard to their freedom to communicate their views; whether parties, candidates and 
supporters have enjoyed equal security; whether voters have been able to cast their 
ballots freely, without fear or intimidation; whether the secrecy of the ballot has been 
maintained; and whether the overall conduct of the ballot has been such as to avoid 
fraud and illegality.”250 
 
Ad 9.) Balloting, monitoring and results 
Free and fair elections are not defined by Election Day alone, but it still deserves 
particular attention. There is a multitude of issues to scrutinize: the location of polling 
stations, and their accessibility for the population; the presence of competent officials, 
versed in the procedure; the presence of party representatives; secrecy of the act of 
voting and the security of the ballot box; the integrity of the counting process and its 
translation into a genuine political result.251  
Balloting involves the “organization and management of voting, including the 
opening and closing of polling stations at stated times; the arrangement of booths and 
the orderly movement of voters; the identification and verification of voters (hence 
the importance of a credible registration system, discussed above); an established 
procedure for objection and challenge; the issue of ballot papers to recognized voters; 
the marking of ballot papers out of sight of officials or other electors; the deposit of 
marked ballots; and, in the absence of other sufficient guarantees, the identification of 
voters, for example, with indelible ink, in order to prevent double voting.”252 
International Assistance providers regularly point out the importance of national and 
international observers in the polling locations to emphasize the confidence of the 
electorate into the voting processes. 
 
Interestingly, counting is not included explicitly as a separate factor, rather part of 
‘Balloting, monitoring and results’. In general terms a State’s legal framework should 
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“ensure that all votes are counted and tabulated accurately, equally fairly and 
transparently.”253 
The author wants to emphasize the importance of the count process, which is already 
suggested by this thesis on Kosovo’s Count Center processes and Pastor’s analysis as 
one of the most persistent problems in transitional elections254. A fair and transparent 
vote count is a linchpin for democratic elections.  
 
Counting 
“Complementary to the principle of secret ballot is the integrity of the count, which 
looks both to ensure that the expressed wish of the elector is taken into account, and 
that the result declared corresponds with the totality of the votes cast.”255  
The counting process must ensure the demand that ballot boxes are emptied before the 
beginning of the vote and are closed and secured once polling stations (PS) are closed 
or ballot boxes transferred.  
In general, ballots are counted directly in the PS following the voting but sometimes 
due to security issues or administrative reasons (no time for training PS staff about 
counting procedures, a lack of trust towards PS officials, etc.) ballot boxes are 
transferred to a central count location. One of the administrative tasks of an EMB is to 
detail standard procedures for the closing of a PS and counting the ballots.  
Once the voting has ended, PS officials must seal the ballot-box slot and record the 
number on the designated form. PS staff must then account for all ballot papers (used, 
unused, spoiled) and other polling material, ensuring that the number of ballots 
distributed to voters matches the number of voters recorded as having voted (counting 
the signatures on the voters list). Once this has been verified, the material needs to be 
packed away separately. The ballot box is then opened and the ballots counted 
according to the designated procedure. Once the count process is finalized the ballots 
need to be put back into the ballot box and the box re-sealed and the numbers 
recorded. 
The transparency, accuracy and fairness of this process can be enhanced by the 
presence of domestic or international observers, achieved by preventing fraud or 
manipulation. 	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An IDEA factsheet offers some guiding principles for counting and tabulating votes: 
General principles: 
• The legal framework must clearly state the electoral formula that will be used to 
convert votes into legislative seats.  
• Thresholds, quotas and all details of the electoral formula must be stated clearly 
and all possibilities, such as ties, withdrawals or death of a candidate, must be 
addressed. The law must lay down clear criteria for determining valid and 
invalid ballots in all polling and counting stations across the jurisdiction.  
• Rules for determining the validity of ballots to be counted should not be so 
stringent as to unreasonably result in disenfranchising a voter.  
• The paramount principle should be that if the intention of the voter is clear, the 
ballot should be counted. 
Counting ballots: 
• Regardless of whether ballots are counted at the polling station or at a central 
counting location or at both places, the representatives of parties and 
candidates and election observers should be permitted to remain present on 
this occasion.  
• As well as ensuring the presence of above all entities during the counting of 
ballots, the legal framework should provide safeguards where technology is 
used to count ballots.  
• The legal framework must make possible the independent verification of the 
accuracy and soundness of hardware and software used for counting ballots.  
• Whether manual, mechanical or electronic counting is used, overview 
procedures must be in place to ensure accuracy and reliability.  
• The law must also allow objections to counting procedures, including objections 
to criteria used to determine the validity of ballots. 
• The legal framework for elections should clearly specify that the 
representatives of parties and candidates and election observers be given, as 
far as practicable, certified copies of tabulation and tally sheets.  
• The law must also clearly specify what authorities, if any, are entitled to 
receive this information prior to certification of the election results by the 
central EMB. 
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Tabulating results: 
• The legal framework should provide, in clear and objective language, the 
procedures for transferring the certified copies, results of counting, ballot 
papers and other election materials from polling stations and other, lower 
levels of EMBs to intermediate and higher EMBs for consolidation and 
safekeeping.  
• The law should require that all consolidation of vote counts be available in 
tables or similar format so that representatives of parties and candidates and 
observers may track the vote count of any polling station all the way up, 
through intermediate levels to the final consolidated results.  
• The tabulation for any polling station should provide detailed information such 
as the number of ballots used and returned, the number of blank, spoiled and 
invalid ballots, and the number of votes for each political party or candidate.  
• This information should be broken down for alternative methods of voting, such 
as voting by mail or mobile voting, where this can be done without 
compromising the secrecy of the ballot.  
• This degree of detail is necessary to enable the representatives of parties and 
candidates and election observers to track results and locate specifically, if 
fraud has occurred, where the numbers have been unlawfully changed during 
the consolidation processes. 
• A strictly defined division of responsibility among various tiers of EMB and 
the state authorities is vital during the tallying process.  
• Election legislation should underline the principle that only EMB members 
should be involved in this process.  
• To ensure this it is also important that representatives of parties and candidates 
and election observers are given access to all stages of the process of counting, 
tabulating, consolidating and tallying results. 
 
Ad 10.) Complaints and dispute resolution 
Complaints, appeals and dispute resolution are important mechanisms for any 
electoral process. Complaints and appeals can occur at any moment of the electoral 
process and can be a matter of claimed misinterpretations of electoral procedures and 
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laws, disputes regarding the transparency and accuracy of the count, violations of the 
criminal law or other irregularities that may arise during the process, etc. 
Responsible authorities should deal with complaints as promptly as possible to avoid 
any delay of the election outcome. 
 
All these are important aspects of an election, and only through thoroughly evaluating 
respective processes can elections be judged as ‘free and fair’ within the established 
norms and indices by national and international observers. 
 
3.6.1. Tool kit for electoral assessment 
 
The analytical framework suggested by Jorgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds at the 
IPU Round Table 2004 is the connecting link between the previously touched free and 
fair criteria, democratization and the case study about Kosovo’s count process. 
 
Elklit and Reynolds argue “that the quality of election administration has a direct and 
important impact on the way in which elections and their outcomes are regarded”.256 
They focus on how “institutional factors and institutional choices, and the ensuing 
administrative and political behavior, contribute to the quality of the entire electoral 
process and therefore also to the transition and the eventual consolidation of 
democracies.” In their analysis, they concentrate primarily on how to determine 
electoral quality and legitimacy, more specifically “the effectiveness and positive 
contribution of institutional choices related to electoral process management and the 
impact of the various stages of the implementation process”257. While lacking a fitting 
approach to apply onto stable and emerging democracies, they developed a more 
operational and empirically oriented framework of electoral governance for 
practitioners and academics alike. 
They refer to a certain margin of human error or technical issues affecting electoral 
governance. On a small scale there is no influence on the outcome of elections and 
electoral credibility. The legitimacy of competitive elections becomes contested when 
electoral manipulation is widespread and/or technical and security complications are 	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great enough to become evident. Elklit and Reynolds agree on the difficulty to 
operationalize and empirically measure electoral manipulation due a lack of 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. The ability to draw valid conclusions is 
limited although it can very well act as an indicator for political legitimacy.258 
 
Highlighting the bias of election assessment in “either good or bad or, when a fudge is 
required, it is ‘substantially free and fair’” is limiting. Therefore it is argued to “look 
at both process and outcome to gauge the full picture of election quality.”259 
 
The model consists of eleven steps ranging from the legal framework, electoral 
management, constituency and polling district demarcation, voter education, voter 
registration, access to and design of ballot paper, party and candidate nomination and 
registration, campaign regulation, polling, counting and tabulating the vote, resolving 
election related complaints/verification of final result and certification, and post-
election procedures (see Annex, table 2, p.155). 
 
For the analysis of this case study, steps eight to ten are essential: 
8. Polling 
8.1. What is turnout as a percentage of total registration? 
8.2. What is turnout as a percentage of the voting age population? 
8.3. Is there a low level of serious election-related violence? 
8.4. In how many polling stations did polling happen according to rules and regulations. 
8.5. Are there systems in place to preclude and/or rectify fraudulent voting? 
8.6. Is polling accessible, secure, and secret? 
8.7. If there is substantial desire for election observation, is the desire satisfied? 
8.8. If there is substantial desire for political party election observation, is the desire satisfied? 
8.9. Are there systems in place to preclude vote buying? 
8.9. Is the level of intimidation sufficiently low that voters can express their free will? 
 
9. Counting and tabulating the vote 
9.1. Is the count conducted with integrity and accuracy? 
9.2. Is the tabulation transparent and an accurate reflection of the polling booth count? 
9.3. Are results easily available to interested members of the general public? 	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9.4. Does counting take place with no undue delay? 
9.5. Are parties and candidates allowed to observe the count? 
 
10. Resolving election related complaints. Verification of final result and certification 
10.1. Are serious complaints accepted for adjudication? 
10.2. Is there an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism which operates in an impartial and 
non-partisan manner? 
10.3. Are court disputes settled without undue delay? 
10.4. Do election observation organizations confirm that the elections were without serious 
problems? 
10.5. If legislation prescribes a timeframe for the constitution of parliament, is this timeframe 
met? 
10.6. Is a person with a reasonable case able to pursue that case without unreasonable 
personal and financial risk? 
10.7. Are seats taken only by those properly elected? 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
Elections are not merely a technical endeavor, but more so a practical example of 
human rights. They are a means for managing the potential for violent war and 
conflict and advancing human rights and security for a countries citizen.  
“Although other elements of democracy can develop before competitive elections are 
held, a country cannot be truly democratic until its citizens have the opportunity to 
choose their representatives. Elections can be a primary tool to expand political 
openings and increase citizens’ political participation, offering political parties and 
civic groups an opportunity to mobilize and organize supporters and develop 
alternative platforms. If there is real interest in democratization and systemic reform, 
then missions cannot afford to ignore the electoral process.”260 
 
Achieving a democratic electoral process is part of establishing a system of 
government that can ensure respect for human rights, the rule of law and the 
development of democratic institutions. Post-conflict elections need to be transparent, 
fair and reflect the will of the people. As political events with high-stakes outcomes, 	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“it is often useful to counter them with conflict-sensitive and cautious external 
support”.261  
Despite the growth of electoral assistance since the end of the Cold War, elections 
have had mixed success in meeting the broader goals of democratization. 
International assistance has made important contributions to the conduct of post-
conflict elections, however the IC and all players involved in electoral assistance must 
determine how to balance the need for democracy with local realities, giving security 
issues the highest priority. Without a certain degree of security there can be no free 
and fair elections, which are indispensable to democracy, and no start of a real 
effective democratization process. “Efforts to foster democracy must also support an 
ongoing process of reconciliation among former enemies, security sector reforms, 
law-enforcement and judicial reforms, human-rights monitoring and enforcement, 
strengthening civil society, and a complementary dedication to economic 
development and job creation.”262 
 
The focus on one-off elections in the past by the IC was supported by the belief that 
“fast elections could be the panacea for transitional countries structural and economic 
problems and set a sort of virtuous circle in motion in the partner country”.263 The 
realization followed soon however, that this kind of support was contra productive.  
In contrast to this is long-term support less visible and less politically attractive but 
more sustainable in the long run. Sustainability remains a critical mass of 
international electoral assistance. Large financial investments into advanced electoral 
technology, processes and training are not always maintained and are lacking broad 
local acceptance and know-how. The impact of external support is limited and much 
depends on local actors and conditions and a sustainable domestic environment. 
Building an institutional framework and maintaining support not only for initial 
elections, but also subsequent ones, are important factors for effective and sustainable 
electoral assistance. The electoral cycle approach is one important model to 
emphasize the cyclical nature of elections and its need for cyclical support. It 	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furthermore stresses the need to provide assistance to a wider range of actors (EMBs, 
political parties, media institutions, civil society organizations etc.) – all of which can 
be critical success factors of an election. 
 
Whether an election is deemed free and fair by observers depends on many different 
aspects and processes. Local circumstances and specific national interests influence 
each election. For transitional democracies with great economic, socio-economic and 
other internal problems, a positive election observation assessment promotes the 
people’s confidence for change and evokes an optimistic attitude from the 
international community. “Just as democracy is not founded on a single ballot, so an 
election does not become unfree or unfair solely by reason of one or more breaches of 
international standards.”264 In this sense ‘free and fair’ is more of a semantic notion 
and acts rather as a benchmark for elections. 
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Chapter IV: The Case of the 2010 Kosovo Elections 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
With the end of the military conflict and the creation of a more secure environment in 
Kosovo, the international community shifted their focus towards the development of 
democratic structures as a precondition and cornerstone for a ‘democratic self-
administration’. Kosovo became one of the most prominent examples of ‘state-
building’ by the IC since 1999, with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
and the OSCE playing a critical role in the creation of institutions and democratic 
structures. This was not an easy task, as Kosovo’s history was characterized as 
lacking fundamental sine qua non. Traditional societal structures (patriarchic, clan-
oriented), high birth and illiteracy rates, a difficult relationship between the majority 
Albanian and minority Serbian population in Kosovo, and quasi a missing “political 
culture” made it a rather difficult project for the responsible international 
organizations.265 Kramer and Dzihic illustrate in their book “Die Kosovo-Bilanz. 
Scheitert die international Gemeinschaft?” UNMIK and OSCE’s dilemma of 
institution-building and developing democratic structures, as a task that was taken-
over without accounting for the lack of aforementioned political culture, tolerance, a 
willingness to cooperate and the protection of minorities by the political class in 
Kosovo.266 The expectation of the international community was that democracy and 
institutionalization would materialize once democratic elections were held, a 
parliament and government established, and Kosovo began to follow the example set 
by their presence.267 The international organizations were ill prepared however for the 
juxtaposition of a relatively “well established civic society” and, of principle 
importance, a male dominated clan society268.  
 
Kosovo has seen a number of elections since the adoption of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 in 1999. Two Municipal elections (2000 and 2002) and two 
Assembly elections (in 2001 and 2004) were followed by Mayoral, Local and General 	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Elections held in November 2007. Prior to 2008, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
supervised all these elections to a varying degree and the UNMIK, of which the 
OSCE Mission was part, certified the final results. In 2007 UN Special Envoy Martthi 
Ahtisaari proposed a status settlement agreement, which included issues related to 
Kosovo’s future status and measures to protect minority communities in Kosovo. 
After failed negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, the government of Kosovo 
declared independence in 2008, committing to implement the Ahtisaari plan. The plan 
also “called for general and local elections to be held within nine months of the entry 
into force but negotiations later led to a changed electoral timetable. One of the key 
points in the Ahtisaari package was the decentralizaton plan whereby a number of 
new or expanded municipalities with community majorities other than Kosovo 
Albanian would be established with extensive autonomy. In order to fulfill this plan it 
was agreed to start with local elections in 2009 and to postpone the Kosovo Assembly 
elections to 2011.”269  
 
After the declaration of independence in 2008, the Central Election Commission 
(CEC) assumed the responsibility for administering elections based on a new 
legislative framework without foreign assistance. The role of the international 
community became officially an advisory one, ensuring that international standards 
were met and to assist with technical preparations. The headcount of international 
electoral assistance providers dropped significantly. 
Municipal and Mayoral Elections were held on 15 November 2009 and early general 
elections, on 12 December 2010, representing Kosovo’s first parliamentary elections. 
Both elections experienced an ample number of irregularities, systematic fraud and 
complaints. A multitude of factors are used to explain why previous elections were 
better organized than those of 2009 and 2010, however the dominant explanation 
appears to be the heavy presence of international observers and electoral experts 
between 2000 until 2007. Another reason for a declining quality of the electoral 
process might be found in political disillusionment, the lacking democratic culture as 
suggested by Kramer et al. or a different approach being taken in the Count and 
Result Center, trying to uncover electoral manipulation. 
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4.2. Political Background 
 
The Kosovo conflict ended with NATO’s intervention over the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Slobodan Milosevic’s capitulation. In June 1999 the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1244, mandating the Kosovo Force’s (KFOR) presence 
and the creation of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) to establish and oversee Kosovo provisional democratic institutions of self-
government within a framework of Yugoslav sovereignty. 
UNMIK was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 
and divided into four ‘pillars’.270 
• Pillar I (initially led by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR); phased out in June 2000): Police and Justice Pillar, United Nations 
(UN) 
• Pillar II: Civil Administration, United Nations (UN) 
• Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
• Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, European Union (EU) 
 
In 2002, SRSG Michael Steiner introduced the ‘Standards before Status’ policy as a 
stopgap local mission response to Kosovo Albanian demands for international 
community clarity to Kosovo’s status.271 “The policy stated that if the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) made progress towards achieving certain 
standards, Kosovo’s final status could be addressed in mid-2005. The eight standards 
concerned functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, 
refugee returns and reintegration, economic progress, property rights, dialogue with 
Belgrade and the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps.”272 
 
The latent existing ethnical tensions between the Albanian and Serbian population 
were unleashed in the violent riots of March 2004, which initially started with 
demonstrations against the inefficiency of UNMIK and the open status question. As 	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an answer to the unrest UNMIK published the Kosovo Standards Implementation 
Plan (KSIP). The KSIP described “actions to be undertaken by the PISG and other 
institutions to achieve the standards.”273  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
appointed UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari as chief navigator for the Kosovo status 
talks in Vienna. Following internationally orchestrated, but fruitless status talks, 
Kosovo’s Assembly unilaterally declared independence on 17 February 2008. “In the 
declaration, Kosovo committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Ahtisaari 
[comprehensive proposal] Plan, embracing multi-ethnicity as a fundamental principle 
of good governance, and welcoming a period of international supervision.”274  
Serbia backed by Russia opposes/d the declaration of independence, calling it illegal. 
The government in Belgrade, which lobbied actively against the international 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence and access to international bodies, achieved a 
UN General Assembly backing for the International Court of Justice to issue an 
advisory opinion on the compatibility of Kosovo’s independence declaration with 
international law. In July 2010, the Court ruled that the declaration did not violate 
general international law or UNSCR 1244. This much-anticipated court decision did 
not greatly alter the international support base for an independent Kosovo.  
 
Throughout 2010, Kosovo remained subject to a complex “array of governing 
authorities, with elected Kosovar officials overseen by the International Civilian 
Representative (ICR)/EU Special Representative (EUSR) and supported by the EU 
Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). The UN’s Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) maintained its presence in municipalities north of the Ibar River, which 
remained outside of Pristina’s control. The Republic of Serbia continued to support 
parallel governing structures in Kosovo’s ethnic Serb–dominated northern 
municipalities.”275 
 
As of February 2011, 75 countries had recognized Kosovo's independence, including 
22 of 27 EU member states, all of its neighbors (except Serbia), and other states from 
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the Americas, Africa, and Asia.276 Achieving membership to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in spring 2009 was a diplomatic success 
for independent Kosovo.277 
 
4.2.1. EU & Kosovo 	  
The EU’s intervention in post-conflict Kosovo started with its mandate to contribute 
to the process of economic development and stabilization, “including the 
implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international 
participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, 
stability and regional cooperation” in Resolution 1244, point 17.278 But the EU-led 
Pillar IV failed in developing a clear and successful economic strategy and was 
criticized from all sides for its poor performance and inefficiency. “An [..] obstacle to 
a consistent EU economic strategy in Kosovo was certainly the fact that, owing to the 
unresolved status issue, the hands of both the EU and the Kosovan authorities were 
tied with regard to the EU accession process.”279  
With the beginning of status talks, the need for reorganization of international efforts 
became clear. In 2006 the Council of the European Union decided to establish the 
European Union Planning Team (EUPT) to prepare for a possible future EU crisis 
management operation in the field of rule of law in Kosovo.280 
As set out in the Ahtisaari plan, formally the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement (CSP),	   an EU mission was to succeed UNMIK on the basis of 
Kosovo‘s independence and its new constitution. The Serbian government greatly 
objected to replacing UNMIK with a EU mission, arguing that this would informally 
mean accepting an independent Kosovo by the European Union.   
“In November 2008, the UN Secretary-General submitted the so-called ―Six- Point 
Plan, negotiated between the UN and Serbia, which provided for a status-neutral role 
for the EU mission and the extension of UNSCR 1244. Under the ―Six-Point Plan, 
the protection of the rights of the Kosovo Serb population with regard to policing, 	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customs, justice, transportation and infrastructure, the borders of Serb communities 
and Serb Orthodox religious heritage was transferred to the Serbian government.”281  
The outcome of the ‘Six-Point Plan’ surprised Kosovo’s government, who (believing 
in the support of the USA) had not partaken in the debates and consultations of the 
UNMIK to EU transfer talks.282 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo – EULEX Kosovo was 
officially launched on 9 December 2008 and reached its full capacity on 6 April 
2009.283 The mission’s aim is to assist and support the Kosovo authorities in rule of 
law matters, particularly in the areas of police, judiciary and customs.284 EULEX is a 
technical mission and its legal basis the Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 
February 2008.285 
 
In addition to EULEX, the EU is represented in Kosovo by:286 
 
The European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo 
The European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo was established in September 
2004, being given the responsibility of enabling the European agenda in Kosovo with 
the aim to promote Kosovo's integration to the European Union. As integral part of 
the European External Action Service and the European Commission's representation 
in Pristina, the office ensures that a permanent political and technical dialogue is 
maintained with the Brussels institutions.287 The Liaison Office‘s role includes 
deployment of enlargement tools under the Stabilization and Association Process and 
fostering Kosovo‘s regional and European integration. It is further tasked with 
strengthening Kosovo‘s institutions, developing the economy and realizing the 
achievement of European standards.288 
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European Union Special Representative (EUSR) 
The EUSR offers support and assistance to the Kosovo authorities in the political 
process of developing a peaceful, democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo. EUSR 
provides overall coordination for the EU presences in Kosovo and contributes to the 
development and consolidation of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The EUSR reports to the Council of Europe, the inter-governmental body 
representing the 27 EU member states, through the High Representative/Vice 
President of the European Commission.289 
 
The EU Member State representations (Embassies and Liaison Offices) 
EU member states are represented in Kosovo on a bilateral basis and are also active in 
supporting Kosovo towards a European future.290 
 
 
4.2.1.1. Is EU integration possible? 
 
Vedran Dzihic marked the year 2000 as the beginning of a form of “Europeanisation” 
in the region, “a process of incorporating European ideas, values, norms, rules and 
procedures in the domestic political framework of the Western Balkan countries.”291 
Eleven years later the prospects for the future are dim. Although enormous financial 
and operational resources were granted to Kosovo’s state-building and 
democratization processes, the results and achievements of UNMIK and EULEX are 
meager. High unemployment rates, high poverty and very low economic growth in 
combination with the current global economy crisis act as “ticking bomb”.292 
 
Helmut Kramer and Vedran Dzihic arrive at the conclusion that despite Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, Kosovo remains an “unfinished state” with limited 
sovereignty and as a matter of fact divided into an Albanian dominated south and 
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Serb north.293 EULEX was so far unable to prevent the division of the country, fight 
excessive corruption and organized crime and improve the economic situation. 
 
Five EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) continuously 
refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence, preventing the EU from integrating 
Kosovo into the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), one of the central 
components of the EU’s strategy to stabilize the Western Balkans countries.294 The 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) is the centerpiece of SAP with high 
political value and the formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks that allow the EU 
to work with each country to bring them closer to the standards, which apply in the 
EU.295  
SAA focuses on respect for key democratic principles and the core elements at the 
heart of the EU single market. Through a free trade area with the EU and the 
associated disciplines (competition and state aid rules, intellectual property etc.) and 
benefits (e.g. rights of establishment), this process will allow the economies of the 
region to begin to integrate with that of the European Union. The implementation of 
SAA is a prerequisite for further assessment by the EU of a country’s prospects of 
accession. Kosovo has not signed SAA due to EU’s partition towards Kosovo’s 
independence.  
The continuous “lack of unity in the EU is one of the reasons for the current 
weaknesses and only moderate achievements of the European Union’s biggest and 
most cost-intensive mission, the European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the 
paralyzed policy of the EU in Kosovo.”296 
Dzihic deduces correctly that “Kosovo and Bosnia in their present shape are still far 
away from a new and modern form of statehood and thus from the ultimate goal of 
full EU-integration.”297 Wielfried Wöß concluded from his study that the EU could 
have defused the “ticking bomb” by giving Kosovo a concrete perspective towards a 
path for EU-integration. But Kosovo has not signed the SAA and was not part of the 
visa liberalization process like other Western Balkan countries. The key to a 	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successful EU accession is primarily in the hands of the Kosovar government to 
establish well-functioning institutions, in addition to their cooperativeness with 
neighboring Serbia. Another factor should be EU’s demand from Serbia to cooperate 
with EULEX and a direct dialogue with Kosovo’s government, and with Russia’s 
reconsideration towards its Kosovo policy.298 
Serbia and the EU reached consensus on a 9 September 2010 General 
Assembly resolution calling for dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo to promote 
cooperation, achieve progress on the path to European Union membership and 
improve the lives of the people.299 
 
4.3. Legal Framework and Electoral System 
 
Kosovo is a parliamentary democracy300 with a unicameral parliament. The Kosovo 
Constitution, which came into force on 15 June 2008,301 the Law on General 
Elections302 and other election related laws determine the election system for the 
Kosovo Assembly.  
The Constitution follows the recommendations and obligations set out in the Ahtisaari 
package, which emphasizes the rights and freedoms granted to minority communities 
living in Kosovo. According to Article 22 in the Constitution, Kosovo is obligated to 
prioritize several main treaties (e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) over Kosovo laws, as Kosovo 
has not signed any human right treaties.303 
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Union, in Bosnien und Herzegowina sowie im Kosovo: Strategien, Entwicklungen und Perspektiven., 
Wien, 2010, p.181ff 
299 General Assembly, 9 September 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10980.doc.htm 
[access: 11/11/2011] 
300 Parliamentary democracy and proportional representation (PR) electoral systems in modern states 
are predicated not only on the idea that parties are cohesive units but also on the idea that it is those 
cohesive units for which electors vote and which therefore have a democratic mandate from the voters. 
See: Katz, Richard S., Democratic Principles and Judging “Free and Fair”. In: Revisiting Free and Fair 
Elections, An International Round Table on Election Standards, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, 
2004, p.19 
301 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Chapter IV “Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo”, Article 
64 and Chapter XIV “Transitional Provisions”, Article 148. 
302 LGE, Chapter XVII “Electoral System for the Assembly if Kosovo”, Articles 110-112 
303 ENEMO Election Observation Mission, Kosovo Assembly Elections 2010: Statement of 
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, p.4 
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The Assembly comprises one hundred twenty (120) members, where twenty (20)304 
seats are set aside for representation of minority communities:305 
• Kosovo Serb Community 10 
• Roma306 community 1 
• Ashkali307 community 1 
• Egyptian308 community 1 
• The Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyptian community with the highest overall 
votes 1 
• Bosnian309 community 3 
• Turkish310 community 2 
• Gorani311 community 1 
 
Certified political entities competing for reserved seats of minority communities must 
declare the community the wish to represent.312 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 This number represents a numerical overrepresentation compared to their proportion of the 
population. See more about ‘Sustaining multi-ethnicity in Kosovo’ in: Simonsen, Sven Gunnar, 
Nationbuilding as Peacebuilding: Racing to Define the Kosovar, in: International Peacekeeping, Vol.0, 
Summer 2004, pp.289-311 
305 Please see Section 4.6.5 “Participation of Minorities: Reserved Seats and Guaranteed Seats”. 
306 The Roma are believed to originate from India. They speak their unique language called Romano 
and Serb. See: Post-Election Opinions in Kosovo 2008: Findings from an IFES public opinion survey, 
USAID – IFES, 2008, p.2 
307 The Ashkali communities speak Albanian and have mostly Albanian traditions. The 
Ashkali live in the eastern and central part of Kosovo. The origins of these communities are disputed. 
See ibid, p.2 
308 The Egyptian communities speak Albanian and have mostly Albanian traditions. 
The Egyptian reside mostly in the south-­‐west of Kosovo are not to be confused with nationals of Egypt. 
The origins of these communities are disputed. See ibid, p.2 
309 Bosniacs are a minority ethnic group living in Bosnia and parts of Serbia and Montenegro, 
with smaller populations living in Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Bosniacs in Kosovo 
live in the southern parts of the country, south-­‐east of Prizren. They adhere to Islam and speak 
a dialect of Nasinke. See ibid, p.2 
310 Kosovar Turks are a minority ethnic group believed to have their origins in Turkey; however, 
many are assimilated Albanians and converted Catholics who adopted the Turkish 
language and adhered to Islam for different reasons. Turks live throughout 
Kosovo, but are concentrated primarily in Prizren while smaller populations live in Prishtina, 
Vushtrri and Mitrovica. See ibid, p.2 
311 Goranis are a minority ethnic group living between Albania, Macedonia, parts of Montenegro and 
Kosovo.  In Kosovo, they inhabit the mountainous regions south of Prizren. Goranis speak a Slavic 
Torlak dialect called Nasinske. Goranis adhere to Islam. See ibid, p.2 
312 ENEMO (2010), p.4 
ENEMO followed up on criticism from some political parties that Kosovo Albanian candidates are 
running on the ticket of non-majority entities in order to find an easier access to the Assembly. The law 
does not specify any rules for the ethnicity of the individual candidates. In fact it only states that a 
political entity shall indicate in its application whether it wishes to contest any of the seats guaranteed 
for the non-majority communities.  
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The remaining 100 members are to be elected from one Kosovo-wide electoral 
district, through proportional representation, on the basis of open candidate lists313 of 
political entities. There is a five percent threshold for non-minority parties to pass in 
order to enter parliament, which means that the minimum number of seats an 
Albanian parliamentary party can have is six.314  
 
The President is elected by parliament to serve a five-year term, as well is the Prime 
Minister appointed by the parliament. The elected assembly members serve a three-
year term.315 The prime minister assembles the government. 
 
In the proportional tier316, there is a 30 percent female quota under which every third 
candidate must be female.317 This special provision aims to ensure enhanced 
participation of women in politics. “Among the seats allocated to a political entity the 
gender that has received fewer seats shall have at least 30% of the total seats received 
by the party. If this is not the case the elected majority gender candidate with least 
votes shall be replaced by the next minority candidate on the entity list. The 
replacements will continue until the minority gender has at least 30% of the seats.”318 
 
An interesting antagonism exists in the implementation of the present voting system, 
which combines a minority gender quota with an open list system319. Both principles, 
the principle of representing the will of the voter and the principle of promoting 
gender equality, are laid out in the Kosovo Constitution. The requirement of replacing 
a candidate, who received more votes than a female candidate, does not reflect the 
will of the voter. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Electors may vote for up to five individual candidates within the list of up to 110 of their party of 
choice. 
314 BalkanInsight: Kosovo Election 2010: Key Facts http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-
elections-2010-key-facts [access: 03/22/2011] 
315 http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=253, [access: 02/23/2011] 
316 Tier (legislative): Legislatures can be conceptually divided into groups of seats called tiers. Each 
tier is defined by a feature of interest in the respective set of electoral rules. In mixed-member systems, 
for example, one tier may be elected in single-seat constituencies, and another tier may be elected 
under list proportional representation, from: http://www.electionguide.org/glossary.php (03/21/2011) 
317 LGE, Chapter XVIII, Article 111.6 
318 ENEMO (2010), p.5 
319 An open list voting system is designed to capture election results that directly reflect the candidate 
preferences of voters. See: ENEMO (2010), p.5 
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4.4. Kosovo’s Electoral Management Body 
 
 
Since 1999, four election cycles (2000, 2001, 2004 and 2007) have been almost 
exclusively international undertakings. The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK), as 
UNMIK Pillar III, was mandated with the organization and supervision of these 
elections. From 2004 onwards, elections were managed to an increasing extent by a 
Kosovan electoral administration, the Central Election Commission of Kosovo (CEC) 
and its Secretariat. Twelve years later, the OSCE Mission retains a non-executive 
advisory role and continues to provide substantial assistance and capacity building 
support to the CEC and the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP).320 
 
Electoral events in Kosovo are managed by a three-tier election administration 
comprising the CEC, 37 Municipal Election Commissions (MECs) and 2,280 Polling 
Station Committees (PSCs) located in 746 Polling Centers. 
 
4.4.1. The Central Election Commission of Kosovo (CEC) 
 
The CEC is the main independent and permanent body authorized to draft, 
implement, and enforce the rules and regulations for Kosovo’s elections.321 The CEC 
ensures the preparations and the conduct of elections in accordance with the 
principles and requirements of the law on General Elections (LGE) and Law on Local 
Elections (LLE). 
 
Currently Valdete Daka322 holds the position of the Chairperson of the CEC, which is 
appointed by the President of Kosovo from among the judges of the Supreme Court 
and courts exercising appellate jurisdiction.323 The Chair serves for a seven-year 
term324, and a maximum of two consecutive terms.325  
 
Ten other CEC members are nominated by the major political parties represented in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Elections – OSCE Mission in Kosovo, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/43390, [access: 11/25/2011] 
321 LGE, Chapter X, Article 59 
322 Valdete Daka was appointed to complete the term of the previous CEC President who resigned for 
health reasons in 2010.  
323 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 139.3 
324 LGE Chapter X, Article 61.2. 
325 LGE Chapter X, Article 61.3.b. 
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the Kosovo Assembly in accordance with article 139 of the Constitution of Kosovo.326  
Criteria for the selection and nomination of CEC board members as well as the rules 
for early termination are defined in the LGE. Interestingly it is not stated who decides 
upon whether a member of the CEC meets the required “conditions and criteria” of 
the LGE or whether a member’s actions violates and “seriously affects the status and 
integrity of the CEC”.327  
 
At present, PDK is represented by two members, and LDK, LDD, AAK and AKR by 
one member each. Four party members of non-majority communities complete the 
composition of the CEC board. This arrangement of party representatives gives the 
impression of acting as some sort of political panel during decision-making processes 
in the electoral cycle. This was also mentioned in the Final Report of the European 
Union Election Expert Mission to Kosovo (EU EEM). In some respects CEC 
members seem biased, perceiving “themselves as members of a ‘political board’ 
overseeing the election, rather than professional election administrators. One is left 
with an impression that they are not always on ‘top of the election issues’, which are 
left mostly in the hands of the CEC Secretariat, a body stipulated in the LGE to assist 
the CEC discharge its responsibilities and functions, and whose Chief Executive the 
CEC appoints. This attitude has the potential to make the CEC membership ‘hostage’ 
to the CEC staff who could have their own agendas, despite being formally civil 
servants.”328 
As was described earlier in this study, the composition of an election commission can 
vary, and there are no binding international standards. An impartial and independent 
commission is recommended, but Kosovo’s CEC model can be seen as conducive to 
transparency as it gives the main parties of the day the possibility to have an insight 
into and involvement in the process.329 “This solution will work as long as neither the 
authorities nor political parties are in a position to influence the performance of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, Article 139.4 
Six (6) members shall be appointed by the six largest parliamentary groups represented in the 
Assembly, which are not entitled to reserved seats. If fewer groups are represented in the Assembly, 
the largest group or groups may appoint additional members. One (1) member shall be appointed by 
the Assembly deputies holding seats reserved or guaranteed for the Kosovo Serb Community, and three 
(3) members shall be appointed by the Assembly deputies holding seats reserved or guaranteed for 
other Communities that are not in majority in Kosovo. 
327 LGE Chapter X, Article 61.5. a and d 
328 European Union Election Expert Mission to Kosovo, EU EEM to Kosovo 2010, Final Report, 2011, 
p.6 
329 ibid. 
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election commissions beyond the limits of the law and as long as the commissions 
conduct business in a professional and politically impartial manner.”330 
 
The role and responsibility of the CEC is laid out in Art. 59.3: 
a) Undertake voter education activities designed to increase voter awareness of 
and participation in elections; 
b) Undertake projects or research in relation to electoral system and related 
matters; 
c) Establish appropriate procedures and undertake activities to ensure that all 
persons with disabilities are able to exercise their right to vote and participate 
fully in electoral processes in Kosovo; and 
d) Perform any other functions ancillary to the holding of elections in Kosovo 
assigned to it by relevant rues and subsidiary instruments there under, 
including actions necessary to protect the integrity of elections process in the 
face of force major. 
 
The CEC is still dependent on external electoral assistance in many parts of the 
election process. Setting up the Count and Result Center (CRC)331 and mobile polling 
stations in the northern Kosovo Serb municipalities were organized by IFES. The By-
Mail Voting operation and certain logistical processes (e.g. ballot printing, 
distribution of sensitive electoral material, etc.) were strongly supported by the 
OSCE. 
 
Room for Improvement 
Through strong support by the International Community, the LGE was amended by 
the CEC in haste in November 2010 in order to regulate the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. The LGE gives considerable authority to the CEC, which is tasked to draft 
numerous rules enabling clarification of the law. Examples of such include the rules 
on certification and decertification of political entities, certification of candidates for a 
given election, political party financing and Election Day procedures etc. “This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 Ibid. 
331 The CRC is the location where reconciliation and results forms from all polling stations Kosovo-
wide are audited and tabulated, and the final results compiled. Conditional ballots, By-Mail ballots, and 
any other ballots as required by the CEC or Electoral Complaints and Appeals Panel (ECAP) are 
counted. 
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effectively enables the CEC to legislate, which does not accord with good practice. It 
also lessens transparency as it could prevent broad and timely understanding of 
election rules by voters and candidates alike.”332 
The authors of the EU EEM Final report rightly observe that “in view of the rules 
determining the composition of the CEC as a multi-party body, the certification of 
entities and candidates for contesting an election, essentially takes the form of a ‘peer 
review’, and may therefore result, or be perceived to result, in conflicts of interest.”333 
 
The CEC Secretariat (CECS) 
The CECS is defined as the operational arm of the CEC, being a locally recruited 
body with a permanent and independent public-service structure. The CECS is an 
entirely technical organization with a non-political mandate. 
In 2004 the CECS was responsible for activities related to field-coordination and 
planning, political entity and candidate certification, public information, accrediting 
observers and distribution of election materials. Other critical areas of competence 
such as the preparation of the voters’ list, out of Kosovo voting, and the Count and 
Result Centre remained the responsibility of the OSCE. Later OSCE and IFES 
strongly supported the Secretariat in technical aspects. 
 
The Municipal Election Commissions (MECs) 
MECs are the bodies established by the CEC in each municipality to assist in the 
conduct of elections. MECs are responsible for providing information to voters and 
political entities about their rights and obligations. Prior to an election, they also 
appoint and train Polling Station Committees and assist in technical arrangements at 
polling stations (PS). The MECs are expected to conduct their affairs in an unbiased 
and professional manner, providing an equal level of service to all. 
 
The MEC and PSC have one chairperson and six members nominated by 
parliamentary political entities. De facto, some MECs have more representatives in 
order to facilitate representation of non-majority communities on election 
commissions. The EU EEM found this to be the case in Pejë/Peć. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 EU EEM Final Report (2011), p.21 
333 ibid. 
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4.4.2. ECAP Elections Complaints and Appeals Panel334 
 
The ECAP is a permanent and independent body competent to adjudicate complaints 
and permitted appeals concerning the electoral process as established pursuant to Law 
No. 03/L-073 or the Law on General Elections [LGE] and electoral rules.335 
ECAP has been considerably strengthened compared to the 2009 municipal elections, 
following some amendments to the legal framework. ECAP is guided by the 
principles of political impartiality, confidentiality and professionalism.336 Needless to 
state, its decisions should be guided by the Fundamental Principles provided in the 
Law on General Elections especially on free, equal, universal, direct and secret 
votes.337 
The Law on General Elections provides the following powers to ECAP: 
1. Adjudicate election complaints pursuant to the laws 
2. Adjudicate appeals from decisions of Central Elections Commission as 
specified in the laws 
3. Investigate allegations in the complaint and appeal as necessary 
4. Order recount of ballots in a polling station or polling centre and examination 
of the balloting materials if and when necessary as part of its investigative 
powers. 
5. Conduct hearings if and when necessary. 
6. Establish its Rules of Procedure. 
7. Require any kind of assistance from all Kosovar authorities when it deems 
necessary. 
8. Ex officio investigate and provide sanctions if warranted in cases involving 
submission of false information pursuant to LGE, Articles 29.9 and 119. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Source ECAP, Quick Reference Guide Book, IFES, Kosovo, 2010 
335 Law 03/L-073 otherwise known as the Law on General Elections in the Republic of Kosovo, 
[Hereinafter to be referred to as LGE], Article 115.1 as Amended by Law No. 03/L-256 entitled Law 
Amending and Supplementing the Law No. 03/L-073 on the General Elections in the Republic of 
Kosovo [hereinafter referred to as the Amendment]. See also Article 3 of LGE as Amended defining 
ECAP as “. . . an independent body in charge of adjudicating complaints and appeals concerning the 
electoral process.” Law No. 03/L-072 otherwise known as the Law on Local Elections by virtue of 
Article 28 thereof makes Chapter XX on ECAP and other provisions relating to ECAP in the LGE as 
applicable to the Local Elections. 
336 ECAP Rules of Procedure, Article 1.3. See also ECAP’s First Annual Report, August 2010, p.3 
337 LGE, Article 2. 
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A complaint is a written allegation of a violation or violations of the electoral laws 
and/ or rules filed by a legal or natural person who has a legal interest in the matter or 
whose right has been injured. 
ECAP adjudicates two kinds of complaints. 
a) Those that involve violations that do not affect the election results and which 
according to LGE, Article 38.1 merit administrative fines; and 
b) Those that involve violations that “have attempted to affect the elections results” 
and are considered administrative offenses as well as criminal offenses pursuant to the 
Criminal Code of Kosovo. 	  
Timeframe of filing a complaint: 
a) Complaints regarding the conduct of voting shall be submitted to ECAP within 
twenty-four (24) hours after the close of the polling stations. 
b) Complaints concerning the conduct of the count at Counting & Results Center 
(CRC) shall be filed with ECAP within twenty-four (24) hours of the occurrence of 
the alleged violation. 
c) All complaints not related to voting and counting shall be filed within seventy-two 
(72) hours (for example, those related to campaigning). 
 
4.5. Choosing Parties and Candidates on the Ballot 
 
The choice of electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy. 
Yet, in historical terms, it is rare indeed that electoral systems are  
consciously and deliberately chosen.338 
 
The electoral system in Kosovo has undergone tremendous changes since 1999 and 
has been subject to a degree of criticism. Due to the mixed political structure of an 
international UN Mission holding ultimate power, and an elected Assembly with 
limited authority – the foundation of democracy and the accountability of the elected 
Assembly to its own citizens was restricted.  
“The importance of the electoral system should not be neglected as it influences all 
the spheres of political life in a country. As the Kosova electoral system was designed 
under special circumstances, it is extremely important to the fragile peace in Kosova 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338  Reynolds, Andrew http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/esa.htm, [access: 03/05/2011] 
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that all communities agree to a viable system of political representation that is 
conducive to [an] accountable governance and interethnic cooperation.”339 
 
Following the conflict, the OSCE saw the necessity to implement an electoral system 
that voters would understand and accept, hence taking the post-conflict scenario into 
account.  
 
Kosovo’s electoral system was one of Proportional Representation (PR) with Kosovo 
as one electoral district for the Kosovo Assembly, designed on the premise that PR 
gives minority communities a greater chance of being elected to the legislature and an 
individual citizen’s vote being represented at the national level.340 Electoral PR 
systems are relatively common in post-conflict scenarios to enable the entry of 
minority political representatives. The reserved seats for minority communities were 
especially important for the credibility of the international community in Kosovo and 
concessions to Serbia to smooth the waters after the conflict.  
 
A summary of the electoral system Kosovo from 2000-2010:341 
 
Date Type of 
Election 
System Reserved Seats Threshold 
28 Oct 2000 Local 
Elections 
PR, Open Lists None, minority 
officials were later 
appointed. 
None 
17 Nov 2001 General 
(Assembly) 
Elections 
PR, Closed Lists*, 
Single District 
10 for Serbs; 10 for 
other minorities 
None 
26 Oct 2002 Local 
Elections 
PR, Closed Lists None None 
23 Oct 2004 General 
Elections 
PR, Closed Lists 10 for Serbs; 10 for 
other minorities 
None 
 
17 Nov 2007 Local 
Elections 
PR, Open Lists None None 
17 Nov 2007 General 
Elections 
PR, Open Lists 
(selecting up to 10 
candidates) 
10 for Serbs; 10 for 
other minorities 
5% 
15 Nov 2009 Local 
Elections 
PR, Open Lists None None 
12 Dec 2010 General PR, Open Lists 10 for Serbs; 10 for 5% 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 KIPRED, Reforming the Electoral System of Kosova, Discussion Paper, Pristina, 2005, p.4 
340 UNDP, Human Development Report Kosovo 2004, The Rise of the Citizen: Challenges and 
Choices, Pristina, 2004, p.58 
341 In the KIPRED publication “Reforming the Electoral System of Kosova“ Leon Malazogu and Ilir 
Dugolli summarized the electoral system(s) in Kosovo from 2000-2002. The author of this study added 
details from elections in 2004, 2007, 2009 and 2010, leaving Mayoral Elections (2007, 2009) aside. 
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Elections (selecting up to 5 
candidates) 
other minorities 
* Closed candidates’ Lists mean that a voter can choose a political party but not an individual 
candidate.  
 
The electoral system was criticized because it was:342 
• Indirectly encouraging ethnic parties 
• Increasing party hierarchy 
• Eliminating the possibility for a considerable opposition 
• Unclear accountability due to a closed list system until 2007 
• Leaving a number of municipalities without any representative, thus 
weakening the voter-MP link 
• Enacted by a resolution, the ownership by its constituency was lacking, hence 
the legitimacy limited. 
 
Having been seen as one of the major obstacles for democratic accountability and 
legitimacy of the political class, improvements towards an electoral system to 
increase the political accountability of the Kosovo Assembly were put forward. The 
system is now a wholly open-list system, with voters able to select up to five 
preferred candidates of their party of choice. “The possibility to have up to five 
preference votes was introduced with a view to enhancing the election of women 
candidates by merit.”343 The quota of a third of the “minority gender” – in practice, 
women – on both the party lists and in parliament remains.  
Kosovo remained one electoral district. The possibility dividing Kosovo into several 
electoral districts would enhance the link between the electorate and elected 
Assembly members. 
 
Preference Vote 
Certified political entities are listed in an open list ballot where the voter can mark a 
preferred political entity and up to five candidates from the same entity. Candidate 
names do not appear on the ballots but are represented by pre-assigned numbers. The 
voter can find the number for each candidate in a separate booklet inside the Polling 
station. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 KIPRED, Reforming the Electoral System of Kosova, Discussion Paper, Pristina, 2005, p.4 
343 EU EEM Final Report (2011), p.26 
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Conditional Voting 
Conditional Voting is a voting feature unique to Kosovo, which enables voters to vote 
outside their assigned polling stations. If a voter can prove eligibility to vote but 
cannot be found on the Final Voters List (FVL) in the PS, he/she is entitled to cast a 
so-called ‘conditional ballot’ (CB). 
The EU EEM state in their Final Report on the 2010 Kosovo elections “Conditional 
voting is well understood as an enfranchising tool in a post conflict environment 
where (a passive system for) voter registration is based on permanent population 
registers.”344 EU EEM further remark, “[…] It opens an avenue for manipulation of 
the election and delays the process of announcing results. The justification given is 
the timeframe of these elections and that it serves as a means to enhance Serb 
participation.”345 
 
Conditional Ballots are counted in the Count and Result Center after all Final Voters 
Lists are scanned manually and CB-envelope information346 has been data entered 
into the CRC software application. In order to approve a conditional ballot it has to be 
verified that a voter has not voted in more than one PS. This process is costly in terms 
of time, human resources, in addition o lacking transparency. The announcement of 
final results is therefore delayed and the credibility of the overall electoral process 
endangered. 
 
Basics of Conditional Voting347 
• A still-to-be-confirmed/verified right to vote in the municipality where the 
voter wishes to cast a ballot 
• Rational: Post-conflict and Voter List issues 
o Emphasis on inclusivity 
• How does it work? 
o Not on Final Voters List (FVL) 
o CB envelope (secrecy; eligibility; fraud prevention) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 EU EEM Final Report (2011), p.35 
345 ibid. 
346 Each conditional ballot is cast in a security envelope, which is inside a Conditional Ballot Envelope 
(CBE) with the detailed information of the voter on it. 
347 IFES Working Summary - Presentation, Kosovo 2009 
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• Drawbacks: crutch; cost; fraud 
Reasons for Denying Conditional Ballots348 
• Voter not Registered (not on Voters List) 
• Voter already Voted by Regular Ballot 
• Voter already Voted by CB, BM, SNV 
• Voter Registered in another Municipality 	  	  
4.6. Political Party Landscape 
 
Although Kosovo’s party system and its development are not crucial for this case, its 
existence and development must be addressed here in order to highlight the main 
national actors involved, in addition to serving as an example of international 
involvement in the development of Kosovo’s party systems. 
Political parties play an important role in the management of conflict in societies 
divided along cultural, linguistic, religious, regional, or other lines.349 In theory they 
represent “the political expressions of underlying societal cleavages”.350 In regard to 
post-conflict situations “political parties are the key link between masses and elites, 
and play an absolutely crucial role in building a sustainable democratic polity.”351 For 
many scholars352 the goal is to create broad-based, multi-ethnic political parties, as 
they are less likely to have a negative impact on democracy promotion. Huntington 
argues, that fractionalized and ethnically exclusive party systems are inherently 
damaging for democratic prospects and are, consequently, found widely in failed 
democracies.353 Although there are reasonable empirical arguments in favor of 
avoiding ethnic parties, the guidelines of the OSCE “explicitly affirm the right of 
ethnic minorities to form their own parties and compete for office on an ethnic 
basis.”354 The OSCE introduced a network of ‘political party service centers’ to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 ibid. 
349 Reilly (2006), p.811-827 
350 ibid. 
351 Reilly, ACE Project, p.5 
352 Reilly (2006), Huntington (1991), Gunther, Richard and Diamond, Larry, ‘Types and Functions of 
Parties’ in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy, Baltimore, 
MD, and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2001, p.23-24 
353 Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 
354 OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen declaration available at www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-
1999/hd/cope90e.htm [access: 09/11/11] 
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support the developing political groups to “help move them towards becoming more 
coherent, policy-oriented political parties.”355 Reilly further points out “Kosovo too 
has seen overt attempts by the international community to mandate multi-ethnicity in 
the political system. However, despite some inflated claims to the contrary, the 
success of such interventions so far has been modest, and ethnic parties continue to 
dominate the Balkans’ political landscape.”356 
 
In Kosovo, political parties are clearly divided along ethnic lines and are organized 
around personalities, narrow political interest, and tribal and ethnic loyalties. 
Kramer’s analysis shows that due to their history, Kosovo’s political parties, its 
leadership, party activists and the electorate have little experience with living 
democracy and political pluralism357, hence creating a unique “political culture”.  
The political orientation of Kosovo’s party landscape is significantly defined by the 
situation of the 1990’s and the war in 1999. “During the first phase, from 1989 to the 
international engagement in 1999, the Kosovo Albanian political arena was 
dominated by a single political party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) under 
Ibrahim Rugova, although it faced a challenge from the more militant KLA.”358 
Political party leadership and other representatives of political parties were already 
active in the early 90s and were able to position themselves in the context of the 
conflict against the Serbian regime. There was almost no change after the war, more a 
political confirmation of the status quo.359 Kosovo’s parties are political movements 
or representations of certain groups around a strong leader or personality with high 
political ambitions, which sometimes are held together by a clan-structure. They are 
patriarchal like the existing societal structure and women are represented in 
parliament only due to UNMIK’s introduced female quota. In reality they are playing 
a minor role in the political establishment and decision-making process.360 
 
The five parties of the Kosovo Albanian majority represented in the 2007-2010 
Assembly, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), the Alliance for New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Reilly (2006), p.823 
356 ibid, 
357 Kramer/Dzihic (2006), p.64 
358 Schleicher (2010), p. 110 
359 Kramer/Dzihic (2006), p.65 
360 ibid, p.65 
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Kosovo (AKR) and the Democratic League of Dardania (LDD) defined themselves as 
center-right.361 Whereas PDK formed a coalition with LDK, the other three parties 
were in opposition. 
 
The two main and contrasting traditions of the Kosovo Albanian political spectrum 
have their origins either in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or from the non-
violent resistance movement to Serbian rule. PDK and AAK are both led by former 
KLA commanders: Hashim Thaci, who has served as Prime Minister since 2008, 
heads the PDK,and AAK’s leader is Ramush Haradinaj, who is indicted for war 
crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Fatmir Sejdiu succeeded the LDK’s founding leader and President of Kosovo, 
Ibrahim Rugova, after his death in 2006.  Nexhat Daci heads the LDD. Behgjet 
Pacolli, a construction magnate, founded the AKR to contest the 2007 elections.362 
 
Political Entities for the December elections 
For the 2010 elections, the CEC certified in total 29 political entities, including two 
coalitions and three citizens’ initiatives.363 
The following parties were registered for the parliamentary elections:364 
1. AAK   Alliance for the Future of Kosovo  
2. PAI   Ashkali Party For Integration  
3. SNSD   Association of Independent Social Democrats  
4. BSDAK  Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo  
5. GIG   Citizen's Initiative of Gora  
6. AKR-PD-PSD-PPI-PPK-PNDSH-PGJK Coalition  
7. VAKAT  Coalition Vakat  
8. LDD   Democratic League of Dardania  
9. LDK   Democratic League of Kosovo  
10. PDK   Democratic Party of Kosovo  
11. PDAK   Democratic Party of Kosovo Ashkanlive  
12. KDTP   Democratic Turk Party of Kosovo  
13. SLS   Independent Liberal Party  
14. LEK   League of Kosovo Egyptians  
15. VV   Lëvizja Vetëvendosje!  
16. CDS   Montenegro's Democratic Party  
17. GIKN   National Initiative Civil Wing  
18. IRDK   New Democratic Initiative of Kosova  
19. NDS   New Democratic Party, Kosovo  
20. FER   New Spirit Party  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 EU EEM to Kosovo 2010, Final Report, 2011, p.11 
362 ibid, p.11ff 
363 Central Election Commission, Office of PP Registration and Certification: Candidate's List. 
http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/al/rrethkqz/lk.html [access: 01/12/2011] 
364 CEC, http://www.kqz-ks.org/SKQZ-WEB/al/rrethkqz/lk.html, [access: 01/12/2011] 
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21. SDA   Party of Democratic Action  
22. SDSKIM  Serbian Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohia  
23. SKMS   Serbian Kosovo Metohia Party  
24. SNS   Serbian National Party  
25. SSDS   Serbian Social Democratic Party  
26. SDSG   Social Democratic Party of Gora  
27. KTB   Turkish Union of Kosovo  
28. PREBK  United Party of Kosovo Roma  
29. JSL   United Serbian List 
 
Two new Kosovo Albanian entities, Vetëvendosje  (Self-Determination) and Fryma e 
Re (New Spirit, FER), defining themselves in opposition to the five parties 
represented in the Assembly, contested for the first time and tried to gain support 
from disillusioned voters.365 Some other minority parties entered the political arena 
for the first time as well. 
Due to the 5% eligibility threshold for Kosovo Albanian parties to be represented in 
the Assembly, smaller parties formed coalitions with larger parties.366 
 
4.7. The Context of Parliamentary Elections 2010 
 
In September 2010, the president of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, resigned from his 
position after the Constitutional Court ruled that he had breached the constitution by 
holding both the position as head of state and leader of the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK).367 Thereupon, Jakup Krasniqi, the President of the Kosovo Assembly, 
resumed the responsibilities and duties as Acting President as required by the 
constitution and set an early election date for February 13th 2011 with the full 
agreement of other political parties. With Sejdiu’s resignation and the backing of the 
ratification of the privatization of the Post Telecommunication of Kosovo (PTK), the 
internal policy and party agenda within LDK changed. The party withdrew from the 
ruling coalition between PDK and LDK, leaving the government without 
parliamentary majority and therefore at a political stalemate. The LDK held the post 
of deputy prime minister and five ministerial posts in the twelve-member cabinet.  
“Following these events, the Alliance for New Kosovo (AKR) submitted a vote of no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 EU EEM to Kosovo 2010, Final Report, 2011, p.12 
366 ibid. 
367 Case No. KI 47/10, The Constitutional Court of Kosovo. 29 September 2010. http://www.gjk- 
ks.org/repository/docs/ki_47_10_eng_2.pdf, [access: 11/28/2011] 
Kosovo president resigns after losing constitutional court case, Deutsche Welle 27 Sept 2010, 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6050006,00.html, [acess: 11/25/2011] 
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confidence on the government led by the PDK. The motion was approved on 
November 2, 2010 with the crushing majority of the voters present in parliament, 
including members of parliament of the PDK.”368 
After the breach of the coalition, Hashim Thaci’s government needed to establish a 
caretaker government within eight days or hold elections within 45 days after that.369 
While the elections were called within the legal limit of 45 days, as required by law, 
the minority government could have ruled as technical government to vote the already 
prepared budget and run the country until the February 13, 2010 early election 
term.370 This would have given time to the CEC, political parties and civil society to 
prepare for elections accordingly.  
Organizing elections in such a short time frame was a huge task for the CEC, even 
given the right “to change time frames as needed in accordance with the 
circumstances”.371 Valdete Daka, Head of the CEC, stated in an interview with the 
daily newspapers Koha Ditore that the CEC could not guarantee the quality of the 
processes for the upcoming elections on December 12th, 2010.372 Additionally, civil 
society agents and international election experts were concerned about possible 
malpractices in areas of political parties’ voter strongholds. 
The Electoral Management Body faced a number of challenges that stretched their 
capacities, including adapting to the newly adopted electoral legislation, facilitating 
the Out-of-Kosovo voting (OCV), certifying political parties and candidates, 
appointing and training PSCs, updating the Voter List (VL) and setting up the Count 
and Result Center (CRC). International electoral support was once again highly in 
demand. The OSCE provided advice and technical assistance to the CEC up to 
Election Day, helping to finalize the Voter List, prepare the OCV program and 
support the logistical and operational processes. 
IFES played a key role in setting up the CRC, supporting the voter information 
campaign and administering 14 alternative polling stations positioned in northern 
Kosovo where the Election Commission experienced difficulty recruiting for and 	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opening regular polling centers.373 
“The overall preparations for the elections of December 2010 were seriously 
overburdened by a number of circumstantial factors, not the least of which were 
related to the dates being changed twice in a short period of time. The CEC was faced 
with a number of challenges that stretched their capacities, not the least of which was 
the budget of 2.5 euro per registered voter that was allocated for the parliamentary 
elections”374 
 
It needs to be mentioned at this point that difficulties were faced during the local 
elections in 2009 as well. The trust in the election administration, the political parties’ 
behavior and the lack of prosecution of officials violating electoral law decreased 
based on the experience on the municipal elections a year earlier. “The phrase 
“defend the vote” has consolidated in Kosovo’s lexicon since the 2009 elections, 
usually meaning the need to take action at polling station level to prevent 
manipulations by activists of opposing parties. It contains the risk of escalating 
confrontation between rival party supporters.”375 
 
4.8. The Count and Results Center (CRC) 
 
The quality and transparency of the counting process is imperative for the integrity of the electoral 
process and the legitimacy of is most tangible product – the results. The vote counting “requires 
accuracy, speed and security”.376 
 
Vote counting is one of the most deciding phases of the election process. Delays and 
failure to complete the count and announce results in a timely, transparent and 
accurate manner can jeopardize public confidence and trust in the electoral process, 
and hence the democratic development of a country. Political parties and candidates 
may furthermore refuse to accept the final outcomes and challenge the overall 
process. “Frequently, the importance of detailed planning, training and organization is 
overlooked, or is considered of secondary importance.”377 	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The Count and Results Centre is the central location in Kosovo where all the sensitive 
electoral material is brought to after Election Day. At the close of polls and at the 
completion of the count within the polling stations, the polling station chairperson 
transports their respective polling station material to their municipal election 
commissions. At the municipal hub the material is checked and consolidated prior to 
onward transportation to the central location. 
 
The CRC also receives all the Special Needs Voting378 material from the municipal 
special needs teams and those ballots that were cast By-Mail from voters residing 
outside of Kosovo. The CRC is responsible for counting all those ballots that were not 
regularly cast on Election Day, however are required to be counted before the Final 
Results can be announced. This also includes those ballots that were cast 
conditionally in Dual Polling Stations with the Polling Centers of Kosovo. 
 
The CRC is required to verify and audit all the Reconciliation and Results Forms (and 
corresponding Candidate Results Sheets) that were compiled by polling station 
committees on Election Day. The PS commissioners need to complete two result 
forms after the closing of the polling. The RRF includes information about the total 
number of ballots received and cast, total number of votes for a political entity, as 
well as information regarding spoiled, blank and invalid ballots. The second form is 
the Candidate Result Form (CRF), which includes the candidate votes per political 
entity.  
 
The Centre’s Data Entry Area enters all information of the result forms per polling 
station and scans all Final Voters Lists in order to record all those voters who voted 
regularly on election day to ensure that no voter is able to cast a further, conditional, 
By-Mail or conditional Special Needs ballot. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 LGE Art.99.1 
a) Homebound voters: eligible voters who cannot leave their home to vote in person at a regular 
PS due to physical, medical, or any other kind of disability; 
b) Voters confined to an institution: eligible voters who are hospitalized, elderly people in 
specially designated homes for the elderly, persons of diminished mental capacity in 
institutions of health care, inmates in prisons and detainees in detention centers; 
c) Special circumstance voting: eligible voters living in communities who, due to relocation 
from the vicinity of their regular PS or security concerns, cannot vote at their assigned PS. 
This type of voting shall require the approval of the Municipal Election Commission. 
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The CRC operates in accordance with strict procedures which have been approved by 
the CEC of Kosovo, and define in great detail the processes and procedures that need 
to be followed to ensure a transparent, accurate and timely count. This process 
ultimately ends with the announcement of the Final Results, which upon the closure 
of the appeals period ends in Certification of the results.379 
 
The CRC is staffed with approximately 500 personnel that are divided into the core 
team and daily staff. The CRC Coordinator is responsible for ensuring the overall 
operation and processes at the CRC according to international standards. 
 
The key functions of the CRC entail: 
• Auditing of results compiled by Polling Station (PS) 
• Counting of Conditional Ballots (CBs) and Special Needs (SNVs) and By-
Mail (BM) Ballots 
• Conduct investigations, as needed, with the goal of reconciliation 
• Tabulate results by PS for each constituency 
• Generate the published and final results for the CEC 
 
4.9. Electoral Assistance in Count and Result Center 
 
Until the elections in 2007, the Count and Result Center was an OSCE-led operation. 
However, with a changed political landscape, the OSCE was no longer mandated to 
support the CRC for the elections in 2009 and 2010, requiring another international 
assistance provider needed to step in. 
The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) entered into a mutual 
cooperation agreement with CEC, and was asked to provide technical support to the 
CEC in the areas of voter education and awareness, Count and Result Center, media 
outreach, “in addition to helping the CEC conduct efficient and transparent 
elections”.380 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Count and Results Center Procedures 2010, CEC in collaboration with IFES (Nov. 2010) 
380 Embassy of the United States, Kosovo Pristina, Press Release, Oct 1, 2009, 
http://pristina.usembassy.gov/usaidpr.html, [access: 11/02/2011] 
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The agreement was signed between the former CEC President, Nesrin Lushta, USAID 
Kosovo Mission Director, Patricia Rader, and IFES Chief of Party, Chedomir Flego. 
As a side note, the USAID Director indicated that the agreement is another example 
of cooperation in the long standing relationship between the US Government and the 
Republic of Kosovo.”381 
 
The international advisory team experienced a slew of problems facing the set-up of 
the CRC for a number of reasons: 
• Short time frame 
• Limited budget 
• Inexperienced local staff 
• Late realization of the importance of the CRC by the CEC (the vote count and 
the tabulation of the results comes last in the electoral cycle)  
• Little interest before Election Day in the CRC 
 
Activities of the Electoral Assistance providers:382  
IFES provided nine international advisory staff to the CRC, starting with two advisors 
six weeks prior to election day, and gradually adding advisors with particular 
experience leading and managing CRC operations as election day neared. Some of the 
advisory team had been employed by the OSCE in the Kosovo CRC during previous 
elections. Their skills included general count center management, facility 
management, CRC IT support, data entry, as well as specialist knowledge in intake, 
count, election audit and investigational procedures.  
 
For the 2010 elections, the advisory team saw the urgent need to re-write the CRC 
Procedures (based on the 2009 version) to ensure alignment with the 2010 Assembly 
election requirements.  The CEC approved the procedures just prior to Election Day.  
Barring significant changes in the electoral system, structure or procedures, the 
Kosovo CEC was left with a clear and concise manual that would subsequently 
require little change for future elections and increase the efficiency and sustainability 
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382 Following summary of activities by the international advisory team are based on a report written by 
Matthew Jenkins (CRC Coordinator Advisor) for IFES, Kosovo 2010 
	   119	  
of the CRC set-up process. Whilst finalizing the procedures, extensive advice and 
support to the establishment of a training program was provided. 
Over six hundred local staff, including forty-five core team members, received 
training for their respective areas, including the intake of sensitive material after 
election day; the processing and counting of conditional ballots; the data entry of all 
polling station and CRC generated results protocols; the scanning of final voters lists 
and the audit of all results forms. The international consultant team also enhanced the 
preparation for the Kosovo Serb staff working at the CRC through additional 
information and trainings.  
 
Moreover, the advisory team recommended several changes to the overall procedures 
in order to streamline the intake, including the establishment of an intake schedule, 
increased capacity (area and staffing) for intake and an improved process for 
receiving problematic cases from the MECs. These process improvements were meant 
to reduce the volume of material that would need be quarantined or require immediate 
investigation, thereby increasing the speed with which the intake could be undertaken. 
Furthermore there were recommendations and subsequent changes to the way 
conditional ballots (CB) and Special Needs (SNV) material were processed, which 
would alleviate reconciliation and provide greater transparency and accuracy in the 
provision of results for those voters who did not vote regular on election day. In order 
to ensure voter secrecy, the team advised on changes to the By-Mail processing and 
counting due to the low numbers of registered By-Mail voters. 
Changes were also been made to the Data Entry Area where the speed of data entering 
forms, the scanning of Final Voters List (FVL) and in particular the method of 
verifying conditional ballots was greatly enhanced.  
 
Important changes have also been recommended in the audit area, where crosschecks 
of the Results and Reconciliation Forms (RRFs) and the Candidate Result Forms 
(CRFs) were implemented into the IT system. This was a recommended feature 
according to the amendments of the LGE383, where voters can choose a political entity 
and up to five candidates of that entity. For a detailed list of crosschecks please refer 
to Annex, table 3, p.158. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Art. 7 of the Amendments Law (LGE, Art. 110.4) 
	   120	  
 
To recall the preference vote options on a ballot: 
• A Voter can vote for a political entity 
• A voter can choose up to five candidates from the same entity 
• If a ballot is marked for more than five candidates only the vote for the 
political entity shall be counted 
• A voter cannot choose only a candidate  
 
The creation of a stand-alone Investigation Team was promoted to facilitate the more 
efficient processing of problematic cases encountered at the CRC. The national CRC 
Coordinator was advised on closer co-operation with the representatives of ECAP that 
should help the CRC better inform the CEC on cases that require investigation or that 
are subject to complaints. 
 
Electoral IT solutions provide extremely valuable support to numerous electoral 
processes, despite the sensitive nature of their handling. One of the major components 
of the Count and Result Center is its IT system, which was designed and implemented 
by a Macedonian IT company (avoid challenging a Kosovo company towards their 
political affinity).  As the electoral procedures should dictate the specifications of an 
IT software application, an international IT advisor was needed to translate electoral 
needs and changes of former CRC procedures into IT language and therefore support 
the overall performance of tabulating result data.   
Programming “bugs” were present within the software application during the process, 
caused mainly due to a lack of testing before Election Day. Many additional changes 
were made shortly before the data entry of forms started, without having adequate 
time to properly validate or test the modifications, hence increasing the risk of 
reduced performance.  	  The IFES Advisory highlighted that the local CRC staff was greatly hindered by the 
fact that the CRC Facility was only available two weeks after agreement had been 
reached with CECS. Against this background, CRC staff lacked transport, heating, 
telephone lines and working computers for some time after they commenced work at 
the center. The training material was too little too late. Many of the Core staff lacked 
any relevant previous election (or otherwise) experience for the positions for which 
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they had been recruited, which made the task of preparing them for this challenging 
assignment extremely difficult. As a consequence, the internationals team advised 
strongly to use the more experienced staff in managerial positions, as well as External 
Relations, whose task it was to guide observers through the CRC. The greater 
knowledge of the national staff’s respective areas could have only facilitated the 
efficiency of the count center’s work. 
 
One of the main problems for recruiting qualified staff remained that of common and 
widespread nepotism, which is counterproductive to the transparency and efficiency 
of the CRC election process. Members of the CEC, CECS and CRC alike were trying 
to recruit family members, disregarding the occupational aptitude needed for certain 
positions within the Count Center, e.g. knowledge in the use of computers to work in 
the Data Entry Area, affinity to numbers for the audit of result forms, physical 
strength to work as porter in the Intake area, etc. 
While nepotism is certainly fueled by the bad economic conditions and the high 
unemployment rate in Kosovo, it curtails the overall quality of the electoral process in 
the long-term.	  
 
4.10. Election Day 
 
The first reports submitted by numerous domestic and international observers on 
Election Day were positive. The European Union and the United States viewed 
Kosovo’s first general elections since independence “as a test of its democratic 
maturity, with free and fair proceedings a condition for eventual membership of the 
EU.”384 
Allegations of fraud arose only later that day, with LDK reporting unusually high 
turnouts in two PDK strongholds.385 The European Parliament Election Observation 
Delegation stated in their report, that “the turnout in Skenderaj/Srbica, Decane/Decan 
and Gllogovc/Glocovac was twice as high as the country-wide average turnout and 
reached an unrealistic level of around 90 per cent. Furthermore, the situation in some 
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385 ibid. 
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Kosovo Serb municipalities South of Ibar was chaotic.”386 However the EP 
Delegation assessed a general good outcome of the election and described the 
increased participation by Kosovo Serbs as a positive sign but “the delegation 
regretted that participation in the Kosovo Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo was 
non-existent.”387 
US Ambassador Christopher Dell observed the election and witnessed 
irregularities.388 “Local media reported a high number of complaints of irregularities. 
The Election Complaint and Appeals Panel received 171 complaints from political 
entities over various violations, such as stuffing ballot boxes, multiple voting and 
defective verification ultraviolet lamps.”389 
 
ENEMO presented in their Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions from 
Dec 13th, that “the 12 December Kosovo Assembly elections were organized in an 
orderly manner meeting many international standards, but procedural shortcomings 
and challenges remain.”390 The voting process was depicted as “generally calm and 
peaceful but some cases of breaches of procedural and irregularities were 
observed”.391 The disregard for the secrecy of the vote by the widespread practice of 
family voting and “allegations of the voting and counting processes in certain 
municipalities along with doubts over reported turnout figures in certain parts of 
Kosovo have been registered.”392 
Further observations of the count were described as “the counting process was 
assessed as bad or very bad in 12% of the polling stations observed during the closing 
and counting procedures. In some cases voters arriving after 19.00 were allowed to 
vote and in 6% of the polling stations unauthorized persons were seen directing the 
counting process in the PSC. Some of the counting procedures were not fully adhered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 European Parliament, Election Observation Delegation to the General Election in Kosovo (12 
December 2010, 9 January 2011), p.4, 
www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election.../kosovo_parl_10_11.pdf, [access: 11/11/2011] 
387 ibid. 
388 Embassy of the United States, Kosovo Pristina, 
http://pristina.usembassy.gov/statement_on_the_elections.html, [access: 11/03/2011] 
389 SETimes.com, 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2010/12/14/nb-
03, [access: 08/09/2011] 
390 ENEMO (2010), p.1 
391 ibid. 
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to and in 15% of the polling stations the chairperson did not announce the results, nor 
were the results posted in the wall as stipulated in the law.”393 
 
The Election Appeals and Complaint Panel received 365 complaints from political 
entities over various violations, such as multiple voting, stuffing ballot boxes and 
defective UV lamps.394 “On 16 December, based on the Election Appeals and 
Complaint Panel decisions, the Central Election Commission concluded that complete 
re-runs would have to take place in three municipalities (Skenderaj/Srbica, 
Gllogovc/Glogovac and Decan/Decane) and partial re-runs (in one polling centre) in 
two municipalities (Lipjan/Lipljan and Malishevë/Malisevo) on 9 January 2011.”395 
 
4.11. After E-Day: Findings of the Count and Result Center  
 
With the first reports on electoral manipulation and fraud, the CRC staff faced an 
intensification of focus on processes inside the Center. After the closing of the polling 
stations the focus shifted to the tabulation of results and the reported irregularities. 
On December 15th the CRC corrected the turnout numbers in Skenderaj/Srbica to 94% 
(instead of 95,3%), and in Gllogovc/Glocovac to 87% (instead of 107% initially, later 
90,4%). Observers and electoral contestants alike alleged fraud in the above-
mentioned municipalities and other PSC around Kosovo. 
 
The original Result and Reconciliation Forms (RRFs) from Skenderaj/Srbica and 
Gllogovc/Glocovac showed an ample number of problems: mismatches between the 
draft RRF and the original, certain key control parameters revealed discrepancies, 
amendments or forms of “corrections” to the figures on the original RRFs and 
discrepancies between the original RRFs and the tabulated results at the MEC. 
The improbable voter turnout, approximately twice that across Kosovo, hinted at 
intended fraud, in both cases advantageous for PDK. Such electoral malpractice 
results in the undermining of public trust in the elections and is an apparent sign of 
the lack of political will to conduct elections in line with international standards. 
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During the intake of election material there were a small number of polling stations 
‘quarantined’ due to improper packing, missing items, missing security seals, and 
other reasons, which warranted further investigation.  
 
After the Intake and the ongoing Data Entry process, it soon became very clear that 
not only were the “known” cases of irregularities worrisome, but the newly 
implemented crosschecks flagged an astonishing great number of result forms, which 
did not pass the initial audit. 
The most common types of problems experienced: 
A. The total amount of votes for candidates was more than five times higher than 
the votes for the party 
B. Party has no votes, candidate(s) do(es) 
C. One candidate has more votes than the party 
D. RRF has problems irreconcilable through audit efforts 
 
As of midnight on 15th December 2010, the following was noted:396 
Out of the 2043 Polling Stations processed, 849 PS (41% of the total) needed 
Auditing 
• Number of PS originally placed in Audit: 808 (41% of total PS processed) 
• Resolved in Audit: 287 (35% of the total cases coming to Audit) 
• Sent to investigation: 521 (65% of the total cases coming to Audit) 
 
Outcome of problems identified: 
A. The sum of votes for candidates is more than 5 times higher than the votes for 
the party: 84% of the total cases coming to Investigation 
B. The party has no votes but candidate(s) do(es): 2% of the total cases led to 
Investigation 
C. The candidate has more votes than the party: 10.5% of the total cases led to 
Investigation 
D. RRF has problems irreconcilable through Audit: 3.5% of the total cases led to 
Investigation 
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Matthew Jenkins, IFES Advisor to the CRC Coordinator summarized the findings: 
“The CRC determined originally that 60% of all PS commissions failed to 
correctly complete the results forms. A number of these had mathematical, 
transposition or other obvious errors that were resolved by the auditors. 
However, the 40% of all PS that could not be reconciled and consequently 
could not be included in the results for the General Assembly. The 
overwhelming majority of these stations were irreconcilable due to issues with 
the allocation of votes to candidates. The CRC presented various options to 
the CEC, among them annulling these PS, counting only the party vote 
allocation (and not the candidates), and recounting the PS in order to try and 
reconcile the material. The CEC voted in favor of a complete recount of these 
PS.” 
 
The problems identified were widespread and had additional implications. Each voter 
has the option to choose one political party and up to five candidates within the same 
political party, the total ratio of party votes to candidate votes had to be around 1:5. 
The 40% of all PS with identified problems were mathematically discovered. In cases 
where the ratio was lower, the crosschecks were unable to detect this kind of 
irregularity, and therefore might failing to account for a voter’s intention.  
 
Based on recommendations and a report by the Count Center, the CEC “ordered a 
recount of the ballots of 866 polling stations across Kosovo, almost 40% of all polling 
stations. The number of polling stations was reduced to 762 when the polling stations 
to be included in the 9 January partial repeat election were subtracted, and to 760 after 
the CEC decided on 18 December to increase the tolerance level of discrepancy 
between ballots in the box and voters’ signatures from three to six.”397 
 
Recount 
As a consequence of the significant size of the re-count, CRC local personnel needed 
to be re-deployed and trained in the count procedures, and the audit and investigation 
unit enhanced by competent staff. 
The initial re-count process proved to be rather difficult and inaccurate, possibly due 
to the limited time available to train staff appropriately, the differences in count and 
re-count procedures, and to a certain extent the lack of suitably skilled staff. 
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After the first day of counting, the quality of the recount increased dramatically, 
eliminating the vast majority of type A, B and C problems.398 The systematic errors 
during the original counts in the polling stations were rectified in most cases. 
Additionally, the CEC voted for an increase of the tolerance399 level of the RRF and 
CRF forms, which avoided additional re-counts and investigations for many polling 
stations. 
	  
Repeat Election 
As stated earlier, the CEC ordered to repeat the elections in their entirety in the 
municipalities of Skenderaj/Srbica, Decane/Decan and Gllogovc/Glocovac, “as well 
as in one polling center each in Lipjan/Lipljan and Malisheve/Malisevo on 9 January, 
following a decision of the ECAP to repeat elections in some 70 polling stations in 
these municipalities.”400 
In order to avoid the irregularities from the 12 December vote, all the polling station 
and polling center election officials were replaced for the re-run. The respective 
MECs however remained the same. 
The malfunction of UV lamps and indelible ink were additional reasons given by the 
Supreme Court of Kosovo during their ruling on another repeat election, in twenty-
four polling centers in the Mitrovice/Mitrovica municipality. Thereafter the CEC 
decided to repeat the election for the entire municipality. The faulty UV lamps and 
indelible ink were reported to be double checked by the CEC, but on inspection of the 
EU EEM, the tested equipment failed as originally described.401 
 
4.12. Measuring free and fair in the CRC 
 
The notion of free and fair elections was elaborately discussed in the previous 
chapter, as one of the main features of democracy, including the accurate depiction of 
the voters will. In order for ‘fair’ to assume the equality of the vote402, the correct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398  
A. The total amount of votes for candidates is more than five times higher than the votes for the party 
B. Party has no votes, candidate(s) do(es) 
C. One candidate has more votes than the party 
399 The tolerance level was increased from 3 to 6 on the RRF, and 0 to 6 on the CRF 
400 EU EEM to Kosovo 2010, Final Report, 2011, p.51 
401 ibid. 
402 Goodwill-Gill (2006), p.73 
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count and accurate tabulation of these votes is mandatory for the body responsible for 
this process. Going back to the introductory quote “Its Not the Voting that’s 
Democracy, Its the Counting.”403, the CRC played an extraordinarily important role in 
accounting for the will of every voter, as delivered through their vote.  
 
Having been discussed above, 40% of all polling stations across Kosovo were 
included in a recount of their results from Election Day. Elections in four 
municipalities and additional polling centers were repeated in their entirety due to 
serious irregularities having been identified. 
While some problems became clear with the publishing of the preliminary results, 
others surfaced only because of mathematical crosschecks in the Count and Result 
Center. The CRC in its function is able to reconcile the result forms from all polling 
stations and therefore “check” on the results delivered by MECs.  
This is a crucial element of the electoral process in Kosovo, as it is not common to 
have a central count location, once the vote count has taken place at the polling 
station level. 
Central count locations are often used in precarious security situations, where it is 
easier to guard one location rather than a multitude of polling stations, or when the 
ballot or the count process are too complicated to be carried out in a single voting 
place. Additionally, the administration of certain types of ballots can be facilitated in 
a counting center. “This includes absentee votes, mail votes from armed forces, 
diplomatic missions, refugees, incarcerated persons or persons residing outside their 
electoral district which may come from various voting stations, local or abroad, or 
directly from the voters (by mail).”404 As Kosovo’s voting system still allows 
conditional ballots, and conducts an Out-of Kosovo and SNV voting programs, the 
CRC remains the central count and audit location for all PS. 
 
In contrast to a central count location, counting of ballots in polling stations has many 
benefits. “The main advantages of vote counting in polling stations are speed, cost 
effectiveness and transparency.”405 The quantity of personnel, training and logistics406 
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is greatly reduced; furthermore, counting in PSs enhances public confidence towards 
the electoral process as it “indirectly promotes participation of the population since 
the process is closer to their home, making the results more tangible. The process then 
tends to be regarded as open, accessible, and legitimate.“407 
Public confidence towards the election process is fundamentally important and it 
might be severely affected by the perception of fraud, tampered ballot boxes and 
delays in announcing election results. 
 
Returning to the key principles of fairness in the count process, we need to analyze 
the transparency, accuracy, integrity, secrecy and accountability in Kosovo and the 
CRC: 
Transparency408 
A large number of domestic and international observers (32.135) were accredited to 
observe polling and counting on 12 Dec, with most of these observers being 
nominated by political parties.409 
The transparency of the process was generally assumed. “Domestic observers were 
noted in 93% of the polling stations but in 10% of the stations the observers did not 
have full view of the counting process.”410 The apparent poor quality of the 
performance by PS personnel was not enhanced through the presence of observers. 
The CRC was open to observers and media and tried to accommodate a transparent 
process. One point of criticism was the computerized handling of Conditional Ballots, 
which is inscrutable to observers in all aspects (e.g. not all computer screens are 
visible for a public view, computerized status query if a CB is confirmed or denied). 	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408 See: ACE Project, Guiding Principles of Vote Counting, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/vc/vc20, 
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Transparency: 
“For the counting process to be open and transparent, representatives of political parties and candidates 
should be allowed to witness and/or participate in the process, and be permitted to copy the statement 
of the results of the counting process. National and international electoral observers should also be 
allowed to witness the process and be permitted to copy the statement of the results of the counting 
process. In some countries, ordinary citizens are encouraged to watch the counting process. 
Jurisdictions will often require that the observers to the counting process do not have access to people 
outside the counting location and are unable to communicate via mobile telephones or through other 
methods, until the vote counting is concluded. Manual counting is by its nature more transparent than 
computerized counting. If vote counting is computerized, new mechanisms for ensuring transparency, 
such as external audits, need to be introduced.” 
409 ENEMO (2010), p.13, EU EEM to Kosovo 2010, Final Report, 2011, p.57 
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Accuracy411 
The accuracy of the count process in the polling stations was extremely low, 
evidenced by the result forms (RRFs and CRFs) that did not successfully pass the 
audit process in the CRC. The reasons for this outcome could include inadequate staff 
training, late hours for PS personnel, lacking commitment to the electoral process, or 
attempted manipulation of votes. 
The overwhelming number of PS with errors and possible fraud left the public with 
reasonable doubts towards the electoral process and its integrity. But also the CRC 
faced problems concerning the accuracy of data entered into the software application. 
“The software had ‘not flagged for audit’ all polling stations results where the 
margins of error, established by the CEC, were exceeded.”412 This further delayed the 
announcement of the re-count results. Another point of concern for the CRC staff was 
the low quality of re-counts on the first day. Through audit checks the mistakes were 
spotted and corrected, however resources and time were lost. Lastly all results were 
tabulated and audited.  
 
Secrecy413 
The secrecy of the vote is facilitated by certain provisions such as the handling of 
ballots in a polling station, procedures for voting and counting, etc.  
Although Kosovo’s LGE is designed to enable the secrecy of the vote, it is often 
disregarded by the PSC. ENEMO stated in their report that “in almost 5% of polling 
stations visited the observers noted persons instructed voters whom to vote for. […] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 See: ACE Project, Guiding Principles of Vote Counting: 
Accuracy 
“Accuracy is directly related to the integrity of the count, and of the elections themselves. Later 
discovery of errors and correction of mistakes can lead to accusations of manipulation or fraud. The 
accuracy of the count will depend on clear procedures and manuals, adequate staff training, and their 
commitment to the process. Clear audit trails of ballots and ballot boxes, as well as checking and 
rechecking mechanisms, will contribute to the accuracy of the results. Whilst mechanical voting or 
computerization may enhance accuracy, this must be balanced against the resulting apparent loss of 
transparency.” 
412 EU EEM to Kosovo (2010), p.50 
413 See: ACE Project, Guiding Principles of Vote Counting: 
“Secrecy of the vote is important because it ensures that voters cannot be victimized for the way they 
vote, or intimidated into voting a particular way. To preserve the secrecy of the vote, voters' 
identification must be protected during the count. If their identity and choice on the ballot is 
determined as a result of counting procedures, it must be kept confidential and never revealed by any of 
the people involved in the electoral process. If the secrecy of the vote of individuals or a community is 
a concern, measures such as counting at counting centers, rather than at individual voting stations, or 
mixing ballots from different elections, can be considered. Numbered ballot papers corresponding to 
matching stubs with the voter details, while facilitating accountability and clear audit trails, 
compromise secrecy and are best avoided.” 
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The secrecy of the vote was not always respected and in particular, in a stunning 36% 
of polling stations visited cases of group or family voting was observed.”414 Other 
cases where disabled voters were assisted by poll workers or observers in 
contradiction to the LGE415 were reported as well. 
The secrecy of the vote was adhered to in the CRC. In the event of a small number of 
ballots being cast by-Mail or conditionally in a PS, these ballots were batched into a 
bigger sized unit and accounted for in a separate Batch result form. 
 
Timeliness416 
The LGE stipulates that “the results of the counts at the PS shall be posted in the 
polling center by its Chair person”417 and furthermore “the CEC shall certify the 
election results after the completion of all polling station and counting center 
procedures and when all outstanding complaints concerning polling and counting 
have been adjudicated by the ECA[P] and by the Constitutional Court.”418 The time 
required for recounts or repeated elections is additionally taken into consideration by 
the LGE: “Prior to certification of the election results, the CEC may order a recount 
of ballots in any polling station, or counting center, or a repeat of the voting in a 
polling center or municipality.”419 
There is no clear time line for the counting and tabulation of the votes at all levels, 
and for the announcement of preliminary and final results by the EMB. In order to 
fulfill the requirement of giving all political entities the possibility to file a possible 
complaint, election results must be made available in an appropriate format and 
distributed to all parties immediately.420 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 ENEMO (2010), p.14 
415 LGE Art. 89.5  
A voter who is disabled in such a way so as it is not able to mark or cast the ballot and/or illiterate may 
be assisted to vote by another person chosen by the voter if the so request assistance. Such person shall 
only assist one voter and shall not be a member of the PSC or an accredited observer. 
416 See: ACE Project, Guiding Principles of Vote Counting: 
Timeliness 
“Delays in completing the count and in the release of unofficial preliminary results can negatively 
affect the level of integrity and confidence in the voting process. The responsible electoral management 
body should carefully plan all stages of the counting process to facilitate the early announcement of 
results, or at least to realistically assess when results can be announced, taking into consideration the 
communications and transport infrastructure. It is best practice to inform the public if there are time 
delays in the announcement of the results. If the process is slow updates should be given regularly to 
reassure the public that the integrity of the count is being maintained.” 
417 LGE, Art. 102.3 
418 LGE, Art. 106.1 
419 LGE, Art. 106.2 
420 EU EEM Kosovo 2010, p.65 
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Delays of announcing election results can have a highly negative effect for the overall 
process. Tension between political parties regarding the delayed election results arose, 
and the credibility of the election process was undermined. 
The CEC announced the final results for the 12 December 2010 elections on 30 
January 2011 in the evening, fifty days after the elections took place. 
 
Accountability421 
Considering the poor performance at polling station level, the repeated elections in 
four municipalities, as well as some other polling centers, the level of accountability 
for the counting process and the apparent irregularities was very limited. The 
Municipal Election Commissions should have been held accountable for the electoral 
malpractice in addition to all PS Commissions concerned. 
The lack of accountability by political parties regarding allegations of fraud and 
manipulation is an interesting point brought up by a KIPRED publication of Kosovo’s 
national elections 2010. It stated, “Complaints were mostly shifted to single persons 
or groups of people thus alleviating the pressure on the majority of the party. This 
practice needs to change in order to put parties in a position to educate their 
supporters in the tradition of free and fair elections and make them accountable for 
problems.”422 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 See: ACE Project, Guiding Principles of Vote Counting: 
Accountability 
“Clear responsibility and accountability for each stage of the counting process are important. At the 
national level, the electoral management body should be accountable. At the electoral district level, it 
may be a senior election officer or commission official. 
At voting stations, specified voting station officers may be responsible for voting and counting. Clearly 
defined complaints and appeals processes are also important. There should be structures in place with 
the authority and competency to address complaints and appeals. These may include political party 
liaison committees, conflict management and resolution bodies and legal structures. 
Counting rules, including criteria for rejecting ballots, should be clear, agreed upon and known in 
advance, and understood by everyone involved in the election, including election officials, the general 
public, political parties, candidates, non-governmental organizations, and national and international 
electoral observers. Clear audit trails are essential in ensuring accountability. 
The final stage of vote counting is the aggregation of figures for electoral districts. Electoral districts 
are the territorial units for which representatives, in a first-past-the-post system, are elected and where 
votes are added before the electoral formula is to be applied to determine who is elected. If the 
counting centre is smaller than the electoral district, the figures included in the statements of votes for 
each counting unit must be aggregated for all the counting units in the electoral district. 
This operation involves gathering the results from each counting centre, checking whether all 
statements are in, and aggregating the figures included in each statement. Only once the totals are 
available for the electoral district is vote counting over. The next step is applying the electoral formula 
to determine who is elected.” 
422 KIPRED, Kosovo National Elections 2010: Overview and Trends, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Pristina, 
2011, p.26 
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4.12.1. Analytical framework by Elklit and Reynolds 
 
Returning to the analytical framework by Elklit and Reynolds, a more standardized 
model for analyzing free and fair is given. The answers to the questions are taken 
from various official reports available. 
 
8. Polling 
8.1. What is turnout as a percentage of total registration? 
47,5% 
8.2. What is turnout as a percentage of the voting age population? 
Unknown 
8.3. Is there a low level of serious election-related violence? 
No 
8.4. In how many polling stations did polling happen according to rules and regulations. 
Unable to retrace this information. 
8.5. Are there systems in place to preclude and/or rectify fraudulent voting? 
Yes 
8.6. Is polling accessible, secure, and secret? 
Mostly yes 
8.7. If there is substantial desire for election observation, is the desire satisfied? 
Yes 
8.8. If there is substantial desire for political party election observation, is the desire satisfied? 
Yes 
8.9. Are there systems in place to preclude vote buying? 
Reports on offering votes exist. 
8.9. Is the level of intimidation sufficiently low that voters can express their free will? 
Mostly yes 
 
9. Counting and tabulating the vote 
9.1. Is the count conducted with integrity and accuracy? 
No 
9.2. Is the tabulation transparent and an accurate reflection of the polling booth count? 
No 
9.3. Are results easily available to interested members of the general public? 
No 
9.4. Does counting take place with no undue delay? 
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Yes 
9.5. Are parties and candidates allowed to observe the count? 
Mostly yes 
 
10. Resolving election related complaints. Verification of final result and 
certification 
10.1. Are serious complaints accepted for adjudication? 
Yes 
10.2. Is there an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism which operates in an impartial and 
non-partisan manner? 
Yes 
10.3. Are court disputes settled without undue delay? 
Yes 
10.4. Do election observation organizations confirm that the elections were without serious 
problems? 
No 
10.5. If legislation prescribes a timeframe for the constitution of parliament, is this timeframe 
met? 
Yes 
10.6. Is a person with a reasonable case able to pursue that case without unreasonable 
personal and financial risk? 
Unknown. 
10.7. Are seats taken only by those properly elected? 
Yes 
 
Summarizing the findings based on Elklit & Reynolds’ framework, the polling was 
found to be within international standards, whereas the process of counting and 
tabulating the results was not. However, as there are mechanisms to verify the 
election results and appropriate dispute resolution, the irregularities were resolved 
according to the law. 
By extracting a single process out of the electoral cycle, elections cannot be labeled 
‘free and fair’, but it can act as a good indication as to the overall process. In the 
context of Kosovo’s election in 2010 the notion of ‘free’ remained largely untouched 
whereas ‘fair’ and the integrity of the vote was in question.  
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4.13. Problems and recommendations 
 
A small public opinion poll in spring 2011 captured the ambiguity over the electoral 
process in Kosovo.423 It showed the dissatisfaction with the current electoral 
administration and “indicated that 60% of the respondents believe that the electoral 
process is not credible, citizens do not trust the voting system, and some respondents 
believe that votes are manipulated.”424 The findings are alarming. Sarah Birch rightly 
states that “electoral processes have not only to be free and fair, they have to be 
perceived as being free and fair, as this helps to ensure that they are accepted as a 
legitimate and efficacious tool for exercising popular control.425 This point is 
extremely important towards the further assessment of the election process, audit 
criteria and the balance between the integrity of the vote and the time to announce 
results. 
 
Preferential Voting 
The perceived epidemic of abuses with regards to the five preference votes for 
candidates per political entity requires further consideration. It showed a worrying 
trend towards manipulation and a decline in a political culture, as tampering with 
candidate votes in Kosovo’s open list system means violating the integrity of the vote. 
Although the open list system was a renewal of Kosovo’s post-conflict electoral 
system aimed at enhancing a voters choice in choosing candidates directly, the 
political will towards democracy would need to further mature to ensure process 
quality in maintained.  
As such, a more limited version of the open list system is recommended whereby each 
voter is given one (1) preferential vote instead of five (5). This would allow for the 
simplification of the process, and ensure the limitation of possible manipulation.. 
The transposition between the RRF and the CRF per polling station needs 
improvement. The votes for a specific political entity on the RRF need to be 
transmitted on the CRF before the preference votes are counted and the number 
entered on the CRF. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Osmani, Besnik, Electoral Reform in Kosovo (2010-2015), AUK American University of Kosovo, 
2011 
424 ibid, p.9 
425 Birch, Sarah, Conceptualizing Electoral Malpractice, Project on Electoral Malpractice in New and 
Semi-Democracies, University of Essex, UK, p.3, 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/government/electoralmalpractice/, [access: 01/11/2010] 
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Clearly defined procedures must be established for correcting possible technical 
errors on result forms. 
Better training must be established in the counting process and filling in result forms. 
 
Conditional Voting and Voters list 
Conditional balloting is “costly, time consuming and causes delays in the counting 
process.”426 
Twelve years after the conflict, the need for conditional voting is obsolete, as most 
refugees have already returned. Even after numerous election rounds and a complex 
updating process based on the Civil Registry, the list is “known to contain deceased 
persons or persons that have been erroneously included”427, hence leading to a poor 
quality of the Voters list. 
In order to rectify this situation, the appropriate authorities need to update the Voter 
lists according to the last census. Based on the census of April 2011 the resident 
population of Kosovo was estimated to be 1.7 million.428 88% of the population is 
Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serbs are the biggest minority community representing 7% 
of the population, and the remaining 5% are divided between other constitutionally 
recognized minority communities (Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians and 
Turks).429 
For the assembly election in 2010 the Voters list included 1,630,636 eligible voters430. 
This brings the Voters list further into question considering that Kosovo is home to 
one of Europe’s youngest populations, with an average age of 25,9 years.431 
 
Election Administration 
The timeframe of 45 days to prepare for the 2010 elections was deemed by all 
election professionals as extremely short, and identified as one of the greatest 
obstacles towards the efficient running of the election. Nevertheless, it is the EMB’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 ENEMO (2010), p.2 
427 ibid. 
428 Statistical Office Kosovo, Rekos 2011, The total population in Kosovo is 1.733.872. The census 
results include data from 34 municipalities. Due to objective reasons the enumeration could not be 
carried out in the Northern municipalities. 
http://esk.rks-gov.net/rekos2011/?cid=2,1 [access: 11/24/2011] 
429 US Dep.t of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/100931.htm [access: 11/23/2011] 
430 EUSR, Kosovo 2010 Election Watch, http://www.eusrinkosovo.eu/election/more1.html, [access: 
12/12/2011] 
431 Kosovo, the young Europeans, http://www.kosovo-young.com/#, [access: 12/12/2011] 
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task and responsibility to ensure a transparent and qualitative election process. The 
quality of elections is represented in manifold ways: the professionalism of election 
personnel, official statements by the EMB, announcement of preliminary results, 
transparent and timely procedures and processes, etc. 
The problems concerning the lack of publication of credible preliminary and timely 
final results are not solely the responsibility of the CEC. The poor performance of 
PSC, the large number of irregularities and different legal aspects require review and 
improvement. The lack of political will to adhere to procedures and the prevalent 
manipulation of votes is deeply concerning. 
The CEC must take serious steps to ensure an improvement of counting at the polling 
station level, including deterrence measures against PS staff violating procedures and 
enhance training, integrity and impartiality of personnel. 
In order to combat fraud, the CEC needs to establish a “genuine electoral fraud 
control plan” to be “publically available for review [and] will allow election 
administrators to credibly and pro-actively detect, deter, and mitigate electoral 
fraud.”432 
Additionally, the EMB needs to enhance their communications strategy allowing for 
citizens to be kept informed of election status and developments. When the voters are 
given detailed explanations why there are delays, chances are higher to retain the 
integrity of the process. “The implementation of an electoral fraud control plan is a 
clear indicator that the EMB is willing and prepared to honestly assess threats to the 
integrity of the electoral process and ready to take actions to defend its credibility.”433 
 
Involvement and Pressure 
The international community provided essential resources to Kosovo and its elections. 
The donors should communicate clearly and with a single voice demanding that the 
EMB to improve the conditions for a fair electoral process and to establish rules for 
misconduct by electoral staff. 
The EU EEM report additionally recommends (not only for elections but also other 
areas):434 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Darndolf, Staffan, Assessing Electoral Fraud in New Democracies, IFES White Paper, 2011, p.4 
433 ibid. 
434 EU EEM Kosovo, p.62 
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a) urging the relevant underperforming institutions to implement properly their 
legal obligations or 
b) creating technical fixes either to make deviation more difficult or compensate 
for the likelihood that institutions will default on their obligations. 
 
NGOs and civil society should stay engaged in the political process and demand 
accountability by their institutions. Local media is an important mouthpiece to 
demand reform and improvement of the status quo. 
 
4.14. Conclusion 
 
Kosovo remains an unfinished state despite the efforts of the international community 
and the vast amounts of financial and human resources invested. The economic and 
social situation is desperate, high unemployment rates and poverty are dominant and 
the success of EULEX in establishing a solid rule of law, fighting corruption and 
organized crime has been limited. The once aspiring goals set out in the UN 
Resolution 1244 has faced a lack of strategy by the IC and the lack of political culture 
in Kosovo. 
Prospects for further democratization and accession into the European Union remain 
dim, especially with the ongoing global economic crisis and the standstill of EU’s 
position towards Kosovo’s independence. 
 
Kosovo’s first parliamentary elections as an independent state were marred by a series 
of irregularities and fraud. The audit criteria in the CRC were enhanced and 
demonstrated a great absence of political culture by the third tier of the election 
administration towards a democratic election process. The lack of commitment by the 
polling station commissions to adhere to the electoral laws and procedures was the 
biggest obstacle for this election. Additionally, though necessary to maintain the 
accuracy of the vote, the decision on re-counts and re-elections delayed the 
announcement of results, which further damaged the public confidence in the 
electoral process.  
The public needs to be kept informed of delays and the reasons for such. Sarah Birch 
states, “the concept of ‘free and fair’ elections is one we are all familiar with, but 
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analysis of the comparative literature on electoral processes reveals that there is a lack 
of consensus as to the details of what constitutes a good practice in electoral 
administration or what is to be designated poor practice.”435 Based on Kosovo’s 
example, the counting process was poorly conducted and the fraud observed 
concerning. First OSCE, and later IFES, assisted the CRC throughout the ten years 
since the first post-conflict election in Kosovo. The responsibility of local authorities 
has increased, however the development of local capacities remained insufficient. The 
lack of qualified staff remains a key challenge, as well as the ‘brain-drain’ of trained 
personnel looking for better-paid and permanent positions. Traditional patriarchal 
structures impact voting behavior, as family voting can be found throughout Kosovo 
and therefore restrains the free vote of an individual.  
 
Elections are politically and technically challenging undertakings, especially in an 
environment lacking a democratic culture. The origins of poor performance of PSC 
suggest either a lack of integrity or a lack of training and understanding of the 
procedures. While opportunities for fraud will always exist in elections, further 
safeguards need to be established to reduce their probability of occurring. A first step 
should be the establishment of a genuine electoral fraud control plan by a working 
group consisting of members of the CEC, CRC Coordinator, MEC and international 
advisors with experience in fraud deterrence techniques. Preferential voting should be 
limited to one preference vote to enable the system and PSC to further mature 
democratically, while conditional voting should be substituted in its entirety by an 
updated Voter list. Additionally, the EMB must ensure an unbiased staff recruitment 
process, followed by an improved training program and a clearer communication 
strategy with all relevant internal and external groups. Kosovo’s CEC has to prioritize 
the count process as it is one of the key areas where deceptive practices might be 
found. To minimize the possibility of fraud, CEC members and electoral staff alike 
need to commit to the principles of integrity, impartiality and independence. In the 
event of proven misconduct, clear penalties and deterrence mechanisms must be 
established to leave no doubt to the public that systems are in place to hold the 
responsible person accountable, and maintain the overall integrity of the vote.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 
Elections are a prerequisite towards democratization, however they do not equal 
democracy. Rather, without elections there is no democracy. Analyzing newly 
established democracies and democracies in transition will in many cases be 
indecisive due to the nature of their weak democratic political processes, low quality 
of democratic politics and the lack of democratic political culture. Nonetheless, an 
imperfect democracy is a better alternative to war, conflict and a return to an 
authoritarian regime. 
 
The phrase ‘ballots, not bullets’ suggests the importance of elections after a conflict. 
Although elections are key to post-conflict environments, security and the 
establishment of institutions must be prioritized. “Efforts to foster democracy must 
also support an ongoing process of reconciliation among former enemies, security 
sector reforms, law-enforcement and judicial reforms, human-rights monitoring and 
enforcement, strengthening civil society, and a complementary dedication to 
economic development and job creation.”436 Elections and democracy create and 
legitimize political power and make governments accountable for their actions – at 
least for the time elected.437 Samuel Huntington correctly points out that 
“Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, 
irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies 
demanded by the public good. These qualities may make such governments 
undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic.”438 
 
A parallel might be drawn to free and fair elections. Elections can experience a 
number of difficulties and irregularities, but these alone does not make them unfree or 
unfair, as the notion of free and fair acts just as a reference to international standards 
and is not a definition per se. While no electoral process is perfect, free from fraud 
and no electoral system ideal, the international electoral assistance providers have 
nevertheless collected a plethora of experience and an expertise on best practices to 
assist in conducting democratic elections in accordance with international standards. 	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Electoral Assistance programs have become an important instrument for democracy 
promotion and in the broader sense state-building efforts of the development 
community. Electoral Assistance programs designed by Western states might often 
have a simplistic and superficial nature as already noted by Thomas Carothers (1999) 
and Marina Ottoway (2003), just seeking to make technical improvements to electoral 
processes without seeking to understand the structure of power relations that regulates 
elections and accounts for their peculiarities439, but the goal is to improve this 
approach for a specific country and adapt programs accordingly.  
In the case of Kosovo, the integration of additional audit checks was a technical 
enhancement that had two diverging effects. The positive effect was the possibility to 
safeguard the integrity of the vote and retain a voter’s “voice”, and the 
correctness/accuracy of results. The downside of implementing the crosschecks was 
to delay the process of counting and tabulating the results, which had a negative effect 
on the announcement of final results and therefore the confidence of the public. 
 
Elections are both – politically and technically challenging and require efficient 
management and devoted staff. Elections to the executive office have very high 
stakes. Political parties and candidates might be willing to go far to ensure that their 
party or candidate wins or remains in power. 
The political and time pressure for Kosovo’s general elections in 2010 was very high. 
The international community wanted a continuation of talks with Belgrade but due to 
the non-confidence vote in the Kosovo Assembly, the minority government called 
snap-elections within 45 days. The Central Election Commission faced a very short 
time frame to meet the expectations by the EU and other international donors to 
conduct credible elections. Unfortunately the expectations of the development 
community were not met due to the many irregularities and allegations of electoral 
fraud observed in many municipalities. 
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Hypotheses 1: 
Although elections are a core element of democracy promotion and institution 
building efforts of external aid programs in Kosovo, its long-term outcome depends 
heavily on local actors and conditions.  
 
In the course of this study, it was shown that international donors assisted greatly in 
the establishment and organization of the elections from 2000 onwards. Albeit the 
massive support for all aspects of the electoral cycle (from drafting the electoral law, 
establishing an election commission, training of polling station staff, drafting training 
manuals and procedures for voting and counting, preparing the Voter lists, setting up 
the Count and Result Center, establishing political party centers, helping the voter 
information and media related issues, facilitate Serb voting in the north of Kosovo, 
advising on all logistical matters, dispute resolution activities etc.) the past elections 
in Kosovo saw a significant number of irregularities and electoral malpractice, which 
suggests the continuous need for international support. 
Credible elections consist of the accurate execution of electoral procedures and 
relevant skilled staff that is committed to the principles “integrity, impartiality, 
independence, transparency, efficiency and service-mindedness.”440 Unless local 
actors are willing to integrate these ethics into all electoral activities, the electoral 
process will remain insufficiently credible and transparent, risking destabilizing the 
democracy that was established. The conditions for conducting free and fair elections 
are set by electoral rules and regulations, which need to be adhered to and in case of 
changes to the electoral system adapted accordingly. The urgency to work and revise 
certain processes and procedures remains the responsibility of the EMB, the main 
local institution for organizing, planning and holding elections. The Kosovo Election 
Commission and other relevant institutions need to be directly involved in decision-
making processes and need to understand the implications of their decisions. 
Otherwise the quality of further elections in Kosovo might irrecoverable deteriorate. 
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Hypotheses 2: 
Despite the fraud identified by Kosovo’s Count and Result Center and the partial 
election boycott by the Serbian minority, the Kosovo Parliamentary Elections of 2010 
can be deemed free and fair as the integrity of the vote remained intact through the 
recount of ballots and re-election in certain municipalities. 
 
The framework of free and fair elections is wide ranging and allows for a number of 
different approaches and patterns. The necessity to conduct a transparent and accurate 
count in the polling stations is evident best practice. 
Taking into consideration that 40% of all polling stations in Kosovo were recounted 
and four municipalities and some additional polling centers were re-polled, the 
election process would deem free but only partly fair. As all new results were taken 
into account for calculation of the final voter outcome, the voter’s integrity remained 
intact. Therefore the elections can be deemed fair. The process itself however, 
although accounting for the ballots cast by a voter, became non-credible and less 
transparent for observers and citizens.  
Kosovo’s example clearly demonstrates how difficult it is to label elections. Despite 
with the process being free (disregarding single occurrences where voters faced 
intimidation), the notion of fair is highly disputable. Even when the electoral fraud 
was non-outcome determinative, the trust in the process and the results were 
undermined. 
 
The low participation and the partial boycott of the Serbian population in the North is 
another factor to include when judging the last election as being free and fair. An 
absolutely justifiable argument might be, that as long as most of the Serbian electorate 
in Kosovo does not participate in nation-wide elections, free and fair elections are 
impossible and Kosovo’s goal of being democratic far away.  
The answer is open for speculation. As there is no compulsory voting in Kosovo and 
electors are not obliged to vote, the decision of boycotting or deciding in partaking in 
the elections is free. A situation where people are hindered and threatened to go to the 
poll is somehow different. But then again the overall process might be called free, as 
the majority was able to cast a ballot on Election Day. 
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Hypotheses 3: 
Without substantial change to Kosovo’s political culture, the development towards 
democracy will not be possible. 
 
The question of Kosovo’s final status has been the main objective for the government 
and Kosovo’s political parties for a number of years. The focus on the future status 
was seen as precondition for real democracy. The UN Resolution 1244 was based on 
a compromise with Russia and China, without a clear goal or strategy towards an 
independent Kosovo. “This obfuscation hampered the development of a mature 
political elite, deterred foreign investment and inhibited efforts to start interaction 
between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.”441 
 
Returning to democracy theory, Dahl’s classical work Polyarchy in which he defines 
a model of democracy by his two dimensions ‘participation and contestation’ seems 
too narrow to examine Kosovo’s “democracy” comprehensively, as many other 
factors including economy, political culture, state formation, etc. need to be taken into 
account. The question of state boundaries and nation building remains fundamental. 
Berg-Schlosser argues, “If democracy, in a broad and simple sense, means “rule of 
the people”, it first has to decide who the people are and which boundaries should be 
respected. In this sense, state formation and nation building must be considered as 
prerequisites of any meaningful democratization.”442 Held likewise analyses the 
importance of the sovereignty of a nation-state that has not been questioned and was 
taken for granted in democracy theory for a long time. “It has been assumed that the 
state has control over its own fate, subject only to compromises it must make and 
limits imposed by actors, agencies and forces operating within its territorial 
boundaries, and by agents and representatives of other governments and states.”443 
Kosovo’s current status as an ‘unfinished’ state, in addition to the complex 
government structure containing an array of governing (local and international) 
authorities lacks direct accountability to its citizens. While these are important factors 
for democracy, , the practical day-to-day problems for many Kosovars remain 
unemployment and challenging financial conditions. Many families rely on financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Schleicher (2010), p.331 
442 Berg-Schlosser (2004), p.14 
443 Held, (2002, 2nd ed.), p.336 
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help from relatives abroad. The traditional societal and clan structures remain 
embedded into the society, making a democratic transition both institutionally as well 
as socially challenging. Kramer and Dzihic concluded, that participatory democracy 
and a further development of political structures could not be established only by duly 
executed elections. An environment needs to be developed which promotes direct 
involvement in political decision- making. Traditional societal values and an 
authoritarian policy of political leaders is one of the greater obstacles for Kosovo’s 
democratization process.444 
The international intervention in Kosovo has left many footprints and still maintains a 
large presence through EULEX, UNMIK and other organizations. Their success is 
scarce compared to the enormous resources (mis)used in this peacekeeping operation. 
I want to conclude this thesis with the thoughts of David Held, “the fate of a national 
community is largely in its own hands and […] a satisfactory theory of democracy 
can be developed by examining the interplay between ‘actors’ and ‘structures’ in the 
nation-state.”445 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Kramer/Dzihic (2006), p.59 
445 Held (1996), p.335 
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Abstracts 
 
English Abstract 
 
Elections are a key element of the recognition of human rights and are a vital and 
important step in the democratization process by giving the opportunity for political 
participation and representation. This thesis discusses the role of elections in 
democracy and democratization theory, aiming to study the overlap between the 
operational realities in post-conflict elections and a theoretical political science 
framework. Post-conflict and transitional elections can require various forms of 
external support of which electoral assistance is one. Due to the importance of 
conducting free and fair elections, it forms a pivotal component of peace accords and 
marks simultaneously a step towards democracy. Electoral assistance, which enables 
countries to hold free and fair elections, is a valuable source of promoting democracy 
in a broader sense.  
 
Following the Kosovo military intervention in 1999, the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 established the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). One year later, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) initiated the 
election operation as an important tool for the democratization of Kosovo. In 
subsequent years, different areas of responsibility were handed over from the electoral 
assistance providers to local Electoral Management Bodies (EMB). There were two 
main international players involved in Kosovo’s electoral process: OSCE and the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Both organizations were 
involved in assisting the central Count and Result Center (CRC), where the results of 
all polling stations are audited and tabulated. Throughout the ten years since the first 
post-war elections in Kosovo, the international community has played a continuous 
role within the CRC – either by entirely supervising and managing the operation, or 
by acting in an advisory function. Despite the eventual recounting/ re-polling to 
ensure the integrity of the vote, the fraud observed during the 2010 Parliamentary 
Elections proved the difficulty in achieving a sustainable and credible electoral 
process, and specifically “free and fair” elections without the commitment of all 
actors involved.  
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German Abstract 
 
Wahlen sind für die Ausübung der Menschenrechte besonders bedeutungsvoll, da sie 
die Möglichkeit politischer Teilnahme und Repräsentanz bieten, und somit ein 
grundlegender Schritt in einem Demokratisierungsprozess darstellen. Die hier 
vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die Rolle von Wahlen für Demokratie und 
Demokratieförderung hinsichtlich Demokratietheorien, und versucht die operative 
Realität internationaler Wahlassistenz in Nachkriegsregionen in einen 
politikwissenschaftlichen Kontext einzubringen. Nachkriegs- und Übergangswahlen 
können verschiedene Arten von Unterstützung erfordern, wobei technische 
Wahlassistenz eine der Möglichkeiten darstellt. Deren Wichtigkeit liegt in der 
Erreichung und Sicherstellung freier und fairer Wahlen, die oft einen Bestandteil von 
Friedensabkommen darstellen und somit einen Schritt in Richtung Demokratie 
markieren. Wahlassistenz, die ein Land unterstützt, freie und faire Wahlen 
abzuhalten, ist ein wertvoller Ausgangpunkt zur Demokratieförderung im weiteren 
Sinne.  
 
Nach der militärischen Intervention im Jahre 1999 erhielt die Mission der Vereinten 
Nationen in Kosovo (UNMIK) das Mandat zur Schaffung einer zivilen 
Übergangsverwaltung durch die Sicherheitsresolution 1244. Ein Jahr später begann 
die OSZE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) mit der Organisation und Durchführung der 
Wahlen als einen wichtigen Bestandteil der Demokratisierung Kosovos. In den 
darauffolgenden Jahren wurden die Verantwortlichkeiten Schritt für Schritt von der 
OSZE an die lokalen Wahlführungsgremien übergeben. Die internationalen 
Hauptakteure im Wahlbereich waren die OSZE und die International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (IFES). Beide Organisationen waren im zentralen Count and Result 
Center (CRC) eingebunden. Im CRC werden die Resultate aller Wahlstationen 
zusammengefasst und auf ihre mathematische Richtigkeit geprüft. Seit den ersten 
Wahlen in Kosovo vor zehn Jahren, war die internationale Gemeinschaft durchgehend 
im CRC eingebunden, entweder in einer leitenden oder zumindest beratenden 
Funktion. Die Parlamentswahlen in 2010 waren gespickt von Unregelmäßigkeiten 
und Wahlbetrug. Obwohl es aufgrund dessen zu einer Neuauszählung von Stimmen 
und Nachwahlen gekommen ist um die Integrität der Wahlstimme zu wahren, hat dies 
deutlich gezeigt, wie schwer es ist, einen nachhaltigen und glaubhaften Wahlprozess 
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zu erzielen. Ohne der Verpflichtung zu einem demokratischen Prozess aller 
beteiligten Akteure, sind freie und faire Wahlen nicht möglich. 	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Annex 
 
Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections446 
 
Unanimously adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 154th session (Paris, 
26 March 1994) 
 
The Inter-Parliamentary Council, 
 
Reaffirming the significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which establish that the authority 
to govern shall be based on the will of the people as expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections, 
 
Acknowledging and endorsing the fundamental principles relating to periodic free and 
fair elections that have been recognized by States in universal and regional human 
rights instruments, including the right of everyone to take part in the government of 
his or her country directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives, to vote 
in such elections by secret ballot, to have an equal opportunity to become a candidate 
for election, and to put forward his or her political views, individually or in 
association with others, 
 
Conscious of the fact that each State has the sovereign right, in accordance with the 
will of its people, freely to choose and develop its own political, social, economic and 
cultural systems without interference by other States in strict conformity with the 
United Nations Charter, 
 
Wishing to promote the establishment of democratic, pluralist systems of 
representative government throughout the world, 
 
Recognizing that the establishment and strengthening of democratic processes and 
institutions is the common responsibility of governments, the electorate and organized 
political forces, that periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable 
element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the governed and 
that, as a matter of practical experience, the right of everyone to take part in the 
government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
 
Welcoming the expanding role of the United Nations, the Inter- Parliamentary Union, 
regional organizations and parliamentary assemblies, and international and national 
non-governmental organizations in providing electoral assistance at the request of 
governments, 
 
Therefore adopts the following Declaration on Free and fair Elections, and urges 
Governments and Parliaments throughout the world to be guided by the principles and 
standards set out therein: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm [access: 02/02/2011] 
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1. Free and Fair Elections 
 
In any State the authority of the government can only derive from the will of the 
people as expressed in genuine, free and fair elections held at regular intervals on the 
basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage. 
 
2. Voting and Elections Rights 
 
(1) Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections, on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 
 
(2) Every adult citizen has the right to access to an effective, impartial and non-
discriminatory procedure for the registration of voters. 
 
(3) No eligible citizen shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from 
registration as a voter, otherwise than in accordance with objectively verifiable 
criteria prescribed by law, and provided that such measures are consistent with the 
State’s obligations under international law. 
 
(4) Every individual who is denied the right to vote or to be registered as a voter shall 
be entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review such decisions and to 
correct errors promptly and effectively. 
 
(5) Every voter has the right to equal and effective access to a polling station in order 
to exercise his or her right to vote. 
 
(6) Every voter is entitled to exercise his or her right equally with others and to have 
his or her vote accorded equivalent weight to that of others. 
 
(7) The right to vote in secret is absolute and shall not be restricted in any manner 
whatsoever. 
 
3. Candidature, Party and Campaign Rights and Responsibilities 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country and shall 
have an equal opportunity to become a candidate for election. The criteria for 
participation in government shall be determined in accordance with national 
constitutions and laws and shall not be inconsistent with the State’s international 
obligations. 
 
(2) Everyone has the right to join, or together with others to establish, a political party 
or organization for the purpose of competing in an election. 
 
(3) Everyone individually and together with others has the right : 
• To express political opinions without interference; 
• To seek, receive and impart information and to make an informed choice; 
• To move freely within the country in order to campaign for election; 
• To campaign on an equal basis with other political parties, including the party 
forming the existing government. 
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(4) Every candidate for election and every political party shall have an equal 
opportunity of access to the media, particularly the mass communications media, in 
order to put forward their political views. 
(5) The right of candidates to security with respect to their lives and property shall be 
recognized and protected. 
 
(6) Every individual and every political party has the right to the protection of the law 
and to a remedy for violation of political and electoral rights. 
 
(7) The above rights may only be subject to such restrictions of an exceptional nature 
which are in accordance with law and reasonably necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public order (ordre public), the protection of 
public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and 
provided they are consistent with States’ obligations under international law. 
Permissible restrictions on candidature, the creation and activity of political parties 
and campaign rights shall not be applied so as to violate the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
(8) Every individual or political party whose candidature, party or campaign rights are 
denied or restricted shall be entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review 
such decisions and to correct errors promptly and effectively. 
 
(9) Candidature, party and campaign rights carry responsibilities to the community. In 
particular, no candidate or political party shall engage in violence. 
 
(10) Every candidate and political party competing in an election shall respect the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
(11) Every candidate and political party competing in an election shall accept the 
outcome of a free and fair election. 
 
4. The Rights and Responsibilities of States 
 
(1) States should take the necessary legislative steps and other measures, in 
accordance with their constitutional processes, to guarantee the rights and institutional 
framework for periodic and genuine, free and fair elections, in accordance with their 
obligations under international law. In particular, States should: 
• Establish an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for the 
registration of voters; 
• Establish clear criteria for the registration of voters, such as age, citizenship and 
residence, and ensure that such provisions are applied without distinction of any kind; 
• Provide for the formation and free functioning of political parties, possibly regulate 
the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns, ensure the separation of party 
and State, and establish the conditions for competition in legislative elections on an 
equitable basis; 
• Initiate or facilitate national programmes of civic education, to ensure that the 
population are familiar with election procedures and issues; 
 
(2) In addition, States should take the necessary policy and institutional steps to 
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ensure the progressive achievement and consolidation of democratic goals, including 
through the establishment of a neutral, impartial or balanced mechanism for the 
management of elections. In so doing, they should, among other matters: 
• Ensure that those responsible for the various aspects of the election are trained and 
act impartially, and that coherent voting procedures are established and made known 
to the voting public; 
• Ensure the registration of voters, updating of electoral rolls and balloting 
procedures, with the assistance of national and international observers as appropriate; 
• Encourage parties, candidates and the media to accept and adopt a Code of Conduct 
to govern the election campaign and the polling period; 
• Ensure the integrity of the ballot through appropriate measures to prevent multiple 
voting or voting by those not entitled thereto; 
• Ensure the integrity of the process for counting votes. 
 
(3) States shall respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within their 
territory and subject to their jurisdiction. In time of elections, the State and its organs 
should therefore ensure: 
• That freedom of movement, assembly, association and expression are respected, 
particularly in the context of political rallies and meetings; 
• That parties and candidates are free to communicate their views to the electorate, 
and that they enjoy equality of access to State and public-service media; 
• That the necessary steps are taken to guarantee non- partisan coverage in State and 
public-service media. 
 
(4) In order that elections shall be fair, States should take the necessary measures to 
ensure that parties and candidates enjoy reasonable opportunities to present their 
electoral platform. 
 
(5) States should take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that the 
principle of the secret ballot is respected, and that voters are able to cast their ballots 
freely, without fear or intimidation. 
 
(6) Furthermore, State authorities should ensure that the ballot is conducted so as to 
avoid fraud or other illegality, that the security and the integrity of the process is 
maintained, and that ballot counting is undertaken by trained personnel, subject to 
monitoring and/or impartial verification. 
 
(7) States should take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure the 
transparency of the entire electoral process including, for example, through the 
presence of party agents and duly accredited observers. 
 
(8) States should take the necessary measures to ensure that parties, candidates and 
supporters enjoy equal security, and that State authorities take the necessary steps to 
prevent electoral violence. 
 
(9) States should ensure that violations of human rights and complaints relating to the 
electoral process are determined promptly within the timeframe of the electoral 
process and effectively by an independent and impartial authority, such as an electoral 
commission or the courts. 
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Table 1: Areas of international electoral assistance447 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Reilly, ACE Project, p.8 
	   153	  
Election Stages of Election Administration (Robert A. Pastor)448 
A. Pre-Election Stage 
(1) Designing a system to appoint registration and election officials and then 
training them; 
(2) Delineation of the boundaries of voting areas; 
(3) Designing a voter registration system, establishing voting sites, and 
notifying the voters; 
(4) Registering voters on-site or at home and aggregating a voter’s list at the 
national and local levels; 
(5) Publishing and distributing a preliminary list to allow voters and parties an 
opportunity to review and correct the list, adding, deleting, or modifying 
data or the voting sites; 
(6) Collecting information on voters and processing the data into voter 
identification cards; 
(7) Finalizing the registration list and sending a copies to the regions and the 
voting sites; 
(8) Distributing voter identification cards (sometimes at the same place as 
registration and voting) and assuring that they are received by the rights 
people; 
(9) Registering and qualifying political parties and candidates; 
(10) Establishing and enforcing rules on campaigning, access to the media, 
and financing; 
(11) Ensuring security of the voters, the candidates, and the polling stations; 
(12) Developing rules for the proper observation of elections by domestic 
and international modalities and giving credentials to them; 
(13) Production of election materials; printing and securing the ballot; 
delivery of the election materials to designated sites; 
 
B. Election Day 
(14) Polling officials should set up their booth and verify receipt of the 
materials in the presence of monitors before the polling officially begins; 
(15) Polling officials should open the ballot boxes in the presence of voters, 
then close, and seal them, and begin the voting; 
(16)  Polling officials should certify that voters are on the registration list 
and that they vote privately and in accordance with the procedures (often 
including dipping one’s finger in ink to preclude multiple voting); 
(17) Election officials should monitor the voting of all sites during the day 
and have a quick-reaction teams ready to distribute election materials and 
resolve problems during the day; 
(18) Ballots should be counted in the open, preferably at each site and in the 
presence of monitors for all major political parties or the public; other 
procedures for identifying, counting, and organizing blank or invalid 
ballots should be followed; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 Pastor, Robert A., The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for 
Policy and Research, in: Democratization, Vol.6, No.4, 1999, pp.1-27, p.8ff 
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(19) Tally sheet should be jointly signed by all the poll-watchers, and 
results should be delivered to sub-regional offices and the national election 
commission as expeditiously as possible; 
(20) At the national election commission, results should be announced as 
they arrive, but precautions are needed to avoid double-counting; 
 
C. Post-Election Verification and Dispute Settlement 
(21) Electoral Tribunal or appropriate body should investigate and 
adjudicate complaints; 
(22) Electoral Commission, or designated body, should verify the final 
count and certify the final results. 
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Table 2: Election assessment steps and performance indicators (Elklit & Reynolds) 
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Table 3: Count and Result Center Audit Crosschecks (RRF, CRF, BRF, BCRF) 
 
Audit Crosschecks 
RRF Internal Checks 
Box Logic Tolerance Notes 
9 Box 9 = Box 5 – Box 8 +/- 3 Box 5 is the Number of FVL Signatures; Box 8 
is the Number of Regular Ballots 
9d Box 9d = Box 5d – Box 8d +/- 3 Box 5d is the Number of CVL Signatures; Box 
8d is the Number of Conditional Ballot 
Envelopes 
10 SUM(Party Votes) = Box 
10 
0 Box 10 is SUM of Valid Ballots for all Parties 
13 Box 13 = Box 10 0 Box 13 is the Number of Valid Ballots 
14 Box 14 = Box 11 + Box 12 
+ Box 13 
0 Box 11 is the Number of Blank Ballots; Box 
12 is the Number of Invalid Ballots; Box 13 is 
the Number of Valid Ballots 
15 Box 15 = Box 8 – Box 14 +/- 3 Box 15 is Box 8 minus Box 14; Box 8 is the 
Number of Regular Ballots; Box 14 is the 
SUM of Boxes 11, 12, and 13 (detailed above) 
16 Box 16 = Box 6 0 Box 6 is the Number of Unused Ballots 
17 Box 17 = Box 7 0 Box 7 is the Number of Spoiled Ballots;  
18 Box 18 = Box 8 0 Box 8 is the Number of Regular Ballots 
19 Box 19 = Box 8d 0 Box 8d is the Number of Conditional Ballot 
Envelopes 
20 Box 20 = Box 16 + Box 17 
+ Box 18 + Box 19 
+/- 3 Box 20 is the SUM of Boxes 16, 17, 18, and 19 
21 Box 21 = Box 3 – Box 20 +/- 3 Box 3 is the number of Received Ballots; Box 
20 is the SUM of Boxes 16, 17, 18, and 19 
 
CRF/BCRF Internal Checks 
Box Logic Tolerance Notes 
 SUM(Candidate Votes) ≤ 
Candidate’s Party 
0 No candidate can have more votes than their 
party. 
 SUM(All Candidate Votes) ≤ 
((Candidate’s Party) x 5) 
0 Per party, the total sum of all candidate votes 
cannot exceed their party’s votes times five. 
 
RRF and CRF/BCRF Cross Checks  
The following checks can only be ran after both the RRF and CRF are entered. The CRF and RRF will 
travel together and the RRF should (but will not always be) entered before the CRF. 
Box Logic Tolerance Notes 
 RRF(Party Totals) = 
CRF(Party Totals) 
0 No candidate can have more votes than their 
party. 
 SUM(All Candidate Votes) 
≤ ((Candidate’s Party) x 5) 
0 Per party, the total sum of all candidate votes 
cannot exceed their party’s votes times five. 
 When a Party has votes on 
the RRF, but no Candidate 
from that Party has votes on 
the corresponding CRF, a 
flag should be set. 
N/A A page/report listing all Polling Stations, and 
the specific Party, where this occurs needs to 
be added to the Auditors screens. This should 
not set/trigger an Audit but will be used for 
informational purposes so that CRC can size 
the problem and CRC can advise CEC as to the 
magnitude of the problem. CEC may then 
choose to audit/investigate some or all of these. 
 
Note: CRC administrators will need the ability to adjust tolerance levels from 0 to having a tolerance, 
from having a tolerance to having a 0 tolerance, and from having a tolerance to having a different 
tolerance. Preferably, this should be done via an administrative screen instead of manually. When 
tolerances are adjusted, the internal and crosschecks will need to be re-ran and audit flags (green, 
orange, red) should be set accordingly. 
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